Emory International Law Review
Volume 27

Issue 1

2013

Contextualizing Military Necessity
Nobuo Hayashi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 189 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol27/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY NECESSITY
Nobuo Hayashi∗
ABSTRACT
Modern theories correctly reject the Kriegsräson doctrine, according to
which the laws of war do not override the necessities of war and it is rather the
latter that override the former. One such theory holds that unqualified rules of
international humanitarian law (“IHL”) exclude military necessity being
invoked de novo as a ground for deviation therefrom, yet not as a ground for
additional restraint thereon. This theory—let us call it “counterKriegsräson”—is unacceptable for two reasons. First, in none of the three
pertinent contexts does military necessity restrict or prohibit militarily
unnecessary conduct per se. Seen in a strictly material context of war-fighting,
military necessity merely embodies a truism that it is in one’s strategic selfinterest to pursue what is materially conducive to success and that it is
similarly in one’s strategic self-interest to avoid what is not so conducive. Nor,
in the context of IHL norm-creation, does military necessity give the law
reason to forbid or limit given conduct. Unnecessary evil does, but
unnecessary simpliciter does not, mean illegitimate. In positive international
humanitarian law, military necessity functions exclusively as an exceptional
clause. If not, or no longer, militarily necessary, deviant conduct simply
reverts to being governed by the principal rule. It is the principal rule, rather
than the military non-necessity of the conduct or the now inoperative
exceptional clause, that renders such conduct unlawful. The second reason for
which counter-Kriegsräson is untenable is the same reason for which
Kriegsräson is untenable. Positive international humanitarian law has already
“accounted for” military necessity. This means that no relevant element of
military necessity has survived the process of IHL norm-creation and may
consequently be invoked de novo vis-à-vis unqualified rules once this process
has validly posited them. Where given conduct is unlawful according to a
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validly posited IHL rule of an unqualified character, then, even if the conduct
constitutes material military necessity, invoking it does not “repair” or
“right” the conduct’s unlawfulness. Conversely, where given conduct is
unqualifiedly lawful according to the applicable rule of positive international
humanitarian law, the conduct’s lack of material military necessity does not
“wrong” or “vitiate” its otherwise conclusive lawfulness.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea that international humanitarian law (“IHL”) has been developed
with a view to striking a realistic and meaningful balance between military
necessity and humanity finds support in several treaty provisions1 as well as
numerous scholarly writings.2 In particular, it is often stressed that the law
accounts for military necessity.3
1 See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS) 95, 95–
96 (1907) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]; see also Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV]; INST.
OF INT’L LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 29, 31 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiří
Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 2004) [hereinafter OXFORD MANUAL].
2 See, e.g., INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 394 (2d ed. 2000); THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE
LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN) 12–13 (1908); CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS [ICRC], COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 392–93 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); Eyal Benvenisti, Human
Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 81 (2006); Geoffrey Best, The
Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 3, 5 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991); N.C.H. Dunbar, The
Significance of Military Necessity in the Law of War, 67 JURID. REV. 201, 212 (1955); Christopher
Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 1, 37 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence:
A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 49, 53 (1994); Michael N. Schmitt, Military
Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L
L. 795, 798 (2010).
3 See, e.g., NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (2008); FRÉDÉRIC DE
MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES § 353 (1987); PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2,
at 393; A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 4 (2d ed. 2004) (1996); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 269 (2010); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE
JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT §§ 2.3, 16.44, at 23, 444 (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3–4 (1956); G.I.A.D. Draper, Military Necessity and Humanitarian
Imperatives, 12 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 129, 142 (1973); Greenwood, supra note 2, at 38; In re von Lewinski
(called von Manstein), in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES YEAR 1949,
at 509, 512 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1955) [hereinafter von Manstein]; Schmitt, supra note 2, at 801, n.19 (quoting
Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual (unpublished draft) (“Military necessity was weighed by nations as each
express prohibition was promulgated, and again at the time each State Party ratified or acceded to each
treaty.”)).
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It was once asserted, controversially, that the laws of war do not override
the necessities of war, and that it is rather the necessities of war that override
the laws of war (“Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier”).4 Kriegsräson, as this
doctrine has come to be known, is now thoroughly discredited and considered
obsolete.5 In its place came a widely shared position according to which
positive international humanitarian law admits no military necessity pleas in
defense of delinquent conduct except where the law itself expressly envisions
the admissibility of such pleas.
Some authorities take the matter further. According to one theory, the mere
absence of military necessity renders even otherwise lawful belligerent conduct
unlawful. It will be shown that this theory⎯let us call it “counterKriegsräson”⎯is untenable for two reasons. To begin with, a given act’s lack
of military necessity does not per se imply that international humanitarian law
has reason to prohibit or restrict it. Moreover, with the law having accounted
for military necessity, none of its relevant elements, whatever their
characteristics, have survived the process of IHL norm-creation. It follows that
there is no basis for military necessity to operate as an additional layer of
restraint on belligerent conduct over and above that imposed by validly posited
IHL rules.
This Article begins with an overview of the three distinct contexts in which
military necessity appears: material, normative, and juridical. Within a strictly
material context, military necessity is essentially an amoral notion that merely
separates competent fighting from incompetent fighting. To say that “X1-ing is
militarily necessary to such and such degrees” is simply to signify that X1-ing
conduces towards the materialization of a given military end to such and such
degrees. Conversely, to say that “X2-ing is militarily unnecessary to such and
such degrees” is to signify that X2-ing does not so conduce to such and such
degrees. Thus understood, “material” military necessity embodies a two-fold
truism. First, it is in one’s strictly strategic self-interest to perform an act to the
extent that it is materially conducive to success. Second, it is similarly in one’s
strictly strategic self-interest to forbear an act to the extent that it is not so
conducive.
Within the context of IHL norm-creation, military necessity is one of the
elements that modify the legitimacy of those kinds of belligerent conduct that

4
5

Schmitt, supra note 2, at 796.
See id. at 797.
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inflict evil.6 Thus, while not everything done for a legitimate end that is a
necessary evil may itself be legitimate, an evil that is unnecessary is invariably
illegitimate. Military necessity is not an element in the legitimacy modification
of every kind of belligerent conduct, however. Plainly, where the conduct
entails no evil, its legitimacy or illegitimacy does not depend on whether it is
materially necessary or unnecessary for the accomplishment of its end.
“Normative” military necessity does not sanction the idea that unnecessary
simpliciter means illegitimate.
Within the strictly juridical context of validly posited IHL rules, military
necessity functions exclusively as an exceptional clause. It exempts a measure
from certain validly posited IHL rules principally prescribing contrary action.
Where the deviant conduct is not, or no longer, in accordance with juridical
military necessity, it ceases to be excepted and reverts to being governed by
the principal prescriptions. It is these prescriptions, of which the deviant
conduct in question is now an unexcepted instance, that render it unlawful. The
conduct’s unlawfulness emanates neither from its lack of military necessity
nor from the now inoperative exceptional military necessity clause.
Both Kriegsräson and counter-Kriegsräson are, in effect, matters of
military necessity being invoked de novo vis-à-vis unqualified IHL rules. Their
invocability is therefore a contextual question⎯and that of juridical military
necessity in particular. Kriegsräson is unacceptable because it purports to
justify all conduct that constitutes a material military necessity even where it is
already outlawed under positive IHL. Rejecting Kriegsräson amounts to
rejecting the idea that given conduct’s material military necessity somehow
“rights” or “repairs” its unlawfulness that would otherwise be unqualifiedly
established by validly posited IHL rules. Nor is there any basis for suggesting
a contrario that all conduct that is militarily unnecessary is unlawful according
to positive IHL, even when the former contravenes none of the latter’s rules.
This view would commit its adherents to a strange position whereby given
conduct’s material military non-necessity somehow “wrongs” or “vitiates” its
lawfulness that would otherwise be left unqualifiedly intact by positive IHL.
Kriegsräson and counter-Kriegsräson are both predicated on the erroneous
notion that the law does not fully account for military necessity. On this view,
the process of IHL norm-creation has left some element of military necessity
unaccounted for, and it is this element that now floats freely over validly
6 Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and
International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 39, 41 (2010).
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posited IHL rules. The only difference between Kriegsräson and counterKriegsräson is that this free-floating element of military necessity has a
permissive attribute for the former, while it has a prohibitive one for the latter.
I. “MATERIAL” MILITARY NECESSITY: MILITARY NECESSITY IN A STRICTLY
MATERIAL CONTEXT
A. Military Necessity as a Matter of Amoral, Vocational Competence
Material military necessity denotes a given course of action required for the
accomplishment of a particular military goal.7 Acting in accordance with
material military necessity essentially means doing three things under the
prevailing circumstances. First, the actor desires a military outcome, Y.
Second, he or she identifies a range of realistically available courses of
action—e.g., X1-ing, X2-ing, and X3-ing—each having reasonable chances of
generating Y. Third, he or she chooses and pursues one option, e.g., X1-ing, that
is superior to the other options on the strength of its chances and resource
efficiency.8 Here, X1-ing, X2-ing, and X3-ing enjoy various degrees of military
necessity, depending on their relative conduciveness vis-à-vis Y’s
materialization and their relative efficiency given the circumstances. The more
conducive X1-ing is to Y’s materialization and the more efficient it is in view of
the circumstances, the more of a material military necessity X1-ing is than X2ing and X3-ing.
Thus understood, material military necessity is a function of the ends
sought, the means chosen, and the circumstances prevailing at the time. It is a
situation-specific and relational notion that does not involve any requirement
of causation sine qua non. Just as there can be material military necessities,
there can be material military non-necessities. Pursuing material military
necessities and avoiding material military non-necessities is an amoral
component of a soldier’s vocational competence that separates belligerent
conduct that is effective from that which is not.

7

See, e.g., PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 75 (Edward
Markee & Susan Mutti trans., 1992) (“In its wider sense, military necessity means doing what is necessary to
achieve war aims.” (emphasis omitted)).
8 It is not inconceivable that the available options have such limited chances of success, or that they are
so inefficient resource-wide, or both, under the circumstances prevailing at the time, that there is no rational
alternative to taking no action at all vis-à-vis the desired outcome.

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

196

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

1. Purpose, Conduct, and Circumstance
An ancient Benedictine abbey stands atop Monte Cassino in southern Italy.
During World War II, Adolf Hitler ordered the hill incorporated into the
defensive complex of the Gustav Line against the Allied advance from the
south.9 Monte Cassino was situated at the mouth of the Liri Valley with a
commanding view of all approaches to the valley.10 The valley provided the
most direct gateway to Rome.11 An entry into it became urgent for the Allied
forces in view of the protracted battle at the Anzio beachhead, another strategic
point for the purposes of weakening the Gustav Line.12 The task of opening a
Liri Valley entrance fell on forces under the command of Lieutenant General
Sir Bernard Freyberg.13
In January 1944, Allied commanders were instructed to make every effort
to avoid damage to the abbey.14 This, however, was subject to a proviso added
by the headquarters of General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander to the effect that
“[c]onsideration for the safety of such areas will not be allowed to interfere
with military necessity.”15 On February 9, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark
authorized Freyberg “to fire against the monastery if in Freyberg’s judgment
military necessity dictated this action.”16 Major General F.S. Tuker, Freyberg’s
subordinate charged with weakening the Gustav Line at the Liri valley,
determined that the abbey had to be destroyed.17 When requesting an aerial
bombardment, Freyberg stated that Tuker “who is making the attack feels that
it is an essential target and I thoroughly agree with him.”18

9 MARTIN BLUMENSON, THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS: SALERNO TO CASSINO 155,
311 (1969).
10 See id. at 403.
11 See id. at 226.
12 See id. at 353, 385–96, 401.
13 See id. at 401–02. General Freyberg was in command of the provisional New Zealand Corps with the
2nd New Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions under its control at the time. See id.
14 See id. at 398.
15 Id. at 398–99 (footnote omitted). General Alexander was the commander of the 15th Army Group at
the time. See id. at 34.
16 Id. at 403 (footnote omitted). General Clark was the commander of the U.S. Fifth Army at the time.
See id. at 28.
17 See id. at 403 (“The commander of the 4th Indian Division, Maj. Gen. F. S. Tuker, after studying the
problem of how to break the Gustav Line in the Cassino area, had no doubt that the monastery was a real
obstacle to progress . . . . Since the monastery commanded all the approaches to the Liri valley, Tuker decided
it had to be destroyed before he could attack. He requested his corps commander, General Freyberg, to arrange
for an air bombardment.” (footnote omitted)).
18 See id. at 404.
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Clark was of the opinion that the abbey’s destruction was unwarranted.19
He believed “that no military necessity existed, that a bombardment would
endanger the lives of civilian refugees in the building, and that bombardment
would probably fail to destroy the abbey and would be more than likely to
enhance its value as a fortification.”20 Major General Alfred M. Gruenther,
Clark’s Chief of Staff, was told that Alexander had faith in Freyberg’s
judgment and that “[i]f there is any reasonable probability that the building is
used for military purposes . . . its destruction is warranted.”21 Gruenther also
informed Freyberg of Clark’s view on the matter. One account of Freyberg’s
reply states:
General Freyberg said he had gone into the matter thoroughly with
[Tuker], who was quite convinced that bombing the monastery was
necessary. Freyberg added that he thought it was not “sound to give
an order to capture Monastery Hill and at the same time deny the
commander the right to remove an important obstacle to the success
of this mission.” A higher commander who refused to authorize the
bombing, Freyberg warned, would have to take the responsibility if
the attack failed. Gruenther said that Clark was ready to authorize the
bombing if Freyberg considered it a military necessity. According to
Gruenther’s record, General Freyberg then said that “it was his
22
considered opinion that it is a military necessity.”

An aerial bombardment was scheduled on February 13 and, after a delay,
initiated two days later.23 Almost six hundred tons of high-explosive virtually
demolished the monastery.24 The abbey’s destruction did not bring about the
hill’s capture, however.25 It took the Allied forces another three months to

19

See id.
Id. at 405–06.
21 Id. at 405.
22 Id. at 406.
23 See id. at 406–07, 409.
24 See id. at 411.
25 See id. at 417 (“As General Clark had foreseen, the bombardment of the abbey had failed to break the
Gustav Line at its critical point. Not only the major bombing on 15 February, but the relatively heavy
bombings on successive days, which had further reduced the monastery, failed to dislodge the stubborn and
skillful troops in well-nigh perfect defensive positions. The ground and air commands in the theater were
profoundly disappointed. Had the ground forces been unable to take advantage of the bombardment? Or were
the bombers incapable of eradicating tactical positions and therefore useless for direct support of ground
attack? No one seemed to know…. In the final analysis, no one had been altogether certain what the
bombardment was supposed to accomplish except to flatten the abbey. The escalation of the air effort from a
relatively modest attack to an overwhelming strike had achieved nothing beyond destruction, indignation,
sorrow, and regret.”).
20
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break through the Gustav Line on the Liri Valley (May 15th)26 and to capture
Monte Cassino and its abbey (May 18th).27
Freyberg identified destroying the monastery as the conduct and capturing
Monastery Hill as its purpose.28 The circumstances surrounding the conduct
and purpose included the abbey’s structure, the hill’s topography, weather
conditions, weapons and communications equipment available, and so on.29 In
the event, the particularly thick outer walls of the abbey had “resisted the blasts
and although breaches appeared none of them reached the ground level.”30
This, combined with unintegrated employment of airpower, “did nothing to
lighten the task of the infantry, which was unable to take advantage of the
confusion and destruction by staging a correlated attack.”31
Whether the attack on the abbey did or did not constitute a material military
necessity was hotly debated.32 It is reasonable to assume that Freyberg and
Tuker were professionally competent soldiers and found in good faith that the
abbey’s destruction was a material military necessity. It is also reasonable to
assume, however, that Clark and the others were similarly competent soldiers
who came to different conclusions in good faith.33 Opinions of other persons
associated with the Allied action were also divided.34 The Germans’ suspected
use of the abbey for military purposes exacerbated the situation.35
26

ERNEST F. FISHER, JR., THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

OF

OPERATIONS: CASSINO

TO THE

ALPS 77

(1977).
27

Id. at 78.
See discussion supra notes 23–27.
29 See BLUMENSON, supra note 9, at 402–03, 408.
30 Nigel de Lee, Moral Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 129, 135 (2005)
(quoting G.R. STEVENS, THE FOURTH INDIAN DIVISION 286 (1950)).
31 Id. at 135 (quoting STEVENS, supra note 30, at 286).
32 See BLUMENSON, supra note 9, at 405–06.
33 There were other skeptics too, such as Major General Geoffrey Keyes, Major General Charles W.
Ryder, and Colonel Mark M. Boatner. See BLUMENSON, supra note 9, at 405, 407.
34 Major General Fred L. Walker noted: “This was a valuable historical monument, which should have
been preserved. The Germans were not using it and I can see no advantage in destroying it. No tactical
advantage will result since the Germans can make as much use of the rubble for observation posts and gun
positions as of the building itself. Whether the Germans used the building for an observation post or for
emplacements makes little difference since the mountain top on which the building stands can serve the same
purpose.” Id. at 413 (footnote omitted). According to Blumenson, “In response [to a protest from the Vatican],
President Roosevelt stated that he had issued instructions to prevent the destruction of historic monuments
except in cases of military necessity. The bombardment, he said, had been unfortunate but necessary.” Id. at
415–16.
35 The German forces undertook to ensure respect for the abbey itself despite the fact that their
commander, Henrich von Vietinghoff, acknowledged that the monastery had “good observation posts” and
“good positions of concealment.” See id. at 400. Initially, some Allied commanders received intelligence to the
28

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY NECESSITY

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

199

To complicate the matter further, an act can be of different degrees of
military necessity or non-necessity vis-à-vis its goal. All else being equal, one
course of action can be more or less militarily necessary than another by virtue
of their relative conduciveness vis-à-vis a given purpose. In view of Monte
Cassino’s capture as the Allied objective, destroying the abbey first and then
advancing the infantry was arguably more militarily necessary than advancing
the infantry without first destroying the abbey would have been. In addition, all
else being equal, a given course of action can be more or less militarily
necessary relative to one purpose than to another. For instance, destroying the
abbey was arguably more militarily necessary vis-à-vis capturing the hill than
it would have been vis-à-vis drawing the German strength away from Anzio.36
Moreover, all else being equal, a given course of action can be more or less
militarily necessary in relation to a given purpose in one set of circumstances
than in another. Thus, destroying the abbey was arguably more militarily
necessary for capturing the hill given the abbey’s topographic dominance over
the hill than, say, if it had not had such dominance.37

effect that the Germans used the abbey. See id. at 408. Others disagreed, however, and later confirmed that the
information was not accurate. See id. at 413–14.
36 See de Lee, supra note 30, at 133 (“The Higher Command seemed to be losing sight of the object of
operations . . . the object was not necessarily to attack and capture the Monte Cassino features. The object was
to menace the enemy’s position on the Gustav line as to induce him to withdraw from the Anzio front
sufficient forces to preclude his exerting any sort of decisive pressure there . . . . There were two quite
reasonable operations in that region that could be undertaken which would threaten the safety of the Monte
Cassino feature sufficiently to draw Axis reinforcements.” (quoting Letter from Sir Francis Tuker, Lieutenant
Gen. in the British Army, to Major Gen. Henry “Taffy” Davies (May 26, 1965) (on file with Colonel G.
Shakespear)); see also Reuben E. Brigety II, Moral Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino, 4 J. MIL.
ETHICS 139, 140 (2005) (“[O]ne might morally fault the Allied commanders not for their professional
incompetence in the conduct of the assault, but for their lack of strategic imagination in assigning such grave
military significance to capturing Cassino and the Abbey. Given that General Clark was advised by General
Tuker that the only possibility for success was to launch sustained and devastating air strikes on the target,
which would have caused more damage than General Clark initially indicated would be acceptable to him, the
Allies might have (and arguably should have) re-evaluated if there was another way to achieve their broad
operational and strategic objectives in the Italian campaign without taking Cassino.”).
37 Winston Churchill described the abbey’s topography as follows: “The height on which the monastery
stood surveyed the junction of the rivers Rapido and Liri and was the pivot of the whole German defense. It
had already proved itself a formidable, strongly defended obstacle. Its steep sides, swept by fire, were crowned
by the famous building . . . .” 5 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: CLOSING THE RING 499
(1951). General Alexander provided similar descriptions of topographic details of the hill as well as the
difficulties confronting the Allies to Churchill. See id. at 508–09. One commentator argues that the material
military necessity for the abbey’s destruction was circumstantially undermined by the difficulties associated
with coordinating aerial bombardment, artillery bombardment, and infantry attack. See Uwe Steinhoff, Moral
Ambiguities in the Bombing of Monte Cassino, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 142, 142 (2005) (“What Tuker describes here
is a complicated attack that requires the co-ordination of three different branches of the service and where
timing is crucial. But war is characterized by what von Clausewitz called friction. In war, things have a strong
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The Monte Cassino experience shows that the material military necessity or
non-necessity of given belligerent conduct is inevitably situation-dependent
and evaluative. Given enough facts, the proposition “destroying the
Benedictine abbey atop Monte Cassino on February 15, 1944, constituted a
material military necessity for the Allies” is susceptible to reasonable
assessment, although the determination may differ from assessor to assessor.
What is insusceptible to such assessment is a generalized proposition—such as
“destroying a building sitting atop a strategically important hill constitutes a
material military necessity”—postulated a priori in a manner that holds true
for all, always and everywhere.
2. Causation Sine Qua Non Not Required
Establishing material military necessity does not entail sine qua non (“butfor”) causation. Generally, upholding the “but for” causation between one
event, E1, at a given moment and another event, E2, at a subsequent moment
amounts to asserting the truth of two propositions. They are, respectively, that
both E1 and E2 in fact occur and that E2 would not have occurred but for E1.
The material military necessity or otherwise of the conduct occurring (E1 = Xing) is capable of comprehension even where the purpose sought by it (E2 = Y)
does not, in fact, materialize. Nor, even where E2 materializes, does material
military necessity require that E1’s occurrence be E2’s conditio sine qua non.
a. No Causation Requirement
Acting in accordance with material military necessity does not imply
overcoming what Carl von Clausewitz called war’s “friction.”38 Friction may
well deny the military purpose’s materialization despite the very best and
otherwise effective courses of action being pursued.

tendency not to go the way they were planned. In other words, the probability that the precisely co-ordinated
campaign Tuker asked for could have been delivered under the circumstances was extremely low.”).
38 See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119–21 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton
Univ. Press 1989) (1832). Barry D. Watts offers the following taxonomy of Clausewitzian friction: danger’s
impact on the ability to think clearly and act effectively in war; the effects on thought and action of combat’s
demands for exertion; uncertainties and imperfections in the information on which action in war is
unavoidably based; friction in the narrow sense of the internal resistance to effective action stemming from the
interactions between the many men and machines making up one’s own forces; the play of chance, of good
luck and bad, whose consequences combatants can never fully foresee; physical and political limits to the use
of military force; unpredictability stemming from interaction with the enemy; and disconnects between ends
and means in war. See BARRY D. WATTS, CLAUSEWITZIAN FRICTION AND FUTURE WAR 30, 32 (1996).
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Operation Market Garden is a case in point. According to one authoritative
account, “Operation MARKET-GARDEN accomplished much of what it had
been designed to accomplish. Nevertheless, by the merciless logic of war,
MARKET-GARDEN was a failure. The Allies had trained their sights on farreaching objectives. These they had not attained.”39 The unattained objectives
included securing a bridgehead beyond the Neder Rijn, effectively turning the
north flank of the West Wall, cutting off Germany’s Fifteenth Army, and
positioning the 21st Army Group for a drive around the north flank of the
Ruhr.40 The account continues:
Though MARKET-GARDEN failed in its more far-reaching
ramifications, to condemn the entire plan as a mistake is to show no
appreciation for imagination and daring in military planning and is to
ignore the climate of Allied intelligence reports that existed at the
time. While reasons advanced for the failure range from adverse
weather (Field Marshall Montgomery) and delay of the British
ground column south of Eindhoven (General Brereton) to faulty
intelligence (the Germans), few criticisms have been leveled at the
plan itself. In light of Allied limitations in transport, supplies, and
troops for supporting the thrust, in light of General Eisenhower’s
commitment to a broad-front policy, and in light of the true
conditions of the German army in the West, perhaps the only real
41
fault of the plan was overambition.

With the possible exception of faulty intelligence, the reasons offered
above are typical indicators of an operation’s Clausewitzean friction.42
Moreover, many of the measures taken during the ultimately unsuccessful
Operation Market Garden were nevertheless material military necessities for
the Operation. By way of example, one might note the assault on the Arnhem
39 CHARLES B. MACDONALD, THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS: THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
198 (1963).
40 See id. (also explaining that “[t]he hope of attaining these objectives had prompted the ambition and
daring that went into Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Not to have realized them could mean only that the
operation had failed”).
41 Id. at 199; see also 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
198–200 (1953) (describing how weather and dangerous river conditions contributed to the Allies’ difficulties
in Operation Market Garden).
42 Of course, not all commentators look upon Operation Market Garden’s failure so charitably—to put it
mildly—by describing its difficulties and shortcomings as instances of Clausewitzian friction. See, e.g.,
NORMAN DIXON, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE 145–48 (1976); accord id. at 148 (“For
the student of military disasters, the attack on Arnhem ranks with Kut and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Through
inappropriate risk-taking, underestimation of the enemy, the neglect of unpalatable information and a failure of
technology, military decisions by able brains, at high levels of command, brought down misery and chaos.”
(citation omitted)).
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highway bridge by Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Frost and his battalion,43 as well as
their subsequent effort to maintain their foothold on that bridge.44 By all
accounts, securing the Arnhem highway bridge under the circumstances
prevailing at the time was one of the most crucial components of the
operation.45 The actions of Frost and his men were eminently relevant to the
objectives’ materialization: They reached the bridge and held their position
amid intense enemy action, mounting casualties, and increasingly untenable
conditions.46
Admittedly, the objectives’ non-materialization may—and sometimes
does—indicate the material military non-necessity of the measures taken for
them.47 It does not follow, however, that an objective’s failure always entails
the measure’s lack of material military necessity or that a measure constitutes a
material military necessity only where its objective materializes.
b. No Conditio Sine Qua Non Requirement
Nor does material military necessity involve conditio sine qua non. Causal
elements of conditio sine qua non are by their very nature indemonstrable.48
Moreover, having made allowances for Clausewitzean friction,49 each

43

See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 39, at 171.
See, e.g., id. at 171–72, 179, 185–86 .
45 See, e.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 41, at 196–97.
46 See, e.g., id. at 198.
47 Consider, for example, the fall of Singapore in 1942. The rather dramatic non-materialization of the
British objective—i.e., to defend Singapore from Japanese forces advancing through the Malay Peninsula—
has been attributed to a series of measures, some inadequate (e.g., the stationing of only severely limited and
largely obsolete ships and aircraft) and others affirmatively detrimental (e.g., relentless self-deception and
under-preparation), that were taken by British and Australian commanders. For further discussion, see
TIMOTHY HALL, THE FALL OF SINGAPORE (1983). See also discussion infra Part I.A.3 for examples of material
military non-necessities generally.
48 What is often treated as a causal sine qua non is really an explanation of a singular event rather than
the statement of a purported causal law governing similar combinations of events. See, e.g., DONALD
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 15–17, 149–62 (1980) (“What emerges, in the ex post facto
atmosphere of explanation and justification, as the reason frequently was, to the agent at the time of action, one
consideration among many, a reason.”). There may be other elements of conditio sine qua non that are
demonstrable, but they are either mere analytic connections or incidental connections. See H.L.A. HART &
TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 115 (2d ed. 1985) (1959) (“If a man is knocked down and injured by
a vehicle the fact that he is a man, human, and has a body, is something which is logically entailed by the
description of the event with which we start and whose cause we may seek.”); id. at 116 (explaining that the
act of shooting a gun successfully requires “the fact that the cartridge was charged with explosive”).
49 See VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 38, at 119–21.
44
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belligerent50 is always faced with a choice among a range of courses of action
vis-à-vis its objective.51 This or that particular range may be a sine qua non
with respect to this or that particular objective. Once the range is defined,
however, the particular course of action chosen from that range is never truly a
sine qua non. It is rather a matter of choosing that one course of action which
is the best, all things considered. What makes the particular choice the best is a
function of various criteria, such as the one that stands the greatest chances of
accomplishing the objective, or the one that is the most resource-efficient, or
the one that is the most politically acceptable among co-belligerents.
For instance, there is nothing sine qua non about the Allied forces landing
on the beaches of Normandy for the purposes of invading northwest Europe.
Landing at Normandy was arguably a material military necessity. It was
arguably so, however, not because the Allied invasion of northwest Europe
would have otherwise been unsuccessful. This one cannot know; it cannot be
ruled out that landing at some other location might have also led to a
successful Allied invasion of northwest Europe.52 Landing at Normandy was
arguably a material military necessity because its beaches were the best among
other candidate locations, all things considered.
There may be one element⎯ the genius of the military leader⎯that comes
closest to being truly irreplaceable. Emir Faisal’s forces would in all likelihood
not have taken Aqaba but for Lieutenant T.E. Lawrence.53 Nevertheless, the
mere fact that true military genius in action may practically constitute a
conditio sine qua non for some of the objectives it achieves does not mean that
its existence is the only situation in which one can intelligibly speak of
material military necessity.
3. Material Military Non-Necessities
Wars can be poorly fought in various ways. For instance, X-ing may be
wasteful relative to accomplishing Y; X-ing may be excessive in relation to
accomplishing Y; X-ing may simply have no bearing whatsoever on
accomplishing Y; or X-ing may be done for its own sake and without any
50 In this Article, the term “belligerent” refers not only to a party to an armed conflict but also to a
combatant member of its armed forces.
51 See supra Part I.A.
52 Here, the possible sine qua non range of courses of action would have been to effect a landing
somewhere. Without such a landing, it is quite difficult to imagine how the Allies would have successfully
invaded northwest Europe.
53 See T.E. LAWRENCE, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM 167–68 (1935).
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particular
purpose.
Wastefulness,
excessiveness,
impertinence,54
purposelessness and the like are improvable non-necessities which are not
solely the products of irreducible friction. They would typically emanate from
ill-advised, unrealistic, or otherwise badly defined military goals, ill-chosen
means, and/or poor execution55 under the prevailing circumstances. In reality,
uneconomical wars are often the combined result of these acts and goals.56
As noted earlier, material military necessity is a relational and evaluative
notion.57 The degree to which X1-ing constitutes a material military necessity
vis-à-vis Y is relative to the degree to which some X2-ing constitutes a material
military non-necessity vis-à-vis Y. There are two manners in which material
military non-necessity may be construed. The first is where non-necessity
emanates from the lack of cogency intrinsic to the end sought or the means
taken. Consider futility and purposelessness, for example. Futility would arise
where one identifies an end that is so utterly unattainable at the relevant time
that none of the means then available would have any reasonable prospects of
success.58 Where there is no rational military end set, the act in question might
be purposeless and incapable of being materially necessary in any meaningful
sense of the expression.59

54

See infra Part I.A.3.a–c.
Nigel de Lee suggests that the military necessity of attacking the Monte Cassino abbey diminished
materially (if also morally) because it was not conducted professionally. See de Lee, supra note 30, at 133,
137; see also Brigety, supra note 36, at 140 (“In other words, De Lee suggests that the primary moral
difficulty of the Cassino case is that the attack caused more damage than it might have done if it were carried
out in a more expert and discriminate manner.”(emphasis added)).
56 Ineffectiveness may be blamed on factors such as misguided leadership; political-ideological
preconceptions; doctrinal rigidity; defective communication and co-ordination; unimaginativeness, distraction
and indecision at the tactical, operational and/or strategic levels; poor intelligence; incompetent planning;
inadequate training; lack of equipment; wasteful allocation and expenditure of resources; reckless bravery and
adventurism; indiscipline; cowardice; low morale; defeatism; and so on. See, e.g., DIXON, supra note 42, at 50
(“poor planning, unclear orders, lack of intelligence (in both senses of the word) and fatal acquiescence to
social pressures”); id. at 66 (“unrelieved stupidity” and generals being “inexperienced, irresolute and lacking
moral courage”), id. at 144 (“passivity and courtesy, rigidity and obstinacy, procrastination, gentleness and
dogmatism”), id. at 148 (“inappropriate risk-taking, underestimation of the enemy, the neglect of unpalatable
information and a failure of technology”).
57 See supra Part I.A.
58 Futility would arise inter alia from situations where only forbearing from X-ing can be said to
constitute a material military necessity vis-à-vis accomplishing Y, or where Y ought to be modified so that
performing X-ing does become a material military necessity therefor. Examples include launching an assault
with an insufficient amount of ammunition in the knowledge that the objective sought would remain
unaccomplished as a result, as was arguably the case with numerous instances of kamikaze attacks and Hitler’s
order to defend Berlin to the last man.
59 One example is the Rape of Nanking.
55
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The second manner in which material military non-necessity may be
construed is where non-necessity emanates from the lack of cogency under the
circumstances between an otherwise reasonably attainable end sought and the
otherwise reasonably actionable means taken.60 Examples include
wastefulness, excessiveness, and impertinence.61
a. Wastefulness
Wastefulness means expending more resources than would be reasonably
required to accomplish a military goal under the prevailing circumstances.62
Failing to achieve an economy of force63 typifies a material military nonnecessity of this nature. During World War II, General Lloyd Fredendall of the
U.S. Army received criticism for what may be characterized as the wasteful—
not to mention ineffectual—expenditure of resources, that is, the command
post he had constructed near Tebessa. According to one account:
Commanders usually try to establish their headquarters near a road,
adjacent to existing communications facilities and close enough to
the combat units for convenient visits. Fredendall’s was distant from
the front and far up a canyon, a gulch that could be entered only by a
60 It should be borne in mind however that, as noted earlier, the mere fact that certain Clausewitzian
friction attends a given act in war is not itself indicative of the act’s lack of material military necessity. The
relevant comparison is not one with paper-perfect, arm-chair alternatives but one with those that are
reasonably actionable, friction having been taken into account. Nor, for that matter, is it perforce the case that
a measure’s material military non-necessity derives from it not being the least injurious amongst those
reasonably available courses of action that are similarly conducive towards the end’s attainment or from it not
retaining some acceptable ratio between the gain sought and the harm occasioned. Limiting injury and
proportion are elements of what might be termed “juridical” military necessity. See infra Part III.B.2.
61 See infra Part I.A.3.a–c.
62 See, e.g., Jochnick & Normand, supra note 2, at 53–54 (“Belligerents tend to use the minimal force
necessary to achieve their political objectives.”).
63 The Joint Chiefs of Staff explain economy of force in the Joint Operations manual as:

a.
b.

The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to
secondary efforts.
Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured
allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays,
deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and
time.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT OPERATIONS (JOINT PUBL’N 3-0) app. A, at A-2 (2008); see also Michael N.
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 5, 33 n.92 (2010). Admittedly, calculating the economy of force in military
operations, as well as determining what makes particular belligerent conduct economical as opposed to
wasteful, would be anything but straightforward. Nevertheless, several formulas, such as the Lanchester
Square Law for a given sector of ground combat and its variations, have been suggested. See, e.g., PAUL K.
DAVIS, RAND, AGGREGATION, DISAGGREGATION, AND THE 3:1 RULE IN GROUND COMBAT 2–6 (1995).

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

206

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

barely passable road constructed by his corps engineers. Though
towering mountains and wooded hillsides concealed his presence, he
had underground shelters dug and blasted for himself and his staff.
Two hundred engineers would work for more than three weeks on
this project, then abandon it unfinished under the German threat at
Kasserine. . . . To those who asked, Fredendall explained that
German aircraft were active over the area and that they made special
efforts to destroy command posts. He had gone underground because
he had no intention of having his activities disrupted. Though sixty or
seventy miles behind the front was rather far for frequent visits to the
combat units, he saw no need to be closer. He would run the battle by
64
telephone and radio.

Fredendall also had an entire anti-aircraft battalion emplaced to protect his
command post.65 General Dwight D. Eisenhower was quoted as saying: “It was
the only time during the war that I ever saw a higher headquarters so
concerned over its own safety that it dug itself underground shelters.”66
Fredendall sought the protection of his headquarters against detection and
attack by German aircraft.67 He endeavored to accomplish this objective by
choosing the particular location for it and by expending considerable military
resources—such as engineers for its construction and anti-aircraft batteries for
its defense.68 Some degree of protection from aerial threats, as well as some
corresponding resource expenditure, may be reasonable for any military
headquarters. It is arguable, however, that Fredendall’s was exaggerated in the
end sought and wasteful in the means taken.
During the Cuban Revolution, Che Guevara apparently came to regard
targeted assassinations⎯he called it “terrorism”69⎯as a wasteful tactic. Thus,
64

MARTIN BLUMENSON, KASSERINE PASS: ROMMEL’S BLOODY, CLIMACTIC BATTLE FOR TUNISIA 86–87

(1966).
65

See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944: THE CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF WORLD WAR II, at 361

(1994).
66

RICHARD COLLIER, THE WAR IN THE DESERT 162 (Time Life Books ed., 1977).
See BLUMENSON, supra note 64, at 86–87.
68 COLLIER, supra note 66, at 162.
69 See CHE GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE 139–40 (J.P. Morray trans., Univ. of Neb. Press 1985)
(1961) (“Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism; terrorism and personal assaults are entirely different
tactics. We sincerely believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired
effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement, and that it can bring a loss of lives to its
agents out of proportion to what it produces. On the other hand, attempts to take the lives of particular persons
are to be made, though only in very special circumstances; this tactic should be used where it will eliminate a
leader of the oppression. What ought never to be done is to employ specially trained, heroic, self-sacrificing
human beings in eliminating a little assassin whose death can provoke the destruction in reprisal of all the
revolutionaries employed and even more.”).
67
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In special circumstances, after careful analysis, assaults on persons
will be used. In general, we consider that it is not desirable except for
the purpose of eliminating some figure who is notorious for his
villainies against the people and the virulence of his repression. Our
experience in the Cuban struggle shows that it would have been
possible to save the lives of numerous fine comrades who were
sacrificed in the performance of missions of small value. Several
times these ended with enemy bullets of reprisal on combatants
whose loss could not be compared with the results obtained. Assaults
70
and terrorism in indiscriminate form should not be employed.

Here, targeted assassination was a means being considered for the purpose
of eliminating individual figures notorious for their villainies against the
people. For Guevara, the wastefulness of this tactic would issue from his
conclusion that “it would have been possible to save the lives of numerous fine
comrades who were sacrificed in the performance of missions of small
value.”71
b. Excessiveness72
As a type of material military non-necessity, excessiveness would imply
the combination of two things. First, the means taken accomplishes its end.
Second, the means also generates externalities. Expending more resources than
would otherwise be reasonably required to accomplish a military goal would
be excessive if, by doing so, the expender achieves that goal as well as some
other consequences immaterial to the goal’s accomplishment. Understood thus,
it might be said that excessiveness is a species of wastefulness.
Concentrated artillery bombardment commonly practiced by the Allies
during World War I is a case in point. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March
1915 saw the concentration of artillery fire reach one gun for four yards of

70 Id. at 131. Guevara goes on to state: “More preferable is effort directed at large concentrations of
people in whom the revolutionary idea can be planted and nurtured, so that at a critical moment they can be
mobilized and with the help of the armed forces contribute to a favorable balance on the side of the
revolution.” Id.
71 Id.
72 For abundant caution, it should be stressed that the expression “excessiveness” is used here in a strictly
material sense. Of interest is not excessiveness of the sort prohibited, inter alia, in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5)(b),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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attacking front.73 The then-prevailing doctrine emphasized the importance of
maximizing the volume of shells falling per unit of space (i.e., the means
taken) with a view to destroying as many physical obstacles on it as possible
(i.e., the end sought) ahead of an infantry advance.74 Inevitably, those shells
which successfully eliminated obstacles such as barbed wires would come at
the expense of numerous others which hit surfaces not, or no longer,
containing any obstacle.75 The inefficient excessiveness of bombarding Neuve
Chapelle led to an adjustment in the barrage technique. At the Battle of Aubers
in May 1915, “the bombardment before the attack on the ridge was more
deliberate, and primarily concerned with accurate wire-cutting.”76 This shift
may have reduced the bombardment’s excessiveness vis-à-vis its stated
purpose. One commentator notes, however, that what was really needed, and
later implemented for efficiency, is a shift in the purpose sought (i.e., from
maximum material damage to undermining enemy morale) and in the means
taken (i.e., from the heaviest possible bombardment to one that catches the
enemy by surprise and maximizes intensity).77
c. Impertinence
Impertinence is what results where the stated, otherwise reasonably
attainable objective would not be served in any meaningful way by pursuing,
even successfully, the means chosen.
In 2007, the Ig Nobel Prize for Peace was awarded to the U.S. Air Force
Wright Laboratory “for instigating research & development on a chemical
weapon—the so-called ‘gay bomb’—that will make enemy soldiers become
sexually irresistible to each other.”78 The award was based on research
proposed for the development, inter alia, of “[c]hemicals that effect [sic]
human behavior so that discipline and morale in enemy units is adversely
effected [sic]. One distasteful but completely non-lethal example would be
strong aphrodisiacs, especially if the chemical also caused homosexual
behavior. Another example would be a chemical that made personnel very
73

See IAN V. HOGG, BARRAGE: THE GUNS IN ACTION 11–13 (1970).
Id. at 15.
75 There were complaints in the aftermath that “the wire cutting was patchy and the firing careless, one or
two shells actually falling short during the barrage.” Id. at 16.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 14–15.
78 Winners of the Ig® Nobel Prize, IMPROBABLE RESEARCH, http://improbable.com/ig/winners (last
visited March 30, 2013); see ‘Gay Bomb’ Scoops Ig Nobel Award, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2007), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7026150.stm.
74
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sensitive to sunlight.”79 Reportedly, however, the effort to develop weapons
such as those which would simulate flatulence amongst enemy soldiers was not
pursued when “researchers concluded that the premise for such a device was
fatally flawed because ‘people in many areas of the world do not find faecal
odour offensive, since they smell it on a regular basis.’”80 The concern
expressed by the Ig Nobel laureates might be reformulated as follows: There is
a danger that the stated objective of adversely affecting enemy discipline and
morale will not be pertinently served even if the bomb does simulate flatulence
amongst enemy soldiers as intended.
Although it may come across as harsh historical second-guessing, being
confronted with paradigm-changing weapons and tactics sometimes prompted
warring parties to take courses of action which were impertinent vis-à-vis their
military goals. Thus, at Agincourt in 1415, the numerically superior French
men-at-arms charged “like lemmings” into their death at the hands of English
longbows raining on them in a highly confined and increasingly crowded
“killing zone.”81 Military historians observe that the disjoint between the
victory clearly sought (and assumed) by the French and their seemingly
impertinent battlefield behavior, especially the eschewal of their own
longbows, was attributable to the “confrontational ethos of the feudal
warrior.”82 Such ethos encompassed the traditional skills, weapons and
education by which the feudal warrior identified himself, as well as “the
alleged unwillingness of men-at-arms to cross weapons with archers, their
social inferiors, when the chance to win glory, and prisoners, in combat with
other men-at-arms presented itself.”83 Agincourt arguably exemplifies material
military non-necessity where the tactics were not cogently chosen in view of a
military purpose, but driven in reality by impertinent considerations such as
social status and personal gain.
4. Vocation and Amorality
The foregoing shows that material military necessity is an element of
belligerent conduct, which separates fighting that is effective and conducive to

79 See U.S. AIR FORCE WRIGHT LAB., HARASSING, ANNOYING, AND “BAD GUY” IDENTIFYING
CHEMICALS (1994), available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/wpafbchem.pdf.
80 See US Military Pondered Love Not War, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4174519.stm.
81 ROBERT L. O’CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN 104 (1989).
82 Id.
83 JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE 98 (1976).
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success from fighting that is neither. The notion merely entails the truism that
it is in each belligerent’s strictly strategic self-interest to maximize his abilities
and that it is similarly in his strictly strategic interest to avoid failures.
Indeed, to the consummate soldier of a Clausewitzean cast,84 a good war is
one in which every act constitutes a material military necessity—that is,
executed both professionally and with the optimal resource mobilization, and
directed towards a clearly defined, strategically sound, and reasonably
attainable military goal under the prevailing circumstances.85 Of course, as
noted earlier, it is eminently possible that a soldier acts in accordance with
material military necessity in a given situation without attaining his military
goal.86 Despite his unsparing efforts to the best of his occupational competence
as a soldier, he may simply fall victim to war’s inevitable friction—in other
words, without anyone, himself or someone else, failing to act in accordance
with material military necessity. Acting in accordance with material military
necessity is not, and need not be, a guarantee of success.
As is the case with any other occupation, pursuing material military
necessities and avoiding material military non-necessities is first and foremost
a component of vocational competence.87 This component involves assessing
the relationship between the various means available and the various goals that
might be pursued in the specific set of circumstances prevailing at the time.
The component in question here is also essentially amoral. For our present
purposes, “amoral” may be understood as follows: The component’s amorality
issues from its capacity to be ethically sound as well as unsound.
Consequences of ethically pertinent belligerent conduct are readily convertible
into material military costs—and benefits.88 In particular, “amoral” here
84 VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 38, at 187 (“An army’s military qualities are based on the individual
who is steeped in the spirit and essence of [war]; who trains the capacities it demands, rouses them, and makes
them his own; who applies his intelligence to every detail; who gains ease and confidence through practice,
and who completely immerses his personality in the appointed task.”).
85 See id. at 102–14, 697–771.
86 See supra Part I.A.2.b.
87 See supra Part I.A.
88 Fighting ethically in counterinsurgency exemplifies materially competent and morally beneficial
belligerent behavior. See U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, para. 7-25, at
7-5 (2007) (“A key part of any insurgent’s strategy is to attack the will of the domestic and international
opposition. One of the insurgents’ most effective ways to undermine and erode political will is to portray their
opposition as untrustworthy or illegitimate. These attacks work especially well when insurgents can portray
their opposition as unethical by the opposition’s own standards. To combat these efforts, Soldiers and Marines
treat noncombatants and detainees humanely, according to American values and internationally recognized
human rights standards. In [counter-insurgency operations], preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is
central to mission accomplishment. This imperative creates a complex ethical environment.”).
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denotes the idea that affirmatively unethical actions can also be seen as
materially competent.89
B. Objections
The very notion of material military necessity is predicated on the thesis
that the material component of the belligerent conduct’s vocational
competence is separable from its meta-material components such as ethics. Let
us call this the “separability” thesis of material military necessity. This thesis
holds that, as a matter of principle, the former component is capable of
comprehension without reference to the latter. This remains so although,
admittedly, the two may coincide in certain specific settings.
It follows that the separability thesis entails three major tenets. First,
material military necessity is conceivable independently from whatever other
sense or senses it may be seen to carry. Second, material military necessity is
conceivable in the manner just described even though it does not exclude the
possibility that material competence can form an innate part of ethical
competence. Third, the separability remains true even though it may also be
true that ethical competence can form an innate part of material competence.
These three major tenets invite three corresponding objections. Let us consider
them in turn.
1. Military Virtues vs. Ethical Virtues
Does it not follow from the very use of evaluative terms such as “good”
war and “bad” war90 that there are similarly evaluative statements such as
“sound” and “unsound” military decisions? Does this not mean then that there
is something innately moral about this fighting being “competent” or that

89 Take the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, for example. Assuming that those who committed
these atrocities intended to destroy the targeted groups, they were, in their own frighteningly appalling way,
quite efficient in exterminating a very large number of victims.
90 See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, NORMATIVITY 17 (2008) (“I asked earlier: which judgments are the
evaluatives? I gave three examples, namely that D is a good person, E is a good tennis player, and F is a good
toaster. They are obviously judgments to the effect that a certain thing is good in a certain respect. We also
took note of the existence of such judgments as that G is good at doing crossword puzzles, H is good for
England, and I is good for use in making cheesecake. These too are evaluative judgments to the effect that a
certain thing is good in a certain respect. We can surely say that all judgments to the effect that a certain thing
is good in a certain respect are evaluative judgments.”).
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fighting being “incompetent”—that is, fighting or not fighting as a good
soldier should?91
Indeed, there may be something innately moral here. This Article asserts,
however, that the innate morality of vocationally competent war-fighting is not
inherently one of ethical behavior. In On War, von Clausewitz spoke of “moral
factors,”92 “principal moral elements”93 and “military virtues.”94 Of military
virtues of the army, he wrote:
No matter how clearly we see the citizen and the solider in the same
man, how strongly we conceive of war as the business of the entire
nation, opposed diametrically to the pattern set by the condottieri of
former times, the business of war will always remain individual and
distinct. Consequently for as long as they practice this activity,
soldiers will think of themselves as members of a kind of guild, in
whose regulations, laws, and customs the spirit of war is given pride
of place. No matter how much one may be inclined to take the most
sophisticated view of war, it would be a serious mistake to underrate
professional pride (esprit de corps) as something that may and must
be present in an army to the greater or lesser degree. Professional
pride is the natural forces that activate the military virtues; in the
95
context of this professional pride they crystallize more readily.

91 See id. at 1–2 (“I suggest that we should focus on a different difference among our normative
judgments. I will call our judgments that A ought to be kind to his little brother, that B ought to move his rook,
and that C ought to get a haircut, directives. Intuitively, they differ from our judgment that D is a good person,
that E is a good tennis player, and that F is a good toaster, which I will call evaluatives. We will want to attend
to both kinds of normative judgment.”).
92 VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 38, at 184 (“[The moral elements] constitute the spirit that permeates
war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the
whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quantity. Unfortunately they
will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be seen or felt. The
spirit and other moral qualities of an army, a general or a government, the temper of the population of the
theater of war, the moral effects of victory or defeat—all these vary greatly. They can moreover influence our
objective and situation in very different ways. . . . If the theory of war did no more than remind us of these
elements, demonstrating the need to reckon with and give full value to moral qualities, it would expand its
horizon, and simply by establishing this point of view would condemn in advance anyone who sought to base
an analysis on material factors alone.”).
93 Id. at 186. These elements, according to von Clausewitz, are the following: “the skill of the
commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit.”
94 Id. at 184–89.
95 Id. at 187–88; see also id. (“An army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderous fire; that
cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that, proud of its
victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose
physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that
regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful of all these duties and
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It is unlikely that von Clausewitz used the expressions “moral” and “virtue”
in a manner similar to the same expressions understood in ethical terms. Thus,
in Ulrike Kleemeier’s words:
Originally, I used the term “moral virtues” instead of “moral forces”.
The word “virtue” is not morally neutral in the widespread sense of
the expression “moral”. To say of somebody that he or she possesses
certain virtues means that we praise him or her for being just or kind,
etc. The term “force” seems to be more neutral. To push matters to
the extreme: perhaps a (war) criminal can have moral forces in the
96
Clausewitzian sense.

Kleemeier lists what she regards as components of Clausewitzean “moral
forces”: the “faculty of judgment,”97 “bravery” or “courage,”98 and “a passion
for reason.”99 It would appear that qualities such as these are merely
descriptions—or prerequisites—of excellence in soldiering or effective
fighting, rather than those in ethical conduct. The difference, then, would be
one between what might be termed military virtues, with which von
Clausewitz was concerned, on the one hand, and ethical virtues, on the
other.100
A similar distinction has been suggested by Judith Jarvis Thomson. Thus:
Let us now look again at “Smith is a good liar.” My characterization
of the notions “praise/dispraise simpliciter” and “praise/dispraise
qua” yields the following. Saying “Smith is a good liar” is dispraising
Smith simpliciter, since it is or would be dispraiseworthy in Smith to
be a liar. But it is also praising Smith qua liar, since it is saying that
as liars go, Smith is a good one. So also for “Jones is good at
avoiding responsibility for what he does.” Saying that is dispraising
Jones simpliciter, since it is or would be dispraiseworthy in Jones to
avoid responsibility for what he does. But it is also praising Jones
qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honor of its arms—such an army is imbued with the true
military spirit.”).
96 Ulrike Kleemeier, Moral Forces in War, in CLAUSEWITZ IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 107, 107 n.5
(Hew Strachan & Andreas Herberg-Rothe eds., 2007).
97 Id. at 113.
98 Id. at 114.
99 Id. at 118–19.
100 Contrary to popular belief, it may be doubted whether von Clausewitz really excluded the possibility
of real-life warfare being amenable to ethical constraints. See Best, supra note 2, at 5; Paul Cornish,
Clausewitz and the Ethics of Armed Force, 2 J. MIL. ETHICS 213, 219 (2003); Michael Howard, Temperamenta
Belli: Can War Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 1,
1 (Michael Howard ed., 1979); David J. Lonsdale, A View from Realism, in ETHICS, LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS 29, 34 (David Whetham ed., 2011).
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qua person who avoids responsibility for what he does, since it is
101
saying that as people who do that go, he is good at it.

Now, in relation to virtues,102 Thomson observes:
We should notice . . . that . . . being a clever liar is a virtue in a liar.
(The following is plainly true: a liar is as good a liar as a liar can be
only if he or she is a clever liar. And it hardly needs saying that some
liars are clever liars.) So be it. Being a clever liar is certainly not a
moral virtue [read “ethical virtue” for the purposes of this article] in a
liar. But our use of “virtue” here is the broad one, and being a clever
liar is in that broad use a virtue in a liar—just as while being a sharp
carving knife is not [an ethical] virtue in a carving knife, it is a virtue
103
in a carving knife.

Thomson speaks of desirable qualities in a soldier as “virtues”: “No doubt
it is a virtue of a soldier to fight well; another is to obey appropriate orders.”104
Here, “fight well” may be understood in comparison to Thomson’s discussion
of “play chess well.”105 Thus, “a chess move is strategically correct if and only
if it is a move conducive to winning”106; so is, it would stand to reason, a
belligerent move. It may therefore be said that “rules” of chess strategy107 are
analogous to “rules” of military strategy. Strategic correctness in war would
simply mean pursuing material military necessities and avoiding material
military non-necessities.
Thomson uses the expression “virtue” broadly108 and, more importantly,
distinguishes a “virtue” in a thing or a person of a particular functional nature
from a “moral virtue” (again, read “ethical virtue”) in a person simpliciter.109

101

THOMSON, supra note 90, at 57–58.
See id. at 73 (“For F to be a virtue in a K is for it to be the case that (i) K is a goodness-fixing kind, and
(ii) a K is as good a K as a K can be only if it has F, and (iii) it is possible for there to be a K that lacks F, and
(iv) it is not nomologically impossible for there to be a K that has F.”).
103 Id. at 74 (alteration in original); see also id. at 81 (“[T]here may be strategic, tactical, and political
virtues in a plan or act.”).
104 Id. at 69 n.1. For being a soldier who fights well to be a virtue in a soldier is for it to be the case: (i)
that the kind soldier is a goodness-fixing kind; (ii) that a soldier is a good soldier only if it has being a soldier
who fights well; and (iii) that it is possible for there to be a soldier that lacks being a soldier who fights well.
See id. at 71.
105 Id. at 169 n.3.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 69.
109 See id. at 79–81.
102
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Thus, being a soldier who fights well is a military virtue in a soldier110; being
an ethical person is an ethical virtue in a person.111
It is entirely conceivable that military virtues and ethical virtues in a person
may coincide. What is not so is the idea that one type of virtue necessarily
matches or entails the other. In Thomson’s view, for the statement “A ought to
V”112 to be true is for it to be true that “if a K doesn’t V, then it is a defective
K.”113 Let A denote a soldier, K the kind soldier, and V pursuing material
military necessities and avoiding material military non-necessities. For the
statement “a soldier ought to pursue material military necessities and avoid
material military non-necessities” to be true is for it to be true that if a soldier
does not pursue material military necessities and/or avoid material military
non-necessities, then he or she is a defective soldier. In other words, “being a
soldier who pursues material military necessities and avoids material military
non-necessities” is a military virtue in a soldier.
It turns out that Thomson’s formula for the truth of an “A ought to V”
statement includes an additional condition, namely that:
[T]here is no directive kind K+ such that K is a sub-kind of K+, and
114
such that if a K+ does V, then it is a defective K+.

In other words, for the statement “A ought to V” to be true is for the
following to be true, that:
If a K doesn’t V, then it is a defective K; and there is no directive
kind K+ such that K is a sub-kind of K+, and such that if a K+ does
V, then it is a defective K+.

Consider the December 1944 Malmédy Massacre. During their dash to the
Meuse River, elements of SS Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper’s unit

110 See id. at 80–81. Being a soldier who fights well is a military virtue in a soldier just in case: (i) that a
soldier is militarily as good a soldier as a soldier can be only if it has being a soldier who fights well; (ii) that it
is possible for there to be a soldier that lacks being a soldier who fights well; and (iii) that it is not
nomologicaly impossible for there to be a soldier that has being a soldier who fights well. See id. at 80.
111 See id. at 79–80. Being an ethical person is a moral virtue in a person just in case: (i) that a person is
morally as good as a person can be only if it has being an ethical person; (ii) that it is possible for there to be a
person that lacks being an ethical person; and (iii) that it is not nomologically impossible for there to be a
person that has being an ethical person. See id. at 79.
112 A denotes a member of function-kind K and V a verb-phrase.
113 THOMSON, supra note 90, at 212, 214. This also means that K is what Thomson calls a “directive kind”
as well. See id. at 209 (“Let us say that a kind K is a directive-generating kind—a directive kind, for short—
just in case there is such a property as being a defective K.”).
114 See id. at 214.
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killed hundreds of American prisoners of war (“POWs”) at various
locations.115 An order had apparently come all the way from Hitler, via
Colonel General Josef Dietrich, commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army.116 It
was ordered that the German forces “act with brutality and show no humane
inhibitions,” that “a wave of fright and terror” should precede the attack, and
that “the enemy’s resistance was to be broken by terror.”117 Taking the creation
of terror as their stated purpose yields the result that giving no quarter was
arguably a material military necessity.118 It is also possible that the expected
pace of Peiper’s advance made it materially undesirable to care for enemy
soldiers taken prisoner.119 On this view, Peiper’s objective would be
maintaining the momentum of his rapid advance, and his means of dispatching
surrendered enemy soldiers would arguably constitute a material military
necessity for his objective.
115 See C.E. STRAIGHT, OFFICE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. FOR WAR CRIMES, REPORT OF THE DEPUTY
JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR WAR CRIMES, EUROPEAN COMMAND 48 (1948). See generally RICHARD GALLAGHER,
MALMÉDY MASSACRE 55–72 (1964).
116 STRAIGHT, supra note 115, at 48.
117 HUGH M. COLE, THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE 262–63 (1965); GALLAGHER, supra note 115,
at 111.
118 In the event, however, the terror did not produce the hoped-for breakdown of Allied resistance. Quite
on the contrary, the news of Malmédy “undoubtedly stiffened the will of the American combatants.” See
COLE, supra note 117, at 261; see also id. at 264 (“There were American commanders who orally expressed
the opinion that all SS troops should be killed on sight and there is some indication that in isolated cases
express orders for this were given.” (footnote omitted)).
119 Peiper is quoted as seeking to have the killings excused “by the rapid movement of his kampfgruppe
and its inability to retain prisoners under guard.” Id. at 263. The possibility that the expected pace of Peiper’s
advance made it materially undesirable to care for enemy soldiers taken prisoner is contemplated, if not
endorsed, in one account of the event. See Michael Reynolds, Massacre at Malmédy During the Battle of the
Bulge, WORLD WAR II, Feb. 2003, at 43, 48–49 (“It has to be noted that Peiper’s men faced a very real
problem in deciding what to do with the large number of prisoners taken in the Baugnez area. According to all
German reports, Peiper was in a hurry to get to Ligneuville and capture the U.S. headquarters there, and he
ordered the rest of the Kampfgruppe to follow up as quickly as possible. Faced with mounting delays and an
irate commander, what were those at the crossroads to do with the prisoners? Armored columns had no spare
manpower to look after POWs, and none of the follow-up infantry formation were anywhere near Five Points
at the time. More than 100 men, even if they have surrendered and been disarmed, cannot be left to their own
devices for long. Nor could they be ordered to start marching to the rear into captivity, as is usual in such
circumstances, because there was a simple problem of geography. Peiper had penetrated the American lines on
a very narrow front—a single road—and this meant that as far as the Germans were concerned the enemy lay
along the N-23 to the northwest in Malmédy, the N-32 to the northeast in Waimes and the N-23 to the south in
Ligneuville. There was therefore no road along which they could order the prisoners to set off. And it was
more than possible that American combat units would move south out of Malmédy at any moment. A
combination of all these factors—an angry SS lieutenant colonel in a hurry, no spare men to guard the
prisoners, no easily available route to the rear and the possibility of American combat troops arriving at any
moment—must have created a nightmare scenario for the officer in charge. It is therefore quite possible that he
decided to take the simplest and most practical way out of his dilemma by giving an order to shoot the
prisoners.”).
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Given Peiper’s objectives and the circumstances prevailing at the time,
killing the American POWs in Malmédy might have signaled a military virtue
and failing to do so a military defect. But if Peiper’s men were to act not as
soldiers (i.e., K) but as human beings (i.e., K+), then it is arguable that the
second condition for the truth of Thomson’s statement “A ought to V” was not
satisfied.120 It follows, then, that evaluating the virtues of the function-kind
soldier is not the same as evaluating the virtues of the super-kind human being.
What is important for the present purposes is that the former is capable of
consideration, at least conceptually, without reference to the latter.
2. Military Virtues as Ethical Virtues
This Article proceeds on the assumption that prosecuting war is a purposive
activity.121 It is assumed that the soldier being called upon to pursue material
military necessities and avoid material military non-necessities actually wants
to succeed in what he or she has set out to do.122 This assumption leads us to
the second major objection to the idea that material military necessity is
essentially amoral. There is perhaps something ethical even about being good
qua soldier. It is indeed possible that a military virtue may itself be an ethical
virtue.
The United States has long maintained a Code of Conduct for Members of
United States Armed Forces.123 It admonishes, among other things, that the

120 Another way of putting it would be to point out the fact that, regarding those “ought” statements
involving the kind human being, Thomson proposes a special normative thesis. See THOMSON, supra note 90,
at 216 (“If A is a human being, then for it to be the case that A ought to Vact is for it to be the case that if A
knows at the time what will probably happen if he Vacts and what will probably happen if he does not, then he
is a defective human being if he does not.”). There are many possible kinds of defects in a human being.
Thomson lists, among others: being malicious, callous, lazy, greedy, unjust, reckless, imprudent, ruthless,
cruel, sanctimonious, jealous, rude, weak-willed, unscrupulous, vengeful, petty, intemperate, cowardly,
irresolute, misanthropic, irresponsible, lacking in self-respect, and lacking in generosity. Id. at 218. Plainly,
some (though perhaps not all) of these defects are properly seen as ethical in nature. Moreover, some of these
same defects clearly exemplify instances where military defects and ethical defects overlap each other.
121 So did von Clausewitz, albeit implicitly. Clausewitzian theory makes no sense whatsoever unless one
proceeds on the basis that each belligerent party wants to bring the war it fights to a conclusion on its own
terms. See generally VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 38, at 90–99 (regarding purpose and means in war).
122 See THOMSON, supra note 90, at 172 (“When we say, ‘Alfred ought to move his queen,’ . . . [w]e are
also assuming that Alfred wants to win the game. We normally make these two assumptions when watching
chess players, and we are normally right to make them. If we weren’t making them, we wouldn’t say, ‘Alfred
ought to move his queen.’ At any rate, we would take a closer look at Alfred’s circumstances and wants and
weigh one thing against another before saying those words.”).
123 See Exec. Order No. 10,631, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1955 Supp.), reprinted as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 802 app.
at 860 (2006):
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U.S. soldier “make every effort to escape” and “accept neither parole nor
special favors from the enemy” if captured.124 As a POW, he or she is to “give
no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to [his or her]
comrades,” “evade answering further questions to the utmost of [his or her]
ability,” and “make no oral or written statements disloyal to [his or her]
country and its allies or harmful to their cause.”125 Implicit in this code of
conduct is the idea that refusing to divulge accurate intelligence to the enemy
is not only a material military necessity, but also a sign of loyalty to comradesin-arms as well as patriotic devotion to the nation. Does it not follow, then, that
the ethical virtue of a patriotic citizen includes the military virtue as a soldier?
That may be so. Michael Walzer speaks of the two-fold responsibility that a
mid-level field commander has through the chain of command. Of the upward
variety, Walzer observes:
[The mid-level field commander’s] obligation is to win the battles
that he fights or, rather, to do his best to win, obeying the legal orders
of his immediate superiors, fitting his own decisions into the larger
strategic plan, accepting onerous but necessary tasks, seeking
collective success rather than individual glory. He is responsible for
assignments unperformed or badly performed and for all avoidable
defeats. And he is responsible up the chain to each of his superiors in

I.

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of
life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men
while they still have the means to resist.
If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to
escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the
enemy.
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no
information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am
senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me
and will back them up in every way.
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank,
service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of
my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or
harmful to their cause.
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and
dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the
United States of America.

II.
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

124
125

Id.
Id.
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turn and ultimately to the ordinary citizens of his country who are
126
likely to suffer for his failures.

Of the commander’s downward responsibility, Walzer notes:
His soldiers are in one sense the instruments with which he is
supposed to win victories, but they are also men and women whose
lives, because they are his to use, are also in his care. He is bound to
minimize the risks his soldiers must face, to fight carefully and
prudently, and to avoid wasting their lives, that is, not to persist in
battles that cannot be won, not to seek victories whose costs
overwhelm their military value, and so on. And his soldiers have
every right to expect all this of him and to blame him for every sort
of omission, evasion, carelessness, and recklessness that endangers
127
their lives.

On this view, it is the ethical duty of a soldier to fight competently by
doing his or her best to pursue material military necessities and avoid material
military non-necessities. It would appear, however, that the ethical virtue of the
kind being articulated by Walzer here emanates from the particular community
for which a soldier fights.128 Nothing in the community-specific ethical virtue
makes the strictly amoral construal of military virtue unintelligible. In other
words, the strictly military virtue may also constitute a community-specific
ethical virtue. This is a matter of contingency. Crucially, it does not show that
this must be inevitable, i.e., true for all real as well as hypothetical
communities. Nor, more importantly, does it show that the military virtue of a
soldier forms part of the general ethical virtue of a human being. To use
Thomson’s terminologies, it may be, and in some specific situations is, the
case that being a soldier who pursues material military necessities and avoids
material military non-necessities is a military virtue in a soldier and a patriotic
virtue in a citizen.129 The fact that military competence can entail communityspecific ethical significance merely shows that the former competence is
amenable to being understood “on its own terms,” as it were, in the first place.
And it is precisely in this sense that this Article argues that material military
necessity can be usefully and illuminatingly understood on its own terms.

126

MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 23–24 (2004).
Id. at 24.
128 In a perverse way, one could say that even terrorists might have moral virtues particular to the
community or communities in whose name or on whose behalf they commit their acts. See, e.g., Avishai
Margalit & Michael Walzer, Israel: Civilians & Combatants, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 14, 2009, http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/may/14/israel-civilians-combatants.
129 THOMSON, supra note 90, at 69.
127
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3. Ethical Virtues as Military Virtues
There is a more serious objection to separability as an idea. Is there not
something more to a soldier’s vocational competence than his or her mere
ability to fight effectively and “get the job done?” Is it not true that a soldier
would not even be a vocationally virtuous soldier unless he or she is also an
ethically virtuous soldier? Where performing X-ing is consistent with material
military necessity yet inconsistent with what is ethically expected of a soldier,
should that soldier’s competence qua soldier ultimately not depend on his or
her forbearing X-ing?
Both ethical virtues and military virtues do sometimes point the soldier in
the same behavioral direction. Thus, in Iraq, fighting insurgents in such a way
to garner the support of local residents proved not only strategically sound but
also ethically important.130 Conversely, destroying the cognitive faculties of
Mohammed al-Qahtani, a high-value intelligence detainee, through harsh
interrogation methods was arguably both unethical and lacking in material
military necessity.131
The objection at issue, however, is not with the instrumentalist “strategic
necessity” (expedient attention to ethical considerations).132 Rather, it asserts
that only ethically competent belligerent conduct counts—or should count, at
any rate—as truly vocationally competent belligerent conduct. To begin with,
it may be unethical to do what would otherwise be materially competent. At a
1943 speech before SS officers, Heinrich Himmler stated: “Whether 10,000
Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch
interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished.”133
Forcing the 10,000 Russian women in captivity to perform physical labor to

130

A degree of success in stabilizing Mosul in 2003 has largely been attributed to the adoption of the
types of methods advocated in the U.S. counterinsurgency manual. See U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, supra
note 88, at xv. Such attribution is by no means unanimous, however. See, e.g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE
CHANGING FACE OF WAR: LESSONS OF COMBAT, FROM THE MARNE TO IRAQ 270 (2006); Bradley Graham, A
Sharp Shift from Killing to Kindness, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1.
131 In 2009, Susan Crawford, a Bush administration official then in charge of convening military
commissions, admitted that al-Qathani’s treatment had satisfied even the definition of torture as understood by
the administration. See Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at
A1. Al-Qathani’s lawyer reportedly described him as “‘paranoid,’ ‘incoherent,’ ‘cracked.’” See TORTURING
DEMOCRACY (Washington Media Assocs, 2008), transcript available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
torturingdemocracy/documents/td_transcript.pdf.
132 See Lonsdale, supra note 100, at 39–40.
133 4 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND
AGGRESSION 559 (1946).
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exhaustion may have arguably constituted a material military necessity vis-àvis its objective, namely an anti-tank ditch being completed. The question is
whether, all things considered, such a clearly unethical course of action can
ever be said to be materially virtuous.
Conversely, it might be unethical to avoid what would otherwise be
materially incompetent. Frank Richards, a WWI veteran, recalled his
November 1914 action in northern France at a village called Englefontaine:
When bombing dug-outs or cellars it was always wise to throw
bombs into them first and have a look around them after. But we had
to be very careful in this village as there were civilians in some of the
cellars. We shouted down them to make sure. Another man and I
shouted down one cellar twice and receiving no reply were just about
to pull the pins out of our bombs when we heard a woman’s voice cry
out and a young lady came up the cellar steps. As soon as she saw us
she started to speak rapidly in French and gave us both of us a hearty
kiss. She and the members of her family had their beds, stove and
everything else of use in the cellar which they had not left for some
days. They guessed an attack was being made and when we first
shouted down had been too frightened to answer. If the young lady
had not cried out when she did we would have innocently murdered
134
them all.

Richards considered it “wise”—or perhaps militarily virtuous or materially
competent, to use the expression adopted in this article—“to throw bombs into
cellars first and have a look around them after.”135 But he also clearly found it
ethically troubling to do so. In fact, he found it ethically troubling to such a
degree that he decided not to do the wise thing (and thereby “innocently
murder” the French civilians).136 Instead, Richards, together with his colleague,
chose to shout several times into the cellar.137 Walzer observes:
Innocently murdered, because they had shouted first; but if they had
not shouted, and then killed the French family, it would have been,
Richards believed, murder simply. And yet he was accepting a certain
risk in shouting, for had there been German soldiers in the cellar, they
might have scrambled out, firing as they came. It would have been
more prudent to throw the bombs without warning, which means that
134

FRANK RICHARDS, OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE 198–99 (1966). For further discussion of Richards’s
story, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 152, 154 (4th ed. 2006).
135 RICHARDS, supra note 134, at 198–99.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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military necessity would have justified him in doing so . . . . And yet
Richards was surely doing the right thing when he shouted his
warning. He was acting as a moral man ought to act; his is not an
example of fighting heroically, above and beyond the call of duty, but
138
simply of fighting well. It is what we expect of soldiers.

The objection holds that, where it appears to be vocationally competent qua
soldier yet it is unethical qua human being to perform X-ing, true vocational
competence qua soldier, all things considered, lies with forbearing X-ing. This
is so because ethical virtues form an integral component of military virtues. It
follows that separability as an idea cannot stand.
There may be military virtues “in the narrow, material sense” and military
virtues “in the broad, holistic sense.” In the former, military virtues basically
mean one’s ability to “get the job done,” whereas in the latter, military virtues
include one’s ability and inclination to preserve humanity such as retaining
one’s autonomous moral agency.139 Perhaps military necessity in this “broad,
holistic sense” may entail always acting in a manner that promotes or preserves
humanity. Even if one were to concede that ethical virtues are intrinsic to the
holistic construal of military virtues, however, some separate consideration of
those remaining bits of the latter not entailing ethics is still possible. It is, then,
in this narrow sense that this Article uses the term “material military
necessity.”
138

WALZER, supra note 134, at 152, 154 (quoting RICHARDS, supra note 134, at 199). In contemporary
terms, the “wise” thing to do in Richards’ situations is akin to ensuring force protection. David Luban objects
to soldiers’ additional worth as “assets” and rejects political need for force protection. See David Luban, Risk
Taking and Force Protection 35–40 (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-72,
2011), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/654. But see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS &
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 50 (2005) (“Australia,
Canada and New Zealand have stated that the term ‘military advantage’ includes the security of the attacking
forces.” (footnote omitted)); Benvenisti, supra note 2, at 90 (“The security of the attacking forces may be
viewed as part of the military goals of the attacking army. In addition, emphasis must be placed on the army’s
obligation towards its combatants. Imposing risks on combatants is justified to the extent that the risk is
necessary to secure their individual interests and their interests as citizens. Imposing risks on them to protect
enemy civilians means using them as mere tools for the benefit of others. This does not preclude the moral
duty of combatants to consider taking some risks to reduce the harm to enemy civilians, but not a duty to
actually risk themselves.” (footnotes omitted)).
139 It has been suggested that being a vocationally competent officer entails preserving the humanity of
those under his or her command. On this view, “we can . . . attribute to officers some level of control—and
therefore responsibility—over the specific actions of their troops that might place the troops’ humanity in
jeopardy . . . . A warrior’s humanity is most obviously at risk when he or she participates in an atrocity. Vile
actions such as rape, the intentional slaughter of civilians, or the torture of prisoners of war dehumanize the
victims and degrade the perpetrators. We require officers not to lead or order their subordinates to commit
criminal actions such as these.” Shannon E. French, Sergeant Davis’s Stern Charge: The Obligation of
Officers To Preserve the Humanity of Their Troops, 8 J. MIL. ETHICS 116, 121–22 (2009).

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY NECESSITY

223

II. “NORMATIVE” MILITARY NECESSITY: MILITARY NECESSITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF IHL NORM-CREATION
The second distinct context in which military necessity appears is that of
norm-creation in international humanitarian law. At issue here is not—or no
longer—whether, in view of a specific objective under a specific set of
circumstances, this or that course of action constitutes a material military
necessity or non-necessity. It is rather whether a certain kind of conduct tends
to constitute or is deemed capable of constituting a material military necessity
or non-necessity; and whether, given the said tendency or capability,
international humanitarian law should obligate, authorize, restrict, or prohibit
this kind of conduct.
A contextual shift from the material to the normative is accompanied by
two related shifts. The first is a shift from assessing particular events to
assessing what may be termed “event patterns” or “event-kinds.” For our
purposes, descriptions of particular “conduct-instances” such as “torturing alQahtani”140 are replaced by those of generalized “conduct-kinds” such as
“torturing an intelligence detainee.” Similarly, descriptions of particular
“purpose-instances” such as “extracting reliable and actionable intelligence
regarding al-Qaida” are replaced by those of generalized “purpose-kinds” such
as “extracting reliable and actionable intelligence regarding an adversary.” The
other related shift concerns the evaluative nature of material military necessity.
The question then was whether a given conduct-instance did or would
constitute a material military necessity or non-necessity in view of its purposeinstance under its particular circumstances. The question now is what
international humanitarian law should do about a given conduct-kind if—or
once—it is agreed that a conduct-kind tends to constitute a material military
necessity or non-necessity. Discussions of military necessity in the context of
IHL norm-creation involve stipulating the material military necessity or nonnecessity of conduct-kinds rather than evaluating that of conduct-instances.141

140

See Woodward, supra note 131.
See R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 145, 151 (1972) (“We
should notice that the question which rules of war would be preferred by rational persons choosing behind a
[Rawlsian] veil of ignorance is roughly the question that bodies like the Hague Conventions tried to answer.
For there were the representatives of various nations, gathered together, say, in 1907, many or all of them
making the assumption that their nations would at some time be at war. And, presumably in the light of
calculated national self-interest and the principles of common humanity, they decided which rules they were
prepared to commit themselves to follow, in advance of knowing how the fortunes of war might strike them in
particular.”).
141
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It would appear reasonable to assume that the conduct-kind “disabling an
able-bodied, non-surrendering enemy combatant” is generally regarded as
conducive toward the materialization of the purpose-kind “weakening the
military forces of the enemy.”142 In other words, it would appear reasonable to
stipulate this conduct-kind’s material military necessity. Stipulated thus,
should international humanitarian law have any reason to obligate, authorize,
restrict, or prohibit this conduct-kind? To use another example, it appears
reasonable to stipulate that destroying property in occupied territory is a
conduct-kind that in principle lacks material military necessity. Would the
material military non-necessity of this conduct-kind thus stipulated furnish
international humanitarian law with any reason to obligate, authorize, restrict,
or prohibit it?
Normative military necessity refers to this reason-giving function that
stipulated material military necessity or non-necessity acquires in IHL normcreation.143 It should be noted that the stipulated material military necessity or
non-necessity of a given conduct-kind is only one among various reasons for
which the framers of international humanitarian law144 would consider
obligating, authorizing, restricting, or prohibiting it. Considerations such as
humanity,145 chivalry, fairness, justice, good faith, reciprocal self-interest,
142 This is the premise upon which the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration rests. See St. Petersburg
Declaration, supra note 1, at 95.
143 What follows is essentially an exercise of practical normative reasoning with special reference to
military necessity.
144 This expression refers primarily to states which validly posit rules of international humanitarian law by
forming custom and concluding treaties.
145 The interplay between military necessity and humanity in the process of IHL norm-creation is the
subject of a separate, in-depth analysis by this Author. See Nobuo Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative
Indifference, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 675 (2013); see also, e.g., Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Dec. 7,
1963, Case No. 2,914 (wa) of 1955 and Case No. 4,177 (wa) of 1957 [Shimoda v. State], 8 JAPANESE ANN.
INT’L L. 212, 240 (1964) (Japan); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4–5 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES];
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 683; 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 135
(1968); Draper, supra note 3, at 129, 141; Nico Keijzer, Réponses à la Question 2, 33 REV. BELGE DROIT INT’L
440, 442 (2000); Marco Pertile, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory”: A Missed Opportunity for International Humanitarian Law?, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L.
121, 149–50 (2004); Yoram Dinstein, Military Necessity, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L.,
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e333&recno=7&
author=Dinstein%20%20Yoram (last updated May 2009). According to Riccardo Mazzeschi, Enzo Cannizzaro
holds the view that weighing military necessity vis-à-vis humanitarian considerations is what the principle of
proportionality entails in a unitary system of international law. Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Book Review: Il
principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento internazionale, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1031, 1034 (2002)
(reviewing ENZO CANNIZZARO, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA PROPORZIONALITÀ NELL’ORDINAMENTO INTERNAZTIONALE
(2000)).
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battlefield management—in particular, protocols concerning inter-belligerent
communication—sovereignty, economic gain, religious beliefs, culture, and
the like, also acquire reason-giving functions. This Article juxtaposes the
material military necessity or non-necessity of a given conduct-kind vis-à-vis
the evil or non-evil entailed by it. For our present purposes, “evil”146 denotes,
among other things: the loss of life, injury and attack on the bodily, mental, or
moral integrity of persons; unsanctioned property destruction and damage,
change of ownership or control; unsanctioned change in social institutions or
procedures; and so on, that are occasioned in connection with war. This
construal encompasses all relevant evil, regardless of who suffers it.147
A. Stipulated Material Military Necessity as an Element in the Legitimacy
Modification of Evil Conduct-Kinds but Not of Any Conduct-Kinds
It may be felt that, war being a “necessary evil” par excellence, anything
that is unnecessary in it should ipso facto be evil and therefore illegitimate.
That is not so, however. Things in war can be neither necessary nor evil; nor
need they be illegitimate. The mere fact that a particular conduct-kind vis-à-vis
a legitimate purpose-kind is deemed lacking in material military necessity does
not mean that the said conduct-kind becomes illegitimate for that reason alone.
In IHL norm-creation, stipulated material military necessity or non-necessity is
indeed an element in the legitimacy modification of those conduct-kinds that
are considered evil. It will be argued, however, that it is not an element in the
legitimacy modification of any conduct-kinds, much less those that are not
considered evil themselves.
One detects two sets of reference points here. The first set is the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the purpose-kind. In principle, it would be fair to say that the
purpose-kind’s illegitimacy conclusively establishes the illegitimacy of any
conduct-kind taken therefor. The latter’s illegitimacy would remain no matter
whether it is otherwise deemed capable of constituting a material military
necessity or non-necessity vis-à-vis the former. The same cannot be said where
the purpose-kind is legitimate. The legitimacy of a purpose-kind does not per
146 This expression, although admittedly open-textured and imprecise, has been taken from the preamble
of 1907 Hague Convention IV. See 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 1, pmbl. (“[T]he wording of [these
provisions] has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements
permit . . . .”).
147 It will soon become apparent however that, in the specific context of IHL norm-creation, evil as it is
understood here is ordinarily and intuitively associated with that inflicted by one party to the conflict upon its
adversary or upon neutral parties. On the special case of evil that is exclusively self-inflicted (i.e., inflicted by
one party to the conflict upon itself or its co-belligerent), see discussion infra Part II.D.
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se preordain the legitimacy of the conduct-kind taken for its accomplishment.
Rather, the latter’s legitimacy or illegitimacy would depend on a second set of
reference points. It comprises the various possible combinations between the
conduct-kind’s stipulated evilness or otherwise, and its stipulated material
military necessity or non-necessity in view of its legitimate purpose-kind.
Normative military necessity does indeed offer weighty reasons for the
particular manner in which the framers of international humanitarian law
decide to formulate its rules. On its own, however, normative military
necessity does not offer conclusive reasons. The mere fact that certain conductkinds are considered capable of constituting material military necessities does
not mean that they are legitimate and should therefore be a matter of obligatory
or permissive pursuit under international humanitarian law. Nor, more
importantly for this Article, does the mere fact that certain conduct-kinds tend
to constitute material military non-necessities mean that they are illegitimate
and should be a matter of obligatory forbearance under international
humanitarian law.
B. Purpose-Kinds Vis-à-Vis Conduct-Kinds
1. The Purpose-Kind Itself Is Illegitimate
Where the purpose-kind itself is illegitimate, whatever conduct-kind is
adopted in pursuit thereof, deemed materially necessary or otherwise, is
likewise illegitimate.148 Thomson argues:
Suppose Vact-1-ing and Vact-2-ing are two distinct act-kinds. Let us
ask what the conditions are under which the following is true: A
ought not Vact-1 in order to Vact-2. One thing that would plainly make
it true is its being the case that A ought not Vact-1. (If you ought not
do a thing, then a fortiori, you ought not do it in order to bring such
and such about.) I suggest that there is one other thing that would
make it true, namely its being true the case that A ought not Vact-2. (If
you ought not bring such and such about, then you ought not try to.)
In sum, I suggest that we should accept: For it to be the case that A
ought not Vact-1 in order to Vact-2 is for the following to be the case:
149
either A ought not Vact-1, or A ought not Vact-2.

148 See, e.g., Henry Shue, Civilian Protection and Force Protection, in ETHICS, LAW
OPERATIONS, supra note 100, at 135, 137.
149 See THOMSON, supra note 90, at 222.

AND
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For our present purposes, the truth of “A ought not Vact-2” is a sufficient
condition, though not a necessary condition, for the truth of “A ought not Vact1.” In other words, whenever “A ought not Vact-2” is true, “A ought not Vact-1”
is also true.
In his criticism of what Lon Fuller termed “internal morality of law,”150
H.L.A. Hart observed that it is vital to distinguish between purposive activity
and morality:
Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections on its
purpose may show that it has its internal principles. (‘Avoid poisons
however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit’, or ‘Avoid poisons
however lethal if their shape, color, or size is likely to attract notice.’)
But to call these principles of the poisoner’s art ‘the morality of
poisoning’ would simply blur the distinction between the notion of
efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities
and purposes with which morality in its various forms is
151
concerned.

Here, Vact-2 would be “poison the victim” and Vact-1 “avoid poisons
however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit” and the like. To put it
differently, Vact-1bis would be “choose and administer only that kind and
amount of poison, and only in such a manner, so as to poison the victim
effectively.” Once it is accepted that A ought not to poison B, then it follows
that A ought not to choose and administer that kind and amount of poison in
such a manner so as to poison B effectively. Similarly, in Walzer’s words:
In the course of a bank robbery, a thief shoots a guard reaching for
his gun. The thief is guilty of murder, even if he claims that he acted
in self-defense. Since he had no right to rob the bank, he also had no
right to defend himself against the bank’s defenders. He is no less
guilty for killing the guard than he would be for killing an unarmed
bystander . . . The thief’s associates might praise him for the first
killing, which was in their terms necessary . . . But we won’t judge
him in that way, because the idea of necessity doesn’t apply to
criminal activity: it was not necessary to rob the bank in the first
152
place.

150

See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4 (rev. ed. 1969).
H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARVARD L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) (reviewing LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (1964)); see also H.L.A. Hart, Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, in H.L.A. HART,
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 343, 350 (1983) (book review).
152 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 134, at 128.
151
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The same may be said of belligerent conduct. Thus, according to the 1868
St. Petersburg Declaration, “the only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy.”153 The declaration delegitimizes any object in war—no matter how
rational it may otherwise be—that is not concerned with weakening the
military forces of the enemy. In other words, the declaration delegitimizes any
purpose-kind more or other than the weakening of the military forces of the
enemy.154 It would follow that any conduct-kind taken, whether it is otherwise
deemed capable of constituting a material military necessity or non-necessity,
in pursuit of an illegitimate purpose-kind in war is similarly illegitimate.
It might be thought that the same reasoning would—or should—
subordinate the legitimacy of an act in bello to the legitimacy of an end ad
bellum. Contemporary international humanitarian law has not yet reached that
stage.155

153 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1. For a similar but broader formulation, see Final Protocol of
the Brussels Conference of 1874, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 1,
at 21, 22 (“[T]he only legitimate object which States should have in view during war is to weaken the enemy
without inflicting upon him unnecessary suffering.”).
154 Illegitimate purpose-kinds would include strictly personal gain, lebensraum, racial extermination, and
the like.
155 See, e.g., William V. O’Brien, The Meaning of ‘Military Necessity’ in International Law, in 1 WORLD
POLITY 109, 142–44 (1957). Unsuccessful assertions to this effect were made by de Menthon, a French
prosecutor at Nuremberg. It was a popular theme among Allied prosecutors in post-World War II war crimes
trials. It might be asked whether the strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is always or
everywhere advisable. On one end, in favor of maintaining the traditional separation, are Adam Roberts and
Jasmine Moussa. See, e.g., Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the
Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963 (2008); Adam Roberts, The Equal
Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under Pressure, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931 (2008); Adam
Roberts, The Principle of Equal Application of the Laws of War, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL
AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 226 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008). Those on the other end include
Jeff McMahan, David Rodin, Christopher Kutz and Anthony Coates, among others. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN,
KILLING IN WAR (2009); Anthony Coates, Is the Independent Application of Jus in Bello the Way To Limit
War?, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra, at 176;
Christopher Kutz, Fearful Symmetry, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF
SOLDIERS, supra, at 69; Jeff McMahan, The Morality of War and the Law of War, in JUST AND UNJUST
WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra, at 19; David Rodin, The Moral Inequality of
Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello Asymmetry Is Half Right, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
STATUS OF SOLDIERS, supra, at 44. Be that as it may, this is not a matter pursued further here.
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2. The Purpose-Kind Itself Is Legitimate
The situation changes where the purpose-kind is not illegitimate in itself.
Here, the familiar adage—“the end justifies the means”—comes to mind.156
This adage mirrors utilitarian thinking.157 It is not our purpose here to explore
the philosophical terrain of utilitarianism. Of interest is rather the specific
manner in which military necessity reveals its relationship to it in IHL normcreation.
Utilitarianism becomes relevant to IHL in five ways.158 The first is in its
normative relation to jus ad bellum briefly noted earlier. Espousing
thoroughgoing utilitarianism159 would amount to abandoning the separation
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello and subsuming all questions of jus in
bello under those of jus ad bellum. In particular, it would amount to asserting
that any belligerent conduct-kind materially necessary for victory in a just war
is ipso facto legitimate.
Second, within jus in bello itself, thoroughgoing utilitarianism would entail
the idea that material military necessity per se is a utility worthy of IHL
protection or promotion and that material military non-necessity per se is a
disutility apt for prohibition or restriction.160 As will be seen below, IHL normcreation appears to take the intrinsic utility of material military necessity
seriously, though not conclusively; what it does not do, however, is to treat
material military non-necessity as an intrinsic disutility that should be
prohibited or restricted.161 It is more likely that international humanitarian law

156 Thomson is ambivalent about what role, if any (that is, utilitarian or not), the legitimacy of a purposekind plays in the legitimacy or otherwise of the conduct-kind chosen. See THOMSON, supra note 90, at 222–23
(“Are there also truths of the form: A ought to Vact-1 in order to Vact-2? Alice ought not give her child an
alpha-pill in order to kill it. Ought she give her child an alpha-pill in order to cure it? I don’t myself think it
matters much to what she ought to do for what Vact-2-ing it is such that she gives her child an alpha-pill in
order to Vact-2, so long as it is not the case that she ought not Vact-2. (Though it might well matter to our
assessment of how good a mother she is.) But others may think otherwise, and I therefore leave it open.”).
157 See generally Th.A. van Baarda, Moral Ambiguities Underlying the Laws of Armed Conflict: A
Perspective from Military Ethics, 11 Y.B. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 5–6 (2008) (“Classical
utilitarianism . . . states that morally just is that course of action that creates the greatest amount of good for the
largest number of people. When an agent considers his options, he is obligated to choose that option, which
leads to this result.”).
158 Admittedly, there are ways in which utilitarianism becomes relevant to international humanitarian law
in addition to those discussed here. See, e.g., van Baarda, supra note 157, at 10–12.
159 That is to say, utilitarianism not of a rule-based variety or a variety to which side constraints are
attached.
160 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.a–b.
161 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.b.
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is a system of norms in which the relationship between pursuing purpose-kinds
and taking militarily necessary conduct-kinds is characterized by a form of
rule-utilitarianism162 or a form of utilitarianism to which what Robert Nozik
calls “side constraints”163 are attached.164
The third way in which utilitarian thinking becomes relevant to IHL is in
the latter’s normative relation to Kriegsräson. Put simply, Kriegsräson’s
utilitarian rationale is that a great deal of evil may need to be endured for a
greatly important end in war.165 Plainly, this rationale—although certainly not
the doctrine’s notorious modus operandi166—is present in the very idea of
normatively regulating belligerent conduct. IHL norm-creation is well-placed
to deal with, and indeed contains, such a rationale.167 IHL norm-creation is
driven by the desire to reduce, as far as possible, the range of belligerent
conduct whose compliance or non-compliance with the law depends on a crude
utilitarian interest-balancing exercise by the law’s addressees.168
Fourth, reducing this range is not the same as eliminating it altogether.
Unsatisfactory as it may be, some validly posited rules of international
humanitarian law amount to little more than what Nigel Simmonds calls “a
residual provision” creating “a general legal duty always to act for the greater
good.”169 This general duty has been variously described in ethics as the
“principle of double effect”170 and the “principle of double intention.”171 One
162

See Brandt, supra note 141, at 146–47.
ROBERT NOZIK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).
164 See Shue, supra note 148, at 136.
165 See LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 196–97 (2007) (“For if there is a tactic that must be
employed in order to win a war and the winning the war is morally very important, then it would be only the
rule fetishist who thought that, on grounds of humaneness itself, this exceptional case must be subject to
absolute prohibitions.”). But see WALZER, supra note 134, at 251–63.
166 What is at stake in the context of IHL norm-creation is not so much Kriegsräson’s actual operation.
The latter is a matter discussed in greater detail below in connection with considerations of military necessity
being invoked de novo against validly posited IHL rules. See discussion infra Part IV.
167 See, e.g., NIGEL SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE 37–40 (2d ed. 2002); Manuel
Atienza, Reasoning and Legislation, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION: ESSAYS IN
LEGISPRUDENCE 297, 303–04 (Luc J. Wintgens et al. eds., 2005).
168 See SIMMONDS, supra note 167, at 37–40.
169 See id. at 39; see also SOLIS, supra note 3, at 269 (“In these allowances, terms like ‘if possible,’ ‘as far
as possible,’ and ‘if urgent,’ introduce elements of uncertainty and risks of arbitrary conduct. Without these
concessions, which take reality into account, the allowances could not have been formulated and approved in
the first place.”); Schmitt, supra note 2, at 804–05.
170 See, e.g., COLM MCKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR 64–65 (2002);
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254 (London, MacMillian & Co. 1891); WALZER, supra note
134, at 153; James F. Keenan, The Function of the Principle of Double Effect, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 294
(1993); Joseph T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
163
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example of this is the manner in which international humanitarian law deals
with attacks.172
Fifth, humanity appears to occupy an increasingly privileged place in the
utility calculus of international humanitarian law. That it does so often seems
to be simply assumed, but sometimes it is articulated in IHL instruments173 as
well as in judicial rulings174 and scholarly writing.175 It may be said that,
generally, humanity is anchored through the celebrated Martens clause.176A net

41, 43 (1949); Noam Neuman, Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cumulative
Assessment in International Law and Morality, 7 Y.B. INT’L. HUMANITARIAN L. 79, 104–05 (2004).
171 See WALZER, supra note 134, at 155-6.
172 See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); Neuman, supra
note 170, at 102–05; Kenneth Watkin, Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules, 8 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 26–30 (2005); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
173 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1, at 95 (“[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect
of alleviating[] as much as possible the calamities of war.”).
174 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 262
(July 8) (“Certainly, as the Court has already indicated, the principles and rules of law applicable in armed
conflict—at the heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity—make the conduct of armed
hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements.”).
175 See, e.g., SALAH EL-DIN AMER ET AL., INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA: EXPLANATION, pt. I, § I, paras. 2–2.1, at 74
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE § B, para. 2(c), at 7 (2009) [hereinafter
AIR WARFARE MANUAL]; Emily Camins, The Past as Prologue: The Development of the ‘Direct
Participation’ Exception to Civilian Immunity, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 853, 878–89 (2008); H. Lauterpacht,
The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 360, 363–64 (1952); Theodor Meron,
The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 243 (2000); MAY, supra note 165, at 53–57,
67–90.
176 See the various instruments in which the Martens clause appears, such as the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be
Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols) pmbl., Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S.
137, 163–64; Convention on Cluster Munitions pmbl., May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357 (2009); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) pmbl., June 8, 1977, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100.2, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, 611 (1987) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 1(2); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 158, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 3623, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 392 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art.142, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3424, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 242 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3255, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
120 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3152, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
68 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 1, pmbl.; Convention (II) with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 1, at 60, 61; see also DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145,
at 8–9; Hayashi, supra note 6, at 47; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
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increase in humanity—or a net reduction in inhumanity, as the case may be—is
often considered weightier177 than, say, a net increase in the satisfaction of
other considerations such as material military necessity and sovereignty.178
What follows is a detailed assessment of the relationship between the
legitimacy of purpose-kinds in bello and the legitimacy or otherwise of
conduct-kinds in bello.
C. Conduct-Kinds Vis-à-Vis Purpose-Kinds
As noted earlier, assuming that the purpose-kind itself is legitimate leaves
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the conduct-kind subject to two reference
points.179 They are, respectively, whether the conduct-kind itself is or is not
seen as evil, and whether it is deemed constitutive of a material military
necessity or non-necessity vis-à-vis the purpose-kind. These two reference
points can be combined in four ways, namely: (1) the conduct-kind is
considered evil and constitutive of a material military necessity; (2) it is
deemed evil and lacking in material military non-necessity; (3) it is regarded as
non-evil and constitutive of a material military necessity; and (4) it is treated as
non-evil and lacking in material military necessity.
1. The Conduct-Kind Itself Is Considered Evil
Where the conduct-kind in question is deemed evil, its stipulated material
military necessity or non-necessity is indeed one element in its legitimacy
modification.180 Let us assume for the moment that this evil conduct-kind tends
to constitute a material military necessity. We would then have to compare the
urge to reduce the evil embodied ex hypothesi by that conduct-kind, on the one
hand, and the stipulated concession that it tends to constitute a material
military necessity, on the other. Should the latter be seen as weightier than the
former, then the conduct-kind’s claim to legitimacy would be enhanced.
Conversely, if it were deemed more evil than materially necessary, then its

Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (2000); Schmitt, supra note 2, at 800–01; Helmut Strebel,
Martens Clause, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (1992).
177 See PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 395.
178 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 46.
179 See supra Part II.B.2.
180 By treating military necessity as proportionality, David Luban appears to limit his understanding of
military necessity to this particular setting. See David Luban, Military Lawyers and the Two Cultures Problem
46–49 (Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-057, 2012), available at http://
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/937.
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claim to legitimacy would diminish. Should the relative weight be
indeterminate, the question of the conduct-kind’s legitimacy would remain
uncertain.
In contrast, that conduct-kind which is regarded as evil and lacking in
material military necessity is plainly illegitimate. Unnecessary evil is evil
simpliciter and unmitigated evil is illegitimate.181 Even then, however, it is not
the conduct-kind’s stipulated lack of material military necessity that renders it
illegitimate. It is rather the conduct-kind’s stipulated evil—now laid bare and
unmodified by considerations of normative military necessity—that does.
The kind of situation at issue can be illustrated as follows. In his
autobiography, Raleigh Trevelyan, a World War II veteran, recounted an
encounter with a German soldier:
There was a wonderfully vulgar sunshine. Everything was the colour
of pink geraniums, and birds were singing. We felt like Noah must
have done when he saw his rainbow. Suddenly Viner pointed across
the stretch of scrubby heath. An individual, dressed in German
uniform, was wandering like a sleep-walker across our line of fire. It
was clear that for the moment he had forgotten war, and—as we had
been doing—was reveling in the promise of warmth and spring.
“Shall I bump him off?” asked Viner, without a note of expression
in his voice.
I had to decide quickly. “No,” I replied, “just scare him away.”
Viner aimed above the man’s head, and fired. The Jerry turned for a
moment or two, stared at us with mouth open, then went bounding
through the trees, waving his rifle above his head.
“Another bomb-happy,” said Bishop, who happened to be standing
by us, and he gave him a parting shot.
Only Sergeant Chesterton didn’t laugh. He said that we should have
killed the fellow, since his friends would now be told precisely where
182
our trenches were.

Sergeant Chesterton apparently thought that the German soldier should
have been killed. Here, Chesterton’s purpose-instance was “keeping the

181

See supra Introduction.
RALEIGH TREVELYAN, THE FORTRESS: A DAIRY OF ANZIO & AFTER 23 (1956). It was common among
British soldiers to refer to their German counterparts as “Jerries.” See WALZER, supra note 134, at 140–41.
182
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location of his unit’s trench concealed from the Germans.”183 With a view to
accomplishing this purpose-instance, he advocated the adoption of the
conduct-instance “shooting to kill the German soldier who had noticed the
unit’s presence.” Correspondingly, the purpose-kind at issue is “keeping the
location of the trench of one’s unit concealed from the enemy”184 and the
conduct-kind “shooting to kill an enemy combatant who has noticed the
presence of one’s unit.” It would appear intuitive that the purpose-kind, so
formulated, is legitimate. The conduct-kind, as phrased, would also be
considered clearly evil inasmuch as it involves the taking of human life. The
variable that remains to be fixed is whether the conduct-kind would be deemed
constitutive of a material military necessity or lacking in it vis-à-vis the
purpose-kind.
a. Evil and Necessary
Suppose now that, as was apparently the case in the aforementioned
episode, the German soldier was able-bodied and not offering to surrender. In
other words, he was not placed hors de combat at the time. Then Chesterton’s
would-be conduct-instance—“shooting to kill the German soldier who had
noticed the presence of Chesterton’s unit and was not placed hors de combat at
that particular moment”—was arguably a material military necessity vis-à-vis
the original purpose-instance. Similarly, the conduct-kind—“shooting to kill an
enemy combatant who has noticed the presence of one’s unit and is not placed
hors de combat at the time”—arguably tends to constitute a material military
necessity vis-à-vis the corresponding purpose-kind. It appears that those
involved in IHL norm-creation to date have declined to treat disabling enemy
combatants not placed hors de combat as illegitimate.185 Arguably, according
to today’s validly posted IHL rules, it is not unlawful to disable them by way
of killing.
Admittedly, the foregoing does not show that the stipulated material
military necessity of any conduct-kind always trumps its evilness.186 The mere
fact that a given conduct-kind is deemed evil yet constitutive of a material
183 Note here that this Article does not treat “disabling the German soldier” as Chesterton’s purposeinstance.
184 Similarly, this Article does not treat “disabling an enemy combatant” as the corresponding purposekind.
185 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.b as to whether one is duty-bound by positive international
humanitarian law to “capture rather than kill” even an enemy combatant not placed hors de combat.
186 See, e.g., Marshall Cohen, Morality and the Laws of War, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 71, 74, 75 (Virginia Held et al. eds., 1974).
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military necessity does not settle the matter as to whether it becomes legitimate
or illegitimate. Its legitimacy or illegitimacy all depends on the process of IHL
norm-creation and the outcome that it generates. The process involves the
weighing of the general value that is, or would be, harmed by the conductkind’s stipulated evil, on the one hand, and the stipulated need for this conductkind to be adopted if the realization of its legitimate purpose-kind were to be
attempted, on the other.187 It may happen that the conduct-kind’s stipulated evil
prevails over its stipulated material military necessity and thereby renders it
illegitimate. The unqualified188 IHL duty to forbear torture—even effective
tortures are deemed much too cruel to be permitted—is a case in point.189
Conversely, the conduct-kind’s stipulated material military necessity may
prevail over its stipulated evil and thereby render it legitimate. Such is the case,
for instance, with the episode at hand. Shooting to kill an enemy combatant not
placed hors de combat for keeping the location of one’s trench concealed from
the enemy—or, more broadly, for legitimate purpose-kinds generally—is
arguably an unqualified IHL liberty.190
b. Evil and Unnecessary
Let us now assume that the German soldier had dropped his rifle, thrown
his hands up and unambiguously offered to surrender⎯i.e., he had in fact
placed himself hors de combat at the time. Then it is arguable that shooting to
kill him qua conduct-instance would have constituted a material military nonnecessity vis-à-vis keeping the location of the trench used by Chesterton’s unit
187 The existence of this interplay is implied in various parts of international humanitarian law. See, e.g.,
1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 1, pmbl. (“[T]he wording of [these provisions] has been inspired by
the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit . . . .”); St. Petersburg
Declaration, supra note 1, at 95 (“[The commission has] by a common accord the technical limits within which
the necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of humanity . . . the progress of civilization should have
the effect of alleviating, as much as possible the calamities of war . . . .”). For a further discussion on the
military-humanity interplay in IHL norm-creation, see Hayashi, supra note 145.
188 This Article describes as “unqualified” those rules to which no exceptional clauses are attached. Thus,
rules can be “unqualified” in a general way, i.e., unqualified by any exceptional clauses. Alternatively, rules
can be “unqualified” in a limited way, i.e., qualified by certain exceptional clauses but not, for example, by
those exceptional clauses emanating from military necessity.
189 See, e.g., BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 123 (2006) (“We do not have to do a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether such [for example, rape, genocide or torture] are impermissible in warfare: we
already judge such acts to be heinous crimes because of their very nature.”); David Whetham, The Just War
Tradition: A Pragmatic Compromise, in ETHICS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 100, at 65, 82
(“[T]he principle of proportionality and also the idea of mala in se . . . recognizes that some methods of war
are simply evil in themselves, and cannot be justified under any circumstances.”).
190 See discussion infra Part V.B.2 regarding the status of “capture rather than kill” under positive
international humanitarian law.
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concealed from the Germans qua purpose-instance. All else being equal, taking
the German prisoner (who would then be removed from the battlefield and
detained in the rear area) would have constituted more of a material military
necessity for Chesterton’s unit than shooting to kill him.191 That would have
been so in view of the ammunitions saved.192 Given this alternative, shooting
to kill the German would have arguably been wasteful (ammunition-wise) and
excessive (death being an externality here). Note here that the evil entailed by
shooting to kill the German soldier remains the same in kind and amount; it is
its material military necessity that now ceases to exist. The evil conductinstance has moved from constituting a material military necessity vis-à-vis its
legitimate purpose-instance to constituting a material military non-necessity
vis-à-vis the same legitimate purpose-instance.
The corresponding conduct-kind, “shooting to kill an enemy combatant
who has noticed the presence of one’s unit and is placed hors de combat at the
time,” would arguably lack material military necessity vis-à-vis the
corresponding purpose-kind, “keeping the location of the trench used by one’s
unit concealed from the enemy.” It seems uncontroversial that a conduct-kind
that is deemed evil and lacking in material military necessity vis-à-vis its
otherwise legitimate purpose-kind is plainly illegitimate. According to Michael
Schmitt, it is illegitimate to commit “destructive or harmful acts that are
unnecessary to secure a military advantage.”193 This idea finds support
amongst several commentators194 as well as a number of military manuals.195
191 This Article does not assume that the conditions of combat in which Chesterton’s unit found itself
would be of the kind covered by Article 41(3) of Additional Protocol I. See Additional Protocol I, supra note
72, art. 41(3).
192 It is nevertheless possible that the German soldier’s unexplained and prolonged disappearance might
have alerted his comrades to the potential presence of enemies nearby.
193 Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Law on the Battlefield, 8 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 255,
258 (1997) (reviewing A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD (1996)); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War:
An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 52 (1997).
Here, “destructive or harmful” may be seen as indicating the evilness of the measure taken and “unnecessary”
the lack of material military necessity vis-à-vis its otherwise legitimate end.
194 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 242 (1994) (quoting Napoleon: “‘My great
maxim has always been, in politics and war alike, that every injury done to the enemy, even though permitted
by the rules [i.e. customary law], is excusable only so far as it is absolutely necessary; everything beyond that
is criminal.’”) (alteration in original); PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 396; ARCHER POLSON, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS, WITH PRACTICAL NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF BLOCKADE AND
ON CONTRABAND OF WAR 42 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1853); BILL RHODES, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MILITARY ETHICS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 105 (2009) (“Rather, [military necessity] requires that all harm
inflicted must be the result of legitimate military requirements; doing harm capriciously or wantonly violates
military necessity.”); SIDGWICK, supra note 170, at 255, 257; SOLIS, supra note 3, at 258; TELFORD TAYLOR,
NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 20 (1970) (“[T]he ravages of war should be mitigated as
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Where a given conduct-kind is illegitimate for the reason just described, the
relevant IHL rule would unqualifiedly prohibit it. Such would be the case, for
example, regarding the conduct unqualifiedly prohibited under Article 25 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations. This Article stipulates that “[t]he attack or
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings
which are undefended is prohibited.”196 According to the British manual:
The reason for this rule is that there is no military need to attack a
place that is not being defended. It can simply be occupied without
resistance or bypassed. Enemy armed forces are likely to have
withdrawn. Any remaining members of the enemy armed forces in
the place can be taken prisoner of war and their weapons and military
197
equipment captured.

Here, occupying or bypassing an undefended locality is a legitimate
purpose-kind. Attacking or bombarding such a locality is a conduct-kind that is
deemed evil and lacking in material military necessity for it.
c. Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration: Evil Means
Illegitimate If Unnecessary
As noted earlier, the St. Petersburg Declaration stipulates that “the only
legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to
weaken the military force of the enemy.”198 The Declaration goes on to hold
far as possible by prohibiting needless cruelties, and other acts that spread death and destruction and are not
reasonably related to the conduct of hostilities.”); Draper, supra note 3, at 135; Waldemar A. Solf, Protection
of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 117 (1986); Richard Wasserstrom, The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes,
in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 186, at 47, 49.
195 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., CANADIAN FORCES, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT
THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS § 202, at 2-1 (2003) [hereinafter CANADIAN MANUAL] (“humanity”
effectively held to render unnecessary evil illegitimate); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3, §§ 2.4–2.4.1, at
23 (“humanity” effectively held to render unnecessary evil illegitimate); U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ET AL., THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS § 5.3.1, at 5-2 (2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK] (“[The law’s] purpose is to ensure
that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the enemy’s war efforts and is not used to cause unnecessary
human misery and physical destruction. The principle of military necessity recognizes that force resulting in
death and destruction will have to be applied to achieve military objectives, but its goal is to limit suffering
and destruction to that which is necessary to achieve a valid military objective.”).
196 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, arts. 25, 36, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 2302 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 72,
art. 59.
197 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3, § 5.37.1, at 91; see also Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note
145, § 3.
198 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1, at 95 (emphasis added).
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that “for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men.”199 Disabling the greatest number of men was thereby held to be all that
any belligerent should ever need to do in order to weaken the military forces of
his enemy. Accordingly, though clearly evil and part of the “calamities of
war,” disabling such men was to remain legitimate as far as the St. Petersburg
Declaration was concerned. This first part of the Declaration’s preamble deals
with a conduct-kind that is considered evil yet constitutive of material military
necessity vis-à-vis its legitimate purpose-kind.200
There is one further step in the Declaration where disablement by way of
injury or death now becomes the purpose-kind and employing certain
projectiles becomes the conduct-kind. The Declaration states that its drafters
have “by common accord fixed the technical limits within which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of humanity.”201 There is no
indication, however, that the drafters decided to let the latter requirements
perforce or always trump the former necessities. Nor is there any indication
that the drafters intended categorically to outlaw employing those means of
combat that are deemed evil yet capable of constituting material military
necessities vis-à-vis their legitimate ends. On the contrary, they appear to have
specifically declined to delegitimize such conduct-kinds.202 The Declaration
itself falls short of delegitimizing disabling the greatest number of men and
using explosive projectiles four hundred grams or more in weight. There may
be suffering that is aggravating yet not useless (such as the suffering that
disablement itself entails) and there may be death that is inevitable yet not
useless (such as death as a form of disablement itself). Similarly, there may be
injury that is not superfluous and suffering that is not unnecessary.203
Admittedly, the mere fact that the Declaration declines to delegitimize these
conduct-kinds does not mean that it thereby conclusively legitimizes them.
Nothing in the Declaration precludes the possibility of the said conduct-kinds
becoming illegitimate on grounds that are established independent of, or
subsequent to, the Declaration itself. Such grounds may very well arise, for
instance, from the scope of evil broadening or the requisite thresholds of
material military necessity heightening⎯or both as the case may be⎯over
time.
199

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 The declaration is otherwise silent as to whether evil conduct becomes illegitimate even if it is
materially militarily necessary. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 803.
200
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As noted earlier, excessiveness is a species of material military nonnecessity. The St. Petersburg Declaration essentially stipulates that, qua
conduct-kind, employing explosive projectiles weighing under four hundred
grams produces both evil that is necessary to effect disablement and evil that is
materially excessive (i.e. external to disablement).204 The Declaration
proclaims that the disablement of the greatest number of men “would be
exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable.”205 At stake now is evil
entailed by the suffering of disabled men⎯i.e., those men who are already
disabled but alive.206 Aggravating their suffering and/or rendering their death
inevitable is hereby declared illegitimate insofar as it is deemed an evil that
lacks material military necessity for weakening the military forces of the
enemy. In the words of the Declaration, “the employment of such arms would,
therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.”207 This second part of the
Declaration’s preamble deals with a conduct-kind that is considered evil and
lacking in material military necessity vis-à-vis its otherwise legitimate
purpose-kind. As far as the St. Petersburg Declaration is concerned, disabling
the greatest possible number of men is a conduct-kind that is considered evil
yet constitutive of a material military necessity vis-à-vis its legitimate purposekind and is therefore legitimate; however, aggravating the suffering of disabled
men is a conduct-kind that is deemed evil and bereft of material military
necessity vis-à-vis the same purpose-kind and is therefore illegitimate.208
Disablement per se may legitimately take the form of incapacitating injury or
death. But evil that is extrinsic or additional to disablement itself is
unnecessary.209 The Declaration then proceeds to ban the employment of
explosive projectiles weighting less than four hundred grams⎯an unnecessary
evil.210
The Declaration exemplifies the notion that, when unnecessary, evil
remains straightforwardly illegitimate. Where a given conduct-kind is held as
both evil and lacking in material military necessity, and where that conduct204

See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1, at 95–96.
Id. (emphasis added).
206 They are “alive,” so they are susceptible to further suffering.
207 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1, at 95 (emphasis added).
208 See id.
209 See, e.g., Hans Blix, Means and Methods of Combat, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW 135, 138–39 (1988).
210 See, e.g., Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 145, § 6 (commenting on the rationale behind the St.
Petersburg Declaration) (“It is virtually a truism today that causing unnecessary suffering to enemy combatants
cannot be a matter of military necessity.”).
205
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kind is held to be illegitimate as a result, this merely shows that material
military non-necessity does not overrule or adulterate what is already evil.
2. The Conduct-Kind Is Considered Non-Evil
The foregoing demonstrates that the stipulated material military necessity
or non-necessity of an evil conduct-kind, is an element in its legitimacy
modification. The question, then, is this: Is the stipulated material military
necessity or non-necessity of any conduct-kind also an element in its
legitimacy modification? In other words, does the fact that it is militarily
unnecessary to do something per se mean that it is therefore illegitimate to do
so?
These questions are to be answered in the negative, particularly in respect
of conduct-kinds that are not deemed evil themselves. Plainly, it would be
legitimate, if not also affirmatively mandatory, to adopt a conduct-kind that is
considered non-evil and constitutive of a material military necessity. Similarly,
it might be normatively indifferent, but clearly not illegitimate, to adopt a
conduct-kind that is deemed non-evil and lacking in material military
necessity. It is possible that there may simultaneously be some third elements
that modify the legitimacy of these conduct-kinds. We are not concerned with
such elements here, however.
Let us return to Chesterton and the German soldier. Suppose now that
Chesterton advocates disabling the German non-lethally by employing an
entirely harmless yet effective weapon that happens to be at Chesterton’s
disposal.211 Now the conduct-instance is non-lethally disabling the able211 Admittedly, whether “non-lethal” weapons really exist is a matter of considerable controversy. See,
e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 246–50 (2009); David P. Fidler,
The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-Lethal” Weapons and International Law in the Early 21st Century, 87 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 525, 531, 550 (2005). Be that as it may, however, one can proceed on the assumption that
there are indeed genuinely “non-lethal” weapons if employed properly. Consider the sticky foam, for example.
If sprayed on the target’s mouth and/or nose, sticky foam may cause injury or even death. On such lethal
effects that even “non-lethal” weapons can have, see BOOTHBY, supra, at 246–47, 249. During Operation
United Shield in Somalia, the U.S. Marine Corps reportedly employed sticky foams for blocking and access
delay, with some success. See Steven H. Scott, Sticky Foam as a Less-Than-Lethal Technology, 2934 SPIE
Proc: SECURITY SYS. & NONLETHAL TECH. FOR L. ENFORCEMENT, Jan. 27, 1997, at 96, 96 (“In late 1994,
Sandia was contacted by the Marine Corps to support material applications for non-lethal use in Operation
United Shield . . . .”); id. at 103 (“The Marine Corps was loaned a number of sticky foam guns, 1000 pounds
of sticky foam, two fill stations, and approximately a dozen safety kits for training, use protocol development,
and ultimate deployment in Somalia. The Marine Corps performed extensive scenario testing, use-of-force
protocol development, and toxicology/safety reviews prior to deployment of any of the non-lethal technologies
to Somalia including sticky foam. These evaluations allowed the Marine Corps to develop escalating force
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bodied, non-surrendering German soldier who has noticed the presence of
Chesterton’s unit, and the purpose-instance is keeping the location of the
trench used by Chesterton’s unit concealed from the Germans. Reformulated as
a conduct-kind and a purpose-kind, respectively, the former becomes nonlethally disabling an able-bodied, non-surrendering enemy soldier who has
noticed the presence of one’s unit and the latter keeping the location of the
trench used by one’s unit concealed from the enemy. The variable that has yet
to be fixed is whether the conduct-kind is deemed constitutive of a material
military necessity or non-necessity vis-à-vis the purpose-kind.
a. Non-Evil and Necessary
The German soldier is able-bodied and not offering to surrender, i.e., not
placed hors de combat at the relevant moment. It would appear that nonlethally disabling him would constitute a material military necessity vis-à-vis
keeping the location of the trench used by Chesterton’s unit concealed from the
Germans. The corresponding conduct-kind would likewise tend to constitute a
material military necessity vis-à-vis the corresponding purpose-kind. A given
conduct-kind that is deemed neither evil nor lacking in material military
necessity vis-à-vis its legitimate purpose-kind would be straightforwardly
legitimate. The resulting IHL rule would most likely reflect this by authorizing
the conduct-kind in question.212
b. Non-Evil and Unnecessary
Now let us suppose, once again, that the German soldier drops his rifle,
throws his hands up and unambiguously offers to surrender. In other words, he
does in fact place himself hors de combat at the time. Then, arguably, even
non-lethally disabling him would constitute a material military non-necessity
vis-à-vis keeping the location of the trench used by Chesterton’s unit concealed
response options for non-lethals and supported the successful use of sticky foam in blocking and access delay
applications in Somalia.”). The effectiveness may have been less than stellar, however. See JON RONSON, THE
MEN WHO STARE AT GOATS 50 (Simon & Schuster 2009) (2004) (“The foam has had a rocky history. In
Somalia in February 1995, United Nations peacekeeping forces were attempting to hand out food when the
crowd began to riot. U.S. Marines were brought in to calm things down and aid in the UN’s withdrawal. ‘Use
the Sticky Foam!’ ordered the commanding officer. And the Marines did. They sprayed the foam not into the
crowd, but in front of it so it would harden and produce an instant wall between the rioters and the food. The
Somali crowd paused, looked at the bubbling, expanding, hardening, custard like substance, waited for it to
solidify, climbed over it, and carried on rioting.”).
212 Such would be the case, for example, regarding the use of “non-lethal” weapons in a manner that is
indeed non-lethal. It should be noted that it is debatable whether a party that possesses non-lethal weapons is
duty-bound to use them. See, e.g., BOOTHBY, supra note 211, at 249.
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from the Germans. Compared to this conduct-instance, and all else being
equal, simply taking the German soldier prisoner would constitute more of a
material military necessity in view of the ammunitions saved. In other words,
non-lethally disabling the German soldier is arguably wasteful in view of the
non-lethal weapons being expended. Here, the non-evil character of nonlethally disabling the German soldier remains the same in nature and degree; it
is its material military necessity that now ceases to exist. The non-evil conductinstance in question has moved from embodying material military necessity to
lacking it vis-à-vis the legitimate purpose-instance. Correspondingly, the
conduct-kind of non-lethally disabling an enemy combatant who has noticed
the presence of one’s unit and is placed hors de combat at the time would tend
to constitute a material military non-necessity vis-à-vis the purpose-kind of
keeping the location of the trench used by one’s unit concealed from the
enemy. Would this, and other similarly non-evil conduct-kinds deemed lacking
in material military necessity vis-à-vis their otherwise legitimate purposekinds, become illegitimate by dint of their stipulated material military nonnecessity alone?
This Author has argued elsewhere that military necessity has helped
distinguish between acts in war deemed materially necessary and hence prima
facie permissible on the one hand, and on the other, those deemed materially
unnecessary and hence impermissible.213 On this view, IHL norm-creation
separates that conduct-kind which is legitimate by dint of it tending to
constitute a material military necessity, from that which is illegitimate by dint
of it tending to constitute a material military non-necessity. It would follow
that matters of rational conduct transform themselves into those of normative
imperative⎯namely, “that which can be done without must be done
without.”214 Thus construed, normative military necessity would be a notion
that provides framers of IHL rules with a reason to restrict or prohibit the
pursuit of material military non-necessities per se.
This Author no longer subscribes to this view. One component in a basic
syllogism, i.e., the major premise, is missing in its chain of reasoning. Let the
minor premise be “the conduct-kind X1-ing tends to constitute a material
military non-necessity” and let the conclusion be “the conduct-kind X1-ing is
illegitimate.” In order for these two propositions to form a complete syllogism,
a major premise such as “any conduct-kind Xn-ing which tends to constitute a
213
214

See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 45.
Id.
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material military non-necessity is illegitimate” is needed. As noted earlier, a
proposition such as this embodies one of the two corollaries of thoroughgoing
utilitarianism, namely that disutilities are per se illegitimate.215 Yet, no cogent
reason has been articulated for which any proposition of this character does or
should exist in IHL norm-creation.216 On the contrary, there is good reason to
consider that it is of no concern to IHL norm-creation when belligerents
engage in conduct-kinds that tend to lack material military necessity. In other
words, it is of no concern to IHL norm-creation to protect or prohibit
belligerents from engaging in poor strategic, operational, or tactical behavior
per se. Material wastefulness, excessiveness, impertinence, and the like are,
strictly speaking, matters of incompetence qua member of a function-kind.
Consider falling for enemy deceptions, for example. From February 26217
until September 8, 1944,218 the Allied Powers conducted Operation Fortitude, a
215 See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 141, at 154 (“This restriction, incidentally, itself manifests utilitarian
considerations, for a nation is limited to the use of means necessary to overcome an opponent. Clearly it is
contrary to the general utility that any amount or manner of force be employed when it is not necessary for
victory.”); see also MELZER, supra note 3, at 281–82; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 195, § 202, at 2-1;
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 396; COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 132
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2005) (1915); ROGERS, supra note 3, at 6; SOLIS, supra note 3, at 258; TAYLOR,
supra note 194, at 34; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3, §§ 2.2.1.c–d, at 22; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF.,
JOINT SERVICES PUBLICATION 383: THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AMENDMENT 3, § 22, at 5
(2010); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 195, § 5.3.1; Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the
Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 230–31
(1998); Draper, supra note 3, at 130; N.C.H. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 442, 444 (1952); Greenwood, supra note 2, at 36–37; Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous
Injury or Unnecessary Suffering: From the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of
1977, 299 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 107 (1994).
216 There are, at best, only vague and oblique references to it. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 141, at 153–54
(“The position of a nation in a serious war is such, then, that it considers overpowering the enemy to be
absolutely vital to its interests (and possibly to those of civilized society generally)⎯so vital, indeed, that it is
willing to risk its very existence to that end. It is doubtful that both sides can be well justified in such an
appraisal of the state of affairs. But we may assume that in fact they do make this appraisal. In this situation,
we must simply take as a fact that neither side will consent to or follow rules of war which seriously impair the
possibility of bringing the war to a victorious conclusion. This fact accounts for the restriction within which I
suggested a choice of the rules of war must take place. We may notice that the recognized rules of war do
observe this limitation: they are framed in such a way as not to place any serious obstacle in the way of a
nation’s using any available force, if necessary, to destroy the ability of another to resist. As Oppenheim has
observed, one of the assumptions underlying the recognized rules of war is that ‘a belligerent is justified in
applying any amount and any kind of force which is necessary for . . . the overpowering of the opponent.’ This
limitation, however, leaves a good deal of room for rules of war which will maximize expectable long-range
utility for all parties. This restriction, incidentally, itself manifests utilitarian considerations, for a nation is
limited to the use of means necessary to overcome an opponent. Clearly it is contrary to the general utility that
any amount or manner of force be employed when it is not necessary for victory.”).
217 See ROGER HESKETH, FORTITUDE: THE D-DAY DECEPTION CAMPAIGN 27 (2000).
218 See id. at 290, 297.

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

244

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

deception operation designed to augment the prospect of Operation Overload
(the Allied invasion of northwest Europe) by denying Germany knowledge of
the true location and moment of the D-Day landing. Fortitude had three major
components. Fortitude North simulated a threat of Allied landing on
Norwegian coasts.219 Fortitude South maintained the pre-D-Day illusion of an
Allied assault on the Pas de Calais region of northern France,220 while
Fortitude South II sought to induce Germany into believing that Normandy
was a diversion ahead of a main invasion at Pas de Calais.221 A combination of
wireless deception,222 inclusion of false information in communication with
Allied POWs in German custody and to resistance organizations,223
concealment of real forces and display of decoys,224 restriction on troop leaves
and postal services,225 and, most importantly, double agents,226 was used in the
operation. Historical assessments of Fortitude’s impact on Germany vary, but
it appears commonly agreed that the deception did help the German High
Command retain its major formations in the Pas de Calais area before and after
the Allied forces landed on Normandy.227
Germany naturally sought to obtain the information on the invasion with a
view to optimizing its defense preparations.228 In this it largely failed due, inter
alia, to its overestimation of Allied strength,229 its own preoccupations about an
ideal landing site,230 its internal disagreement and indecision,231 as well as its
generally inadequate intelligence.232 Of the latter, one account states:
According to John Masterman, who ran the Double-Cross
Committee, the British captured and turned every agent whom the
Germans sent to Great Britain. This could imply a certain degree of
ineptitude on the part of the Germans either in the people whom they
chose to be agents or in the level of training that they gave
219 See MARY KATHRYN BARBIER, D-DAY DECEPTION: OPERATION FORTITUDE
INVASION 42, 45 (2007).
220 See id. at 64–67.
221 See id. at 127–31.
222 See id. at 24–26.
223 See id. at 26.
224 See id. at 26–30.
225 See id. at 30–32.
226 See id. at 32–39. See generally HESKETH, supra note 217, at 46–57.
227 See BARBIER, supra note 219, at 187–95.
228 See generally id. at 148–81.
229 See id. at 158–59.
230 See id. at 149–50, 169–70.
231 See id. at 161, 165–67, 171–75.
232 See id. at 159–60, 167–68.
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prospective agents. There is no denying that the British excelled at
identifying possible enemy spies. The exploits of Garbo and Tricycle,
as portrayed in their autobiographies and their case files, seem at
times a bit far fetched; therefore, one has to wonder why the Germans
failed to question their reliability and appeared to accept all of the
information that these two and other spies provided. According to
“Johnny” Jebsen, a double agent known as Artist, Canaris “did not
care if all the agents in Britain were fakes as long as he could go to
Field Marshal Keitel, the head of the German high command, and
report that he had twelve agents in Britain, each of them writing a
letter every week.” In addition, it is possible, by the end of the war,
that several Abwehr officers were no longer employing agents
despite the fact that they were still providing information from them.
Several officers pocketed the money meant for the agents and either
233
fabricated the information or obtained it from the newspapers.

For our present purposes, Germany’s purpose-instance might be described
as discovering the true location and moment of the main Allied landing on
northwest Europe in 1994 and one of its conduct-instances as choosing,
training and monitoring Garbo and Tricycle as German agents operating in
Great Britain. It is arguable that the latter constituted a material military nonnecessity for the former on account of its wastefulness and impertinence.
Moreover, it was a material military non-necessity of a nature that revealed
Germany’s own improvable vocational incompetence not entailing evil per
se.234 The same would be true of the corresponding purpose-kind and conductkind, respectively. In view of the legitimacy of espionage itself as a purposekind,235 the framers of IHL have apparently seen no reason to protect the party
engaged in espionage from non-evil material military non-necessities such as
failing to select, train, and handle its spies properly. Nor, for that matter, have
they considered it their business to prohibit such non-evil material military
non-necessities outright.

233

See id. at 159–60 (footnotes omitted).
This Article will soon consider situations where vocational incompetence produces “own-side” evil.
235 See, e.g., 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 196, art. 24; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra
note 145, at 241; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 157, at 419 (H. Lauterpact ed., 7th ed.
1952) (1906); AIR WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 175, § R, r. 119, at 42; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note
3, §§ 5.15–5.15.1, at 63.
234
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c. Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration: Does Unnecessary
Mean Illegitimate Even If Non-Evil?
The St. Petersburg Declaration may be seen to encapsulate the idea that a
conduct-kind becomes illegitimate on account of its stipulated lack of material
military necessity alone.236 But it does not. As noted earlier, the Declaration
delegitimizes that particular conduct-kind which is deemed evil and lacking in
material military necessity, i.e., the employment of explosive projectiles
weighing less than four hundred grams.237 The Declaration’s drafters found to
be “contrary to the laws of humanity” excessive evil brought about “by the
employment of arms” that either uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled
men or render their death uselessly inevitable.238 Plainly, the Declaration’s
reasoning does not address itself at all to situations where the conduct-kind is
considered non-evil in the first place.
Consequently, the Declaration does not assert that the conduct-kind that is
deemed materially unnecessary for its otherwise legitimate purpose-kind
becomes illegitimate for that reason alone. Indeed, where the conduct-kind in
question is considered non-evil, its stipulated material military non-necessity
such as wastefulness, excessiveness, impertinence, and pointlessness, would
not itself be a ground for its illegitimacy.
It would appear, then, that where a given conduct-kind deemed lacking in
material military necessity becomes illegitimate for some reason, the reason is
not its stipulated material military non-necessity. The reason would rather be
the operation of some other element or elements in that conduct-kind’s
legitimacy modification. Thus, a conduct-kind considered lacking in material
military necessity may become illegitimate on account of its stipulated evil
(e.g., maltreating persons hors de combat),239 its stipulated lack of chivalry,
unfairness, or bad faith (e.g., improper use of enemy uniforms in certain
situations of combat)240 and the like.
236

See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 47.
See supra notes 204–210 and accompanying text.
238 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 1, at 95.
239 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 41(1); Hayashi, supra note 145, at 728.
240 See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 196, art. 23(f); Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art.
39(2); Hayashi, supra note 145, at 752 (footnote omitted) (“[D]uring combat, the law clearly and unqualifiedly
prohibits the use of enemy uniforms. Performing this conduct-kind would generally be deemed both unfair and
confusing for everyone—including, self-defeatingly, those fighting for the very party resorting to such a tactic.
‘Prescriptive fairness’ would demand and normative military necessity would robustly permit the forbearance
of this conduct-kind. Consequently, a prospect of their firm joint satisfaction arises. The positive IHL rule on
the matter makes the pursuit of this joint satisfaction unqualifiedly obligatory.”).
237

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY NECESSITY

247

D. Special Cases: Conduct-Kinds Considered Evil in an Exclusively SelfInflicted Way
The discussion has thus far proceeded on the assumption that evil as
understood in IHL norm-creation encompasses all evil regardless of who
suffers it. It may be asked, however, whether this assumption is apt always and
everywhere. Does IHL norm-creation really concern itself consistently with
those conduct-kinds which are considered evil but in an exclusively selfinflicted way? If it does, does it juxtapose the conduct-kinds’ exclusively selfinflicted evil vis-à-vis their stipulated material military necessity or nonnecessity in the same way as those conduct-kinds deemed evil but not in an
exclusively self-inflicted way?
There is no compelling reason for which those conduct-kinds involving
exclusively self-inflicted evil should fall outside the scope of legitimacy
modification in IHL norm-creation.241 Nevertheless, instances where they are
included seem to be distinctly limited.242 More often than not, IHL normcreation appears aloof vis-à-vis conduct-kinds of the type in question here.
Thus, for example, the legitimacy or otherwise of the following conduct-kinds
does not appear to be considered in IHL norm-creation: deliberately inflicting
discipline and fighting spirit through fear243; incurring loss of life amongst
one’s own soldiers resulting from decisions of incompetent and/or
inexperienced commanders,244 actions of barrier troops,245 artillery tactics,246
241 See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 2, at 82–83 (demonstrating that one vision of international
humanitarian law “highlights the overriding and unconditional humanitarian obligation toward civilians
regardless of their nationality”).
242 See, e.g., id. at 87 (“The principle of universality suggests that the right to life of enemy civilians is
entitled to the same protection granted to that of our own civilians, that all civilians be shown the same
concern during combat, regardless of their national affiliation. This principle is not explicitly recognized in the
law on the conduct of hostilities . . . .”).
243 An example is refusing to permit one’s own civilians in a besieged city to evacuate with a view to
driving locally raised units to “defend the city more desperately.” ANTONY BEEVOR, STALINGRAD 106 (1998).
The same thought appears to have been in Goebbel’s mind in defense of Berlin. See ANTONY BEEVOR,
BERLIN: THE DOWNFALL 1945, at 178 (2002).
244 Consider, for example, the massive loss of life at the Somme. See DIXON, supra note 42, at 388
(placing blame more on Haig than on Rawlinson); MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, THE FIRST DAY ON THE SOMME: 1
JULY 1916, at 271–73 (1972) (placing blame more on General Sir Henry Rawlinson than General Sir Douglas
Haig).
245 In the summer of 1942, during the Axis advance towards Stalingrad, Stalin issued Order No. 227
which came to be known as “Not One Step Backwards.” According to Antony Beevor:

The order was to be read to all troops in the Red Army. ‘Panic-mongers and cowards must be
destroyed on the spot. The retreat mentality must be decisively eliminated. Army commanders
who have allowed the voluntary abandonment of positions must be removed and sent for

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

248

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

executing deserters,247 and, at least hypothetically, soldiers being ordered
passively to allow their own deaths” if the commander believes it is necessary
for mission accomplishment;”248 inflicting or sustaining friendly fires;249 and
deploying faulty equipment resulting in the gratuitous loss or reduction of
fighting capabilities.250

immediate trial by military tribunal.’ Anyone who surrendered was ‘a traitor to the Motherland’.
Each army had to organize ‘three to five well-armed detachments (up to 200 men each)’ to form
a second line to shoot down any soldier who tried to run away. Zhukov implemented this order
on the Western Front within ten days, using tanks manned by specially selected officers. They
followed the first wave of an attack, ready ‘to combat cowardice’, by opening fire on any soldiers
who wavered.
BEEVOR, STALINGRAD, supra note 243, at 85; see also id. at 167 (“Blocking groups . . . were placed behind
[militia brigades] to prevent retreat.”). An arguably “milder” version of the same idea can be seen in the orders
reportedly given to Allied airborne division sergeants dropping over Normandy, in Beevor’s words:
A sergeant mounted first to go to the front of the plane and the platoon commander last, as he
would lead the way. The sergeant would bring up the rear so that he could act as “pusher” to
make sure that everyone had left and nobody had frozen. “One trooper asked the sergeant if it
was true that he had orders to shoot any man that refused to jump. ‘That’s the orders I’ve been
given.’ He said it so softly that everybody became quiet.”
ANTONY BEEVOR, D-DAY: THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 28 (2009).
246 See HOGG, supra note 73, at 21 (“By the time of the Somme, July 1916, more experience had been
gained and more ammunition and guns amassed, and artillery support began to take on the shape with which it
closed [World War I]. Moreover the infantry had become more used to the idea of close support and had
realized the advantages of the curtain of fire. They began to speak of ‘leaning on the barrage’ by which they
meant following close upon the bursting shells . . . . The French, with their greater elan and still-unconquered
spirit of attack at all costs, were known to observe that unless the infantry suffered ten percent of their
casualties from their own artillery, they weren’t following the barrage close enough!”).
247 It has been suggested that the court-martial, guilty verdict and execution of U.S. Army Private Eddie
Slovik on account of desertion had to do with the need to discourage further desertions, already a problem,
amid the difficult Hürtgen Forest campaign. See, e.g., WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE
SLOVIK 9–10 (1954) (“Major Frederick J. Bertolet . . . stated . . . ‘If the death penalty is ever to be imposed for
desertion it should be imposed in this case, not as a punitive measure nor as retribution, but to maintain that
discipline upon which alone an army can succeed against the enemy.’”); id. at 12 (“[W]ith the 28th Division
bloodily engaged in Hürtgen Forest, a division court-martial gave Slovik the death sentence.”).
248 Richard V. Meyer & Mark David Maxwell, The Natural Right to Intervene: The Evolution of the
Concepts of Justification and Excuse for Both State and Individual, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 555, 556 (2009)
(citing RICHARD B. MYERS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES
FORCES § 3(a) (2005)); see also id. at 556 n.3 (“The previous Standing Rules of Engagement were promulgated
in January 2000 (CJCSI 3121.01A).”).
249 See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29 [103] (Lord Hope) (appeal taken from Eng.);
PETER ROWE, THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON ARMED FORCES 139 (2006) (“Allied armed forces may
mistake friendly forces as being those of the enemy and attack them. These, so-called ‘friendly fire’ incidents
have occurred to a greater or lesser extent in all modern armed conflicts.”).
250 R v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29 [127] (Lord Rodger).
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1. Minding One’s Own Business
The underlying assumption for the exclusion of these norms from
international humanitarian law seems to be as follows. In principle, the sort of
evil with which international humanitarian law concerns itself is first and
foremost that which a party to a conflict inflicts on its adversary or on a neutral
party. Conversely, international humanitarian law does not really concern itself
with evil that a party inflicts upon itself or sustains amongst those associated
with it.251 It might be said that there is something faintly Millian252 about this
assumption.253 This may be explained by the fact that international
humanitarian law has been developed primarily to regulate inter-belligerent
and belligerent-neutral relations, rather than relations between co-belligerents,
between a belligerent and persons and objects intrinsically affiliated with it, or
between a belligerent and persons or objects similarly affiliated with its cobelligerent.254 Thus, if, as shown above, it is not of concern to IHL norm251 It is arguable that international human rights law is making its inroads into the minimization of intraparty evil. See infra Parts II.D.2, IV.B.2.
252 That is, John Stuart Mill. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 49 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1948) (1859) (“But if he refrains from molesting others in what
concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern
himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed,
without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost.”). Thereafter, Mill reiterates the idea
that a person should be able to act on his own judgment and “stand the consequences” when those actions do
not cause harm to others. Id. at 67; accord id. at 86 (“If either a public officer or any one else saw a person
attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of
his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty
consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not
a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the
motive which may prompt him to incur the risk; in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in
some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I
conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it.”).
253 But see Luban, supra note 138, at 33 (“Notably, the impartial character of the obligation to avoid
unintended harm to civilians is the conventional understanding of the principle of distinction, as well as the
understanding embedded in the law of war.”). Interestingly, however, Luban offers no authorities for the view
that the principle of distinction in attacks applies to the attacker’s own civilians; rather, he appears simply to
assume it.
254 In this connection, see Finland’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to specify in the chapeau of Article
75 of Additional Protocol I concerning fundamental guarantees that such guarantees apply to “the Parties’ own
nationals and nationals of . . . co-belligerent States having normal diplomatic representation with the Party in
whose power they are.” 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 295 (1978); see
also PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 838 (referring to a declaration of the Finnish government on the
ratification of Additional Protocol I) (“[T]he Finnish Government declare their understanding that under
Article 72, the field of application of Article 75 shall be interpreted to include also the nationals of the
Contracting Party applying the provisions of that Article . . . .”). The International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”) notes ambiguities here. See PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 868 (“What conclusion can be drawn
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creation whether the belligerent fights competently and increases its prospects
of success or incompetently and imperils itself with dangers of failure, it is of
little concern to IHL norm-creation whether the belligerent inflicts evil on
itself, its co-belligerent, or those associated with them while seeking success or
inviting failure.
A similar assumption is perhaps more clearly discernible in the manner in
which war crimes are perceived.255 The absence of positively shared allegiance
between the perpetrator and the victim is formally required for grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The perpetrator’s own nationals—whether
defined technically, e.g., by Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV,256 or more
creatively as in Tadić257—are not protected under the “grave breaches”
provisions. As regards other war crimes, such as serious violations of the laws
and customs of war, the absence of shared allegiance appears to be taken for
granted through the formulation of a requisite nexus.258 The same may be said
mutatis mutandis of war crimes even when committed in non-international
armed conflicts.259 This stands in contrast to crimes against humanity260 and
the so-called “auto-genocide” as a species of genocide.261
from this? Some claim that the fact that the reference to own nationals was deleted reveals an intention to
exclude nationals from the application of the provisions of Article 75. Others believe that precisely by virtue of
the wording of Article 72 (Field of application) and Article 75 there was no need to mention nationals of the
Parties to the conflict explicitly.”). Interestingly, the ICRC argues that, in wars of national liberation, the fact
that the victim may technically be a national of the state in whose power he or she finds him- or herself should
not deprive that victim of protection under Article 75 precisely because the former is not bound by a duty of
allegiance vis-à-vis the latter. See id. at 867. Nevertheless, the ICRC concludes that the provisions of Part V,
Section III, of Additional Protocol I (which includes Article 75) “apply to a Party to the conflict’s own
nationals, except where the article itself indicates otherwise.” Id. at 838; see also RENÉ PROVOST,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 40, 42 (2002).
255 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 67 (3d ed. 2013); Ted van Baarda, The
Ethical Challenges of a Complex Security Environment, in ETHICS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra
note 100, at 148, 154–55.
256 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
257 See Prosecutor vs. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, paras.164–69 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
258 See, e.g., Prosecutor vs. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judegment, paras. 58–
59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
259 See, e.g., Prosecutor vs. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Judgement, para. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (describing how Kosovar Albanians were charged with war crimes
against Kosovar Albanian victims because of the latter’s “collaboration” with the Serbian authorities);
Prosecutor vs. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgement, paras. 1, 36, 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005). But see Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, paras. 37–51 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Mar. 14, 2012) (noting that at no point was
the possibility that the victims’ ethnic or other bases of allegiance might not diverge from that of their
victimizers raised as an issue).
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Many conduct-kinds that involve exclusively self-inflicted evil are
characterized by what a belligerent party does or does not owe its constituent
people, whom it asks to support its cause and make sacrifices therefor.262 For
example, it may very well be that a grossly negligent combat decision of a
commanding officer imperiling the life of his subordinates may constitute a
breach of the latter’s human right to life.263 On an incident involving the death

260 See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 72
(2d rev. ed. 1999) (“The essential difference between acts deemed war crimes and those deemed ‘crimes
against humanity’ is that the former acts are committed in time of war against nationals of another state, while
the latter acts are committed against nationals of the same state as that of the perpetrators.”); GEOFFREY
ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 260 (3d ed. 2006) (1999)
(“[O]ne significant distinction between a war crime and a crime against humanity would be that the latter
could be committed by a government against its own nationals (e.g. the Nazis against German Jews), while
war crimes could be perpetrated only upon enemies or foreigners.”); Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity,
23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 178, 182 (1946) (“[C]rimes committed by Germans against Germans, however
reprehensible, are in a different category from war crimes and cannot be dealt with under the same
procedure.”).
261 See, e.g., Florian Jessberger, The Definition and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide, in THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION—A COMMENTARY 87, 110 (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009). William Schabas was initially
skeptical of the notion, but he appears to have rescinded this skepticism. Compare WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 119–20, 148–49 (2000), with WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 138–40 (2d ed. 2009).
262 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 126, at 24.
263 See, e.g., ROWE, supra note 249, at 137–39; accord id. at 138–39 (“Depending upon the degree of risk
of loss of life and the nature of the compulsion (through the medium of military punishment for refusing to
obey orders) it is possible to foresee a situation where a solider may arbitrarily be deprived of his life. An
extreme example may illustrate the point. A commander has taken very little care over a plan to attack an
enemy military installation with large numbers of his own soldiers. He expects that very many of them will be
killed in the attack. If, however, any reasonable commander had thought through the planned operation he
would have concluded that the loss of life of his own soldiers would clearly be excessive compared with the
concrete and direct military advantage to be gained from the attack. It might not be difficult to conclude here
that some of his men have been deprived of their lives arbitrarily.” (footnotes omitted)). In the view of this
Author, however, Rowe’s view is deeply problematic for two reasons. First, it is not unusual at all that a
commander may find himself ordering his soldiers to launch a dangerous and risky assault, fully expecting
many of them to lose their lives doing it. The extent to which the commander takes care over his plans may
first of all be a matter of his personality (some commanders are more cautious than others). Besides, speaking
of cautious/audacious style of commanding, would it make any difference if the commander himself expected
to lose his life during the planned assault given its high risk and nevertheless led the assault? It is possible that
he acted negligently as far as his subordinates’ lives are concerned, but it is equally possible that he may be
praised for his bravery and leadership rather than blamed for the deaths of his soldiers. Second, even if,
arguendo, it can be said that a state is bound by its human rights obligations not to let its commanders launch
attacks that are too risky given the weapons, personnel, conditions, and so on, how would it follow from this
that the death of one’s own soldiers in such attacks becomes a breach of their right to life if such losses “would
clearly be excessive compared to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained” from these attacks?
This is clearly a formulation borrowed from in the proportionality test applicable to attacks, as Rowe himself
admits. See id. at 138 n.102. But the relevant “loss” variable for determining their proportionality or otherwise
is not the loss of life of one’s own soldiers, but that of civilians. Why should the standard for determining the
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of a soldier caused by heatstroke while serving in Iraq,264 the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom held:
If armed forces on active service abroad are within a State’s
jurisdiction for purposes of article 1 [of the European Convention on
Human Rights], the question arises of the scope of the substantive
obligations imposed by article 2 [of the same convention]. Would the
Strasbourg Court hold that they extend to the adequacy of the
equipment with which the forces are provided; to the planning and
execution of military manoeuvers? These questions are not easy to
265
address, but an affirmative answer certainly cannot be excluded.

The failure of a government adequately to budget its military procurement
programs, train its troops, and ensure competent combat decisions by its
commanders, may properly be a matter of domestic accountability266 and
perhaps even of accountability under international human rights law. Whether
it is, or should properly be, of concern to international humanitarian law
remains unclear.267
2. Delegitimizing Self-Inflicted Evil in War
There is nevertheless some indication that, in certain limited circumstances,
IHL norm-creation does take it upon itself to reduce evil that is exclusively
self-inflicted. Where some conduct-kinds involving such evil are also deemed
lacking in material military necessity, their illegitimacy appears to be readily
affirmed and contrary action readily demanded.268
arbitrariness of the loss of a soldier’s life in an attack in which he participated from the viewpoint of human
rights depend on whether that loss was or was not excessive compared to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from that attack? See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29 [120–24] (Lord
Rodger) (appeal taken from Eng.).
264 See, e.g., Army Blamed for Iraq Heat Death, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/scotland/south_of_scotland/6137990.stm.
265 R v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2010] UKSC 29, [79] (Lord Phillips); see also id. [100–06] (Lord Hope),
[118-19] (Lord Rodger). But see id. [214], [216-17] (Lord Mance).
266 See, e.g., Family Sues MoD over Marine Death, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/england/humber/8302050.stm; MoD Budget ‘Harm’ Claims Denied, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8217172.stm; Soldiers’ Families ‘Losing Faith’ in MoD, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file_on_4/4075539.stm.
267 But see Peter Rowe, The Obligation of a State Under International Law To Protect Members of Its
Own Armed Forces During Armed Conflict or Occupation, 9 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 16–24 (2006).
268 See, e.g., the rules contained in Articles 73 through 77, as well as Article 79, of Additional Protocol I.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, arts. 73–77, 79. According to the ICRC, these rules protect not only
victims in the hands of their adversary but also those in the hands of their own state. PILLOUD ET AL., supra
note 2, at 838. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II also
appear to apply to all eligible persons without distinction as to their allegiance. See IV OSCAR M. UHLER ET
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The norm underlying Article 58269 of Additional Protocol I appears to
indicate that even those conduct-kinds considered evil in an exclusively selfinflicted way yet constitutive of material military necessities can sometimes be
illegitimate.270 The norm underlying Article 54(5) of Additional Protocol I
begins by recognizing “vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion.”271 In recognition of such
requirements, it authorizes deviation from the prohibition against the
destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population—
this prohibition being otherwise binding upon a party to the conflict within
such territory under its own control—where deviation is “required by
imperative military necessity.”272 In other words, this norm renders legitimate
the infliction of self-inflicted evil in the form of scorched earth from which
one’s own population will suffer. It does so, however, only in the event of
imperative military necessity.273 This shows, first, that scorching one’s own
territory is principally unlawful and, second, that it is exceptionally lawful only
if imperatively demanded by military necessity.274
Similarly, the belligerent’s duty to separate cultural property from military
objectives under its own control also transcends the exclusion of self-inflicted

AL.,

COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR 40 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1359, 1369–70.
269 Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 58; see also article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I, although
this latter provision is not limited to the treatment of one’s own civilians and civilian objects. See id. art. 51(7).
270 See PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 692. The duty that Article 58 creates for a belligerent party is
predicated, at least vis-à-vis its own population, on self-interest. See id. at 692, 694; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF.,
supra note 3, § 5.36.2, at 89.
271 Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 54(5).
272 Id.; see also Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights Law, 293 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94, 100 (1993).
273 See, e.g., PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 659 (“in an extreme case”); see also Dinstein, Military
Necessity, supra note 145, § 8. The British military manual mentions conduct-kinds such as “the flooding of
low-lying areas to impede invading forces” as falling within the scope of Article 54(5). U.K. MINISTRY OF
DEF., supra note 3, § 5.27.1, at 74.
274 A number of states present in Geneva during the negotiations of this provision initially took it for
granted that norms such as this apply only where the evil in question would be inflicted by one party to the
conflict and suffered by another. See 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 280, 350 (1978). The adoption of Article 54(5) in its final formulation shows the drafters’ effective
concession that authorizing scorching one’s own territory if imperatively demanded by military necessity was
an unavoidable trade-off for otherwise unqualifiedly prohibiting the destruction of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population—that is, presumably, including one’s own civilian population. See id. at
462, 516.
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evil.275 The legitimacy or otherwise of such evil depends, inter alia, on whether
“military necessity imperatively requires” its infliction.276 Furthermore, each
belligerent, when compelled to abandon its wounded and sick to an adversary,
is duty-bound by international humanitarian law to reduce self-inflicted evil by
leaving with them elements of its medical personnel and materiél to assist in
their care—although, admittedly, only as far as “military considerations
permit.”277
III. “JURIDICAL” MILITARY NECESSITY: MILITARY NECESSITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF VALIDLY POSITED IHL RULES
The foregoing demonstrates that a given conduct-kind’s stipulated lack of
material military necessity does not render it illegitimate or give the framers of
IHL rules reason to prohibit or restrict it. Nor, as will be shown below, is a
given conduct-instance’s failure to satisfy juridical military necessity the basis
for its unlawfulness under positive international humanitarian law.
In its strictly juridical context, military necessity exceptionally permits
certain conduct-instances principally prohibited by validly posited IHL rules.
As such, juridical military necessity is essentially an evaluative notion used to
interpret and apply provisions of international humanitarian law to specific
facts.278

275

See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 4(1), May
14, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-1(A), 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Cultural Property Convention].
276 See id. art. 4(2). It appears that it is the avoidance of evil inflicted upon such property as a “universal”
concern, rather than that seen from a strictly self-interested point of view, that is at stake. See, e.g., JIŘÍ
TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 68–69 (1996).
277 Geneva Convention I, supra note 176, art. 12; see Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field art. 1, July 27, 1929, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 1, at 409, 411; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field art. 1, July 6, 1906, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 1,
385, 387. This rule, according to the ICRC, meets a “humanitarian requirement so obviously necessary.” See I
FRÉDÉRIC SIORDET, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 141 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952).
278 This Author has discussed juridical military necessity in some detail elsewhere. See generally Hayashi,
supra note 6.
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A. Military Necessity as a Clause Exceptionally Modifying the Content of a
Principal Rule
Juridical military necessity appears exclusively in exceptional clauses
attached to certain validly posited IHL provisions.279 The former clauses
authorize conduct-instances deviant from the latter provisions’ principal
prescriptions to the extent required for the attainment of military purposeinstances and otherwise in conformity with positive international humanitarian
law.280 Where deviation is not, or is no longer, so required, the conductinstance ceases to be excepted and reverts to being governed by the principal
prescriptions. In other words, a conduct-instance’s lack of military necessity
renders inoperative the exceptional military necessity clause attached to the
principal rule by which the corresponding conduct-kind is regulated.
It is important to bear in mind here that the conduct-instance’s lack of
military necessity does not, by itself, render it unlawful. For example, the
ground on which a given instance of militarily unnecessary destruction or
seizure of enemy property becomes unlawful is neither its lack of military
necessity nor the now inoperative exceptional military necessity clause
attached to Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations.281 Rather, the ground is the
principal content of that provision, whereby “it is especially forbidden [t]o
destroy or seize the enemy’s property”282 of which the destruction in question
becomes an unexcepted instance.283
B. Specific Requirements of Juridical Military Necessity
Juridical military necessity entails four requirements: (i) that the conductinstance be adopted primarily for some specific military purpose-instance, (ii)

279

See id. at 55–56. A recapitulation of some of its highlights may nevertheless be of some use here.
See id. at 59; see also Robin Geiß, Military Necessity: A Fundamental ‘Principle’ Fallen into
Oblivion, in 2 SELECT PROC. EUR. SOC. INT’L L. 554, 558–65 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., 2010).
281 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 196, art. 23(g).
282 Id.
283 Similarly, Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV principally prohibits the destruction by the Occupying
Power of real or personal property in territories it occupies “except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 176, art. 53. Before the
Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Ethiopia declined to contend that the destruction of Tserona Town
constituted a military necessity or that the exceptional clause found in Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV
applied to it. The Commission proceeded to find Ethiopia responsible for the destruction, an act principally
prohibited by Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV. See Ethiopia vs. Eritrea, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims
Commission, Partial Award Central Front—Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, & 22, § 63, § 71, at 138, 139 (Apr.
28, 2004).
280
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that the conduct-instance be required for the attainment of that purposeinstance, (iii) that the purpose-instance be in conformity with positive
international humanitarian law, and (iv) that the conduct-instance itself be
otherwise in conformity with that law.284
1. Adopting the Conduct-Instance Primarily for Some Specific Military
Purpose-Instance285
This requirement is two-fold. First, it must be shown that there was, in fact,
a specific purpose-instance for which the conduct-instance was adopted.
Second, it must be shown that this purpose-instance was primarily military in
nature.
Juridical military necessity pleas are inadmissible where the conductinstance is adopted for no purpose-instance.286 If, for example, an area was
devastated purposelessly, it would lack any meaningful point of reference
against which the devastation’s military necessity is to be assessed.287
“[N]ecessary . . . for what?,”288 one might ask in vain. The military purposeinstance sought need not be complete submission of the enemy. While it is true
that this formulation was found in some, typically older, military manuals,289 it
is not the case in most of the later ones,290 nor is it the case in jurisprudence291
or commentaries.292

284 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 62; Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An
Israeli Perspective, 4 J. MIL. ETHICS 3, 11–12 (2005).
285 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 63–68.
286 See discussion supra Part II.A.3 regarding purposelessness as a variety of material military nonnecessity.
287 See, e.g., United States v. List (Hostages Trial) (Military Tribunal V 1948), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 757,
1253–54 (1950) [hereinafter 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS]. Albeit in the context of
deportation/forcible transfer as a crime against humanity, one trial chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ruled that military necessity does not justify evacuation for the sake of
evacuation. See Prosecutor vs. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judegment, paras. 524–27 (Aug. 2, 2001).
288 MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 525 (1961) (emphasis added).
289 See, e.g., CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 195, § 202.2, at 2-1 (allowing complete submission only as
“the primary aim of armed conflict” (emphasis added)); WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING
PART III OF THE MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW ch.1, para. 3, at 1 (1958); U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 3,
at 4.
290 See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3, § 2.2, at 21 (“complete or partial submission of the
enemy”); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., JOINT SERVICES PUBLICATION 383, supra note 215, § 22, at 5;
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 195, at 5-2 (“partial or complete submission of the enemy”); see also
DE MULINEN, supra note 3, § 352 (“overpowering of the enemy”).
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Even if a specific purpose-instance is shown to have existed, it must
additionally be shown that the purpose-instance was primarily military in
nature. Here, the expression “military” may be understood as a quality
characterizing or purportedly characterizing293 sound strategic, operational, or
tactical thinking in the planning, preparation, and execution of belligerent
activities. It follows that military necessity pleas are inadmissible with respect
to conduct-instances adopted for purpose-instances that are not primarily
military in the sense just described. Such pleas are also inadmissible where the
conduct-instance was adopted primarily for some non-military purposeinstance yet would incidentally produce militarily useful results.294
2. Conduct-Instance Required for the Materialization of the Military
Purpose-Instance295
In order for juridical military necessity pleas to be admissible, the conductinstance must be required for the attainment of the military purposeinstance.296 Assessing the admissibility of such pleas therefore involves
evaluating the relationship between the conduct-instance adopted, on the one
hand, and the purpose-instance that it was meant to attain, on the other.
Within the meaning of juridical military necessity, a conduct-instance
cannot be considered required for a particular military purpose-instance unless
it satisfies all of the following criteria:
(i)
(ii)

That the conduct-instance was materially relevant to the
attainment of the military purpose-instance;
That, of those materially relevant conduct-instances that were
reasonably available, the one adopted was the least evil; and

291 See, e.g., Hardman v. U.S. (U.K. v. U.S.), 6 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 25, 26 (Arb. Trib. 1913); Hostages
Trial, in 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 1296–97.
292 See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 3, at 5; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 145, at 131–32; SOLIS, supra
note 3, at 260; Greenwood, supra note 2, at 36.
293 “Purportedly characterizing” accounts for incompetence.
294 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 64–68.
295 See id. at 68–87.
296 Various expressions, such as “indispensable,” “need,” “requirement,” “necessary,” and so on, have
been used to denote essentially the same notion of “required.” See, e.g., Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field art. 14, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 1, at 6 (“indispensable”); DE MULINEN, supra note 3, § 354
(“indispensable”); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 288, at 524, 527 (1961) (“necessary”); William
Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (1953) (“need”);
Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protection Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 90 MIL.
L. REV. 49, 55 (1980) (“requirement”); O’Brien, supra note 153, at 138 (“indispensable”); Dinstein, Military
Necessity, supra note 145, passim (“necessary”).
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That the evil that the conduct-instance would cause was not
297
disproportionate to the gain that it would achieve.

Understood thus, the conduct-instance “being required” does not mean
“constituting a material military necessity.” The two notions may be similar to
each other to the extent that material relevance is a common element in them.
They are dissimilar, however, because material military necessity alone
contains an element of superior conduciveness or efficiency, and judicial
military necessity alone contains the criteria of least injuriousness (see (ii)
above) and acceptable evil-gain ratio (see (iii) above). In other words, criteria
(ii) and (iii) make the scope of juridical military necessity more restrictive than
that of material military necessity. These two criteria arguably have humanitydriven origins. Material military necessity concerns itself with competent or
incompetent fighting; juridical military necessity concerns itself with
exceptionally authorizing deviation from the law which, as noted earlier, gives
humanity a privileged position in its norm-creation.298
Where a given conduct-instance fails to satisfy the four cumulative criteria,
it is arguably better described as a military “advantage” or “convenience”299
ineligible for exception than as a military “necessity.” A situation may also
arise where even the least evil of those reasonably available and materially
relevant conduct-instances causes, or is expected to cause, disproportionate
injury. Where this is the case, juridical military necessity may leave the
belligerent with no alternative but to modify the military purpose-instance or
abandon its pursuit altogether.300

297 David Kretzmer observes that this three-pronged test is “accepted in some domestic systems as a
general principle in international law” and “adopted by international bodies.” David Kretzmer, The Supreme
Court of Israel: Judicial Review During Armed Conflict, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 392, 450 (2004).
298 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
299 But see, e.g., MELZER, supra note 3, at 291–92; ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 122–23 (2006) (discussing Eisenhower’s General Order No. 68, Dec. 29,
1943); SOLIS, supra note 3, at 264 (“Sometimes, military necessity is invoked when military convenience is
closer to truth.”); Draper, supra note 3, at 134 (“One thing seems to be clear. Military ‘necessity’ is not
synonymous with ‘military convenience.’” (quoting von Manstein, supra note 3, at 522)); von Manstein, supra
note 3, at 522 (“Now first and obvious comment on the wording of [Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations] is that the requirement is ‘necessity’ and not ‘advantage.’”).
300 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 80. Walzer makes a similar ethical argument regarding Hiroshima. See
WALZER, supra note 134, at 263–68.
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3. Purpose-Instance, for Which the Conduct-Instance Was Adopted, in
Conformity with Positive International Humanitarian Law301
Juridical military necessity pleas are inadmissible where the purposeinstance for which the conduct-instance was adopted was itself contrary to
positive international humanitarian law. This is so even if the belligerent
chooses among the relevant and available conduct-instances the one that is the
least evil and whose injurious effect is not disproportionate to the gain. This
requirement, together with the next requirement discussed below, makes
juridical military necessity an exception from an obligation rather than a
justification or excuse for that obligation’s breach.
4. Adopted Conduct-Instance Itself Otherwise in Conformity with Positive
International Humanitarian Law302
Juridical military necessity does not exempt conduct-instances from the
prescription of unqualified IHL rules. The prohibition against the killing of
POWs and enemies who have surrendered at discretion is a case in point.303
This is an unqualified prohibition. If the circumstances surrounding the captor
are such that it becomes no longer feasible to keep his prisoner of war in
custody—for example, encirclement by enemy formations and shortage of
food rations—and if he kills the prisoner of war as a result, then he is not
entitled to plead military necessity.304

301

See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 87–90.
Id. at 91–93.
303 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(vi), done July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Geneva Convention III, supra note 176, art. 130; Charter of the International Military
Tribunal art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 288; 1907 Hague Regulations, supra
note 196, art. 23(c).
304 The U.S. Military Commission in Augsberg, Germany, convicted Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert
of killing an American prisoner of war notwithstanding their military necessity pleas. U.S. Military
Commission, Trial of Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert, in U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 3 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 56, 58 (1948); see also United States vs. Ludwig Kluettgen, Case No. 12-1502
(U.S. Military Trib. 1947); HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR—THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 501 (1993).
Similarly, in the Hostages Trial, Walter Kuntze was charged with the killing of unarmed civilians in occupied
Greece and Yugoslavia. He asserted that, with ground troops in short supply, intimidating the population was
militarily necessary in order to maintain order and security. This assertion was rejected. See United States v.
List (Hostages Trial) (1948), in 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 757, 1281.
302
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5. Miscellaneous Observations: Knowledge, Urgency, Scale, and
Competence305
Evaluating juridical military necessity also involves considering factors
such as knowledge, urgency, scale, and competence. Pleas made under
exceptional military necessity clauses based exclusively on hindsight are
inadmissible. Such pleas must be assessed in the light of the purpose-instance
that the belligerent had in mind when he adopted the conduct-instance. The
mere fact that a conduct-instance taken initially for some non-military purposeinstance happens to fulfill a military purpose-instance afterwards does not,
retrospectively, turn it into juridical military necessity.306 Conversely, a given
conduct-instance’s reasonable availability to the belligerent, its material
relevance to his stated military purpose-instance and the scope and nature of its
evil should be assessed on the basis of his contemporaneous and bona fide
knowledge thereof.307
It is possible that urgency308 is an aspect of juridical military necessity. But
if it is, then urgency or a lack thereof is already implied in the notion of the
conduct-instance being “required” or “not required” for the attainment of its
purpose-instance.309 In order for a given conduct-instance to be considered
“required” for a particular purpose-instance, it must be the least evil of the
alternatives that are reasonably available and materially relevant at the time,
and its evil must remain in proportion to the gain that it would achieve.310
The range of such alternatives, as well as the degree of thoroughness
with which the belligerent would be expected to assess them, would
in general increase or decrease with the amount of time he had before
305

See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 94–101.
See, e.g., HCJ 606/78 Ayyub v. Minister of Defense [1979] (Isr.), translated in 1 MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–80: THE LEGAL ASPECTS app. A, at 382
(Meir Shamgar ed., 1982); HCJ 390/79 Dweikat v. Gov’t of Israel (Elon Moreh) [1979] IsrSC 34(1) (Isr.),
translated in 19 I.L.M. 148, 173–74 (1980).
307 Prosecutor vs. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, para. 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Hostages Trial, in 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at
1297; MELZER, supra note 3, at 296–97; Brian J. Bill, The Rendulic ‘Rule’: Military Necessity, Commander’s
Knowledge, and Methods of Warfare, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 119, 125 (2009) (quoting Hostages
Trial, in 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 1295–97); von Manstein, supra note 3, at
522; Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 145, § 28.
308 See, e.g., Geneva Convention II, supra note 176, art. 28 (“urgent military necessity”); Geneva
Convention I, supra note 176, art. 33 (“urgent military necessity”); id., art. 34 (“urgent necessity”);
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 288, at 72 (“prompt realization”); Downey, Jr., supra note 296, at 254–
56 (“urgent need, admitting of no delay”); O’Brien, supra note 153, at 138–41 (“immediately indispensable”).
309 See supra Part III.B.2.
310 See supra Part III.B.2.
306

HAYASHI GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:26 AM

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY NECESSITY

261

[choosing to adopt one]. The less urgent [the conduct-instance was]
in view of [the purpose-instance], the more carefully the belligerent
would be expected to choose it and hence the more effectively he
311
would be expected to minimise its injurious effect.

There might be something counterintuitive about scaling different degrees
of juridical military necessity—such as, for example, from “mere” military
necessity to “unavoidable” military necessity and then to “imperative” military
necessity. Some commentators suggest that there is a hierarchy of military
necessity;312 others, meanwhile, express their doubts.313 It would be less odd,
however, should one accept the three aforementioned criteria for the conductinstance to be considered “required” for the purpose-instance. Where the
expression “military necessity” is juridically modified by a restrictive
adjective, it could mean, for example, that the interests protected are
considered so important that the belligerent ought to:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

Search more extensively for conduct-instances other than the
one being contemplated that may be reasonably available and
materially relevant to the purpose-instance;
Evaluate more vigorously the relative evilness between all
reasonably available and materially relevant conduct-instances
identified before determining which one is the least injurious;
and
Set a more stringent standard of acceptable evil-gain ratio for
the conduct-instance being considered before determining
314
whether it is or it is not disproportionately injurious.

It is not inconceivable that a given conduct-instance passes the “ordinary”
juridical military necessity threshold and yet it fails to pass a “higher” juridical
military necessity threshold.
Under certain circumstances, pleas made by a person pursuant to juridical
military necessity may become invalid by virtue of his status alone. For
example, only the commanders of forces in the field are authorized to make
311

Hayashi, supra note 6, at 98.
See, e.g., PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 1472–73; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 145, at 134–35;
Pertile, supra note 145, at 136, 151–52; Elmar Rauch, Le Concept de Nécessité Militaire dans le Droit de la
Guerre, 19 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 205, 216–18 (1980).
313 See, e.g., DE MULINEN, supra note 3, § 355; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 7–
8; MELZER, supra note 3, at 295–96; O’KEEFE, supra note 299, at 123, 157–59; ROGERS, supra note 3, at 145,
152; H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 215,
224, 234 (1991); Gabriella Venturini, Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict and in International Criminal
Law, 41 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 45, 53 (2010); Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 145, § 13.
314 Marco Pertile appears to make similar suggestions. See Pertile, supra note 145, at 151–52.
312
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use of the buildings, material, and stores of fixed medical establishment in case
of urgent military necessity.315 Where fighting occurs on a warship, its sickbays and their equipment may be used for other purposes only if considered
militarily necessary by the commander into whose power they have fallen.316
Similar provisions are found in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention317 and its 1999 Hague Cultural Property Protocol II.318
IV. INVOKING MILITARY NECESSITY DE NOVO
It is widely accepted that military necessity pleas de novo are inadmissible
vis-à-vis validly posited IHL rules that are unqualified.319 The standard
argument is based on the inferred existence of an exclusionary intention on the
part of the framers of international humanitarian law. As noted at the outset of
this Article, it is often said that the law has already “accounted for” military
necessity.320 Explaining this “accounting for” typically takes the following
form.321 In some places, one sees express military necessity exceptions.322 This
clearly indicates the framers’ intention to permit pleas being made de novo
under such exceptional clauses. It follows, a contrario, that the framers of
unqualified rules intended to disallow deviations on account of military
necessity; otherwise, they would have appended exceptional clauses expressly
allowing such deviations to these rules. The exclusion of military necessity is
therefore intended elsewhere.323 In other words, no considerations of military
necessity other than those reflected in exceptional clauses have survived the

315

See Geneva Convention I, supra note 176, art. 33.
See Geneva Convention II, supra note 176, art. 28.
317 See Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 275, art. 9.
318 See Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, art. 6(c), Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 [hereinafter Hague Cultural Property Protocol
II].
319 See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 3, at 290; PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 2, at 393; von Manstein, supra
note 3, at 512; Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 145, §§ 8–11.
320 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
321 Elsewhere, however, this Author argues that the argumendum a contrario commonly used in this
context is too crude, incomplete, and ultimately, un-illuminating. There is a more nuanced version that better
explains what it means to say that international humanitarian law “accounts for” military necessity and why
military necessity is inadmissible de novo. This better and more nuanced reason will also show that
humanitarian considerations may in some circumstances be invoked de novo effectively as a justification
and/or excuse for deviant behavior. See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 56–57.
322 See Greenwood, supra note 2, at 38.
323 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 3, at 138; Greenwood, supra note 2, at 38.
316
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process of IHL norm-creation. Consequently, where the rule is unqualified,
military necessity does not except, justify, or excuse contrary behavior.324
There are two ways in which the inadmissibility of military necessity de
novo may be overlooked or misunderstood.325 First, military necessity pleas
may be attempted effectively as a justification and/or excuse; this is essentially
what Kriegsräson purports to do. Second, military necessity is invoked
frequently in recent years as an additional layer of normative restriction over
and above the body of validly posited IHL rules. What this Author proposed to
call counter-Kriegsräson at the beginning of this Article encapsulates the latter
position. Common to both Kriesgräson and counter-Kriegsräson is the
erroneous notion that certain elements of military necessity survive the process
of IHL norm-creation and that these surviving elements are capable of
determining the lawfulness or otherwise of specific conduct-instances once
positive international humanitarian law has run its course.
A. Kriegsräson and Its Variations
Kriegsräson essentially holds that military necessity pleas de novo are or
should be admissible even as a justification and/or excuse in support of
conduct-instances deviant from the unqualified prescriptions of validly posited
IHL rules. The material military necessity of any given conduct-instance vis-àvis a legitimate purpose-instance overrides and renders inoperative any
provisions of the law that prescribe contrary action. Although the law does
indeed take military necessity into consideration,326 it cannot be construed so
that the belligerent is denied the option to adopt such conduct-instances as may
be required for the successful prosecution of its war. Where rules are
formulated without an express military necessity exception, it merely means
that military necessity and the law are considered generally in agreement over
the normative content of these rules. Whenever there is a collision, however,
the former prevails over the latter.

324

See, e.g., Gerald J. Adler, Targets in War: Legal Considerations, 8 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 16 (1970);
Greenwood, supra note 2 at 37–38.
325 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 2, at 796 (“[Military necessity] has been proffered both to justify
horrendous abuses during armed conflicts and to impose impractical and dangerous restrictions on those who
fight.”).
326 It is doubtful whether the advocates of Kriegsräson denied this.
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1. Material Military Necessity as Conclusive Lawfulness, All Things
Considered327
It is not difficult to see how tempting it must be for some—particularly
those with thoroughly utilitarian inclinations to whom the adage “the end
justifies the means” rings true—to regard juridical military necessity as a
justification and/or excuse. After all, the idea that a conduct-instance is
materially necessary for a legitimate purpose-instance tends to strengthen the
idea that the former is, at least prima facie, legitimate as well. Embracing this
idea is only one small step away from asserting that a given conduct-instance’s
material military necessity “rights” or “repairs” its unlawfulness otherwise
unqualifiedly established in light of the validly posited IHL rules applicable to
it.
Kriegsräson found increasing following in Germany during the latenineteenth century and remained influential among German military and
international lawyers until the end of World War II.328 Since its unambiguous
rejection in post-World War II war crimes trials,329 Kriegsräson has been
thoroughly discredited.330
To many commentators, juridical military necessity has no place outside
the confines of specific exceptional clauses.331 Admitting military necessity
327

See also Hayashi, supra note 6, at 52–55.
For a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Kriegsräson and its contours, see Isabel V. Hull,
“Military Necessity” and the Laws of War in Imperial Germany, in ORDER, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE 352,
359–74 (Stathis N. Kalyvas et al. eds., 2008). See also, e.g., GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 172–79
(1983); 1 JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 278–82 (1920), 2 JAMES
WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 195–98 (1920); PHILLIPSON, supra note 215,
at 133–38; SOLIS, supra note 3, at 265–68; Dunbar, supra note 2, at 203–04, 207–08; Mika Nishimura
Hayashi, The Martens Clause and Military Necessity, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: THE JUST
WAR TRADITION AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 135, 137–38 (Howard M. Hensel ed.,
2008); O’Brien, supra note 153, at 119–37.
329 See, e.g., United States vs. von Leeb (High Command) (Military Tribunal VA 1948), 11 NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at I, 541; United States v. List (Hostages Trial) (Military Tribunal V
1948), 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 757, 1255–56, 1272–73, 1296; United States
vs. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (Krupp) (Military Tribunal III 1948), 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at III, 1340 (1950)
[hereinafter 9 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS] (regarding “total war”); von Manstein, supra note 3, at 512–
13.
330 See, e.g., CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 195, § 202, at 2-1; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 145, at
136; SOLIS, supra note 3, at 269; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3, § 2.3, at 23; Greenwood, supra note 2,
at 38.
331 See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 35th Sess., May 5–July 25, 1980, at 45–46, U.N. Doc.
A/35/10; GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1980) [hereinafter ILC Report 1980]; DE MULINEN, supra note 3,
§§ 352, 353; DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 6; LESLIE C. GREEN, THE
328
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pleas de novo for deviations from unqualified rules would risk making the law
unduly volatile and subservient to the exigencies of war.332 Military
manuals,333 judicial decisions,334 and numerous commentators335 are also in
support of this view.
2. Self-Preservation
Some commentators who reject Kriegsräson still advocate a scope of
juridical military necessity that would, under certain circumstances, go beyond
express exceptional clauses.336 For example, in Julius Stone’s view, military

CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 147–48 (3d ed. 2008); INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW RESEARCH
INITIATIVE, THE SEPARATION BARRIER AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: POLICY BRIEF 5–6 (2004);
FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 366 (1971); ROBERT KOLB, IUS IN BELLO: LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 57 (2003); LEVIE, supra note 304, at 496–97; PILLOUD ET AL., supra
note 2, at 392–93, 399; ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 33–37 (1957); G.
Abi-Saab & L. Condorelli, Réponses à la Question 1, b), 33 REV. BELGE DROIT INT’L 406, 407–08 (2000); A.
Andries & J. Verhaegen, Réponses à la Question 2, 33 REV. BELGE DROIT INT’L 428, 435 (2000); Draper,
supra note 3, at 138, 142; Dunbar, supra note 2, at 202; Meyrowitz, supra note 215, at 108.
332 Recently, in the context of the so-called “war on terror,” controversial arguments have been advanced
with a view to effectively excepting, justifying and/or excusing torture despite its unqualified prohibition under
international law. See, e.g., White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales, DoD Gen. Counsel William
Haynes, DoD Deputy Gen. Counsel Daniel Dell’Orto, & Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intell. Gen. Keith
Alexander, Press Briefing, (Jun. 22, 2004), transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html. But see, e.g., Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or Military Necessity?
The Bush Administration’s Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 576
(2007).
333 See, e.g., CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 195, § 202, at 2-1; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note
3, §§ 2.2.1(b), 2.3, 16.44, at 22, 23, 444; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 3, at 4; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 195, at 5-2.
334 See, e.g., High Command, 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 541; Hostages
Trial, 11 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 287, at 1255–56, 1272, 1296; Krupp, 9 NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 329, at 1340; In re Burghoff, in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 1949 DIGEST, supra note 3, at 551, 554–57; In re Rauter, in ANNUAL DIGEST AND
REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES YEAR 1949, supra note 3, at 526, 543; von Manstein, supra
note 3, at 512–13.
335 See PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS: A HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 5
(Paul R. Rothman & Co 1994) (1908); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 6; JEAN
PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 88 (1985); Elihu Root,
Opening Address, 15 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1, 3 (Krause Reprint Corp. 1968) (1921); Donald A. Wells,
The Limits of War and Military Necessity, 19 J. SOC. PHIL. 3 (1988).
336 See, e.g., 2 GARNER, supra note 328, at 196–97 (“It must be admitted that within reasonable limits this
much criticised theory [i.e. Kriegsräson] is legally defensible; that is to say, a belligerent is justified in
disregarding a rule of war law whenever conformity to the rule would involve his destruction . . . .”). N.b.,
upon closer reading, however, it becomes apparent that Garner’s support for self-preservation is more
reserved. See id. at 193–95, 197; see also Brandt, supra note 141, at 147 n.3 (“It is conceivable that ideal rules
of war would include one rule to the effect that anything is allowable, if necessary to prevent absolute
catastrophe. As Oppenheim remarks, it may be that if the basic values of society are threatened nations are
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necessity does—or should, in any event—entitle a state at war to depart from
its duties under international law on account of self-preservation.337 Stone
clearly embraced the criticism of what he called military necessity in “such an
extended German sense.”338 His doubts concern whether this criticism, while
valid in relation to Kriegsräson, could be defensibly construed as excluding
self-preservation.339
In its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, the International Court of Justice observed that such threat or use
would generally be contrary to international humanitarian law.340 The opinion
went on to state, however, that the court “cannot lose sight of the fundamental
right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to selfdefence . . . when its survival is at stake.”341 The court held, by seven votes to
seven, with the President casting the deciding vote, that it “cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake . . . .”342 It may be argued that the court’s
ambivalence goes beyond jus ad bellum—the opinion speaks of “an extreme
circumstance of self-defence”343—to encompass jus in bello.344 Judges345 and
experts346 have responded with concern. The opinion may be seen as
possibly released from all the restrictions in order to do what ‘they deem to be decisive for the ultimate
vindication of the law of nations.’”) (citing 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 351 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1955)).
337 See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS
OF DISPUTES—AND WAR—LAW 352–53 (1954).
338 Id. at 352.
339 See id. at 352–53. But see Dunbar, supra note 215, at 443. Some commentators would even question
whether self-preservation should be discussed alongside justificatory military necessity to begin with. See, e.g.,
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 145, at 136; WALZER, supra note 134, at 305; Cohen, supra note 186, at 76–
78; Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 145, § 10-1.
340 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 262–63
(July 8).
341 Id. at 263.
342 Id. at 266; see also id. at 263.
343 Id. at 301 (separate opinion of Ranjeva, J.).
344 See, e.g., id.at 301–02 (separate opinion of Ranjeva, J.); DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra
note 145, at 85; Christopher Greenwood, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 247, 249–
50 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999); Nishimura Hayashi, supra note 328, at
143–44.
345 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J., at 590 (Higgins, J.
dissenting); id. at 513–20 (Weeramantry, J. dissenting).
346 See, e.g., Luigi Condorelli, Le droit international humanitaire, ou l’exploration par la Cour d’une
Terra à peu près incognita pour Elle, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND
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embracing the view that situations constituting or analogous to selfpreservation and involving the right of self-defense may justify the threat or
use of nuclear weapons notwithstanding its general incompatibility with
international humanitarian law.347
3. Material Impossibility and Impracticality
According to Hillaire McCoubrey, Jean Pictet espoused a version of
juridical military necessity whereby non-compliance with a rule would be
tolerated in the event of genuine material impossibility.348 In truth, however, it
is doubtful whether Pictet discussed “genuine material impossibility” really as
a variant of juridical military necessity. All Pictet said is this:
[T]here is an implicit clause in any law to the effect that no one is
obliged to do what is impossible. This remains implicit because if it
were stated openly the risks of abusive and tendentious
interpretations would be too great. . . . Thus, when we speak of what
is “impossible” we must refer only to a genuine material
349
impossibility.

Pictet’s treatment of genuine material impossibility as an implicit clause
stands in stark contrast to his thoroughgoing rejection of implicit military
necessity clauses: “We should emphasize that there is no express or implicit
clause in the law of war giving priority to military necessity—otherwise there
would be no such thing as the law of war!”350 McCoubrey himself suggested
that, for the purposes of military necessity, “necessity connotes an immediate

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 344, 229, 244–45; Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, supra note 344, at 275, 292; Marcelo G. Kohen, The Notion of ‘State Survival’ in International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note
344, at 293, 310; see also DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES (2010), supra note 145, at 85–86; SOLIS, supra
note 3, at 269; Nishimura Hayashi, supra note 328, at 143–44.
347 See Greenwood, supra note 2, at 36–37; Greenwood, supra note 344, at 264.
348 See McCoubrey, supra note 313, at 220 (“The second position . . . of military necessity appears to be
reflected [into a] much more limiting model advanced by Jean Pictet . . . . Here the doctrine of military
necessity is reduced to an admission that in certain cases it may be ‘impossible’ to comply with legal norms in
which case a ‘defence’ in respect of prima facie unlawful action will arise.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION
OF WARFARE 303–04 (2d ed. 1998).
349 PICTET, supra note 335, at 88.
350 Id. (emphasis added).
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and overwhelming circumstance in military action, which renders [strict]
compliance, upon rational [analysis], impractical rather than ‘impossible.’”351
B. Counter-Kriegsräson
Counter-Kriegsräson treats juridical military necessity as an additional
layer of normative restraint over conduct-instances that are otherwise in
conformity with validly posited IHL rules.352 On this view, a given conductinstance’s material military non-necessity “wrongs” or “vitiates” its lawfulness
otherwise conclusively established or left intact in light of those validly posited
IHL rules applicable to it. The idea that a conduct-instance is lacking in
material military necessity vis-à-vis its legitimate purpose-instance strengthens
the perception that it is illegitimate or, at a minimum, weakens the perception
that it is legitimate.353
As noted earlier, the standard argument is that the inadmissibility of
military necessity de novo, vis-à-vis unqualified provisions of positive
international humanitarian law, issues from the fact that their drafters have
already accounted for military necessity.354 Recall further that it is for this
reason that Kriegsräson is unacceptable. This line of reasoning is readily
espoused by the vast majority of authorities.355 Yet, inexplicably, many of
them go on to state or imply that, over and above validly posited IHL rules,
military necessity imposes a further restraint on belligerent conduct and
outlaws material military non-necessities that would otherwise remain
lawful.356 Counter-Kriegsräson asserts, in effect, that military non-necessity
per se connotes illegitimacy and that this delegitimizing attribute of military
necessity has survived the process of IHL norm-creation.
Some military manuals appear to suggest such a view.357 This position also
finds support among a number of commentators.358 Of the latter, Nils Melzer is
351 McCoubrey, supra note 313, at 237. McCoubrey went on to qualify his position: “Impractical is a term
here carefully chosen, it is by no means intended to imply the concession to tactical and strategic convenience
which is implicit in the maxim kriegsrason geht vor kriegsmanier.” Id.
352 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 47.
353 As noted earlier, this Author used to lean towards a similar position. See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 44–
45.
354 See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 6.
355 See supra notes 333–335.
356 See, e.g., PICTET, supra note 335, at 88.
357 See COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 195, at 5-2 (“[The goal of military necessity] is to limit
suffering and destruction to that which is necessary to achieve a valid military objective. Thus it prohibits the
use of any kind or degree of force not required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a
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perhaps the most vocal and articulate.359 His views on the matter appear to
have evolved primarily in connection with the question as to whether
international humanitarian law imposes an affirmative duty upon belligerents
to “capture rather than kill” enemy combatants,360 a long-running debate that
has regained currency in recent years.361
1. Material Military Non-Necessity as Conclusive Unlawfulness, All Things
Considered
According to Melzer, “[T]he principle of military necessity reduces the
sum total of lawful military action from that which positive IHL does not
prohibit in abstracto to that which is actually required in concreto.”362 He
continues:

minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.”); see also U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 3,
§ 2.2.1(d), at 22 (“[T]he use of force which is not necessary is unlawful.”). This latter formulation is curious
and, in honesty, quite mysterious, inasmuch as the manual continues to state that unnecessary use of force is
unlawful “since it involves wanton killing or destruction.” It is far from clear whether unnecessary use of force
always involves wanton killing or destruction. According to Nils Melzer, Colombia’s Manual of Operational
Law says that military necessity is restrictive. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military
Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831, 910 (2010).
358 See, e.g., SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 145, at 135; TAYLOR, supra note 194, at 34; Federic L.
Borch, Targeting After Kosovo: Has the Law Changed for Strike Planners?, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV.,
Spring 2003, at 64, 66; Greenwood, supra note 2, at 36–37, 38; Meyrowitz, supra note 215, at 107; Shue,
supra note 148, at 136–37; Venturini, supra note 313, at 48–50.
359 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing or Less Harmful Means?—Israel’s High Court Judgment on Targeted
Killing and the Restrictive Function of Military Necessity, 9 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87, 108–13 (2006).
360 The idea was famously articulated by Jean Pictet. See PICTET, supra note 335, at 75–76 (“If we can put
a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by
wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same military advantage, we must
choose the one which causes the lesser evil.”); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 82 n. 221 (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE]; MELZER, supra note 3, at 289; Melzer, supra
note 359, at 108–13. On the rejection of Pictet’s assertion, see, for example, FRITS KALSHOVEN, The Soldier
and His Golf Clubs, in REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS 359, 368–75 (2007); Hays
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and
Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 785–87, 799 (2010); Schmitt, supra note 2, at 835.
361 See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, The International Legal Framework for Stability Operations: When May
International Forces Attack or Detain Someone in Afghanistan?, 39 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 177, 189–90
(2009).
362 MELZER, supra note 3, at 286. In the Interpretive Guidance, a subtle (yet significant) modification has
been made to the text. See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 360, at 79 (“In conjunction, the principles of
military necessity and of humanity reduce the sum total of permissible military action from that which IHL
does not expressly prohibit to that which is actually necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate military
purpose in the prevailing circumstances.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Further, see Nils Melzer,
Targeted Killings in Operational Law Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
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This means that, for example, a direct attack against an otherwise
legitimate military target constitutes a violation of IHL if that attack
is not required for the submission of the enemy with a minimum
expenditure of time, life and physical resources . . . . [T]he various
provisions of IHL which permit a particular conduct in armed conflict
constitute the result of “equations” which already include the
“necessity-factor.” Since it is precisely this necessity-factor which
makes that conduct lawful despite its deviation from the more
restrictive rules applicable in peace time, the loss or absence of this
factor necessarily changes the equation to the effect that the said
conduct becomes unlawful . . . . The restrictive aspect of military
necessity has significant practical consequences because it requires at
least a basic assessment of military necessity in each case, and not
only where positive IHL expressly so demands. While positive
prohibitions may restrict the extent to which military necessity can
justify military action, the absence of a prohibition does not liberate
parties to the conflict from the fundamental constraints imposed by
363
the principle of military necessity.

Melzer refers to “particular conduct” simpliciter rather than particular
conduct that is evil. It would therefore appear that he asks himself whether
“materially unnecessary per se means unlawful” and not—to be abundantly
clear—whether “materially unnecessary evil means unlawful.” Material
military necessity separates that belligerent conduct-instance which is
conducive to the accomplishment of its objective from that which is not.364 It is
also true that the material military necessity or non-necessity of a given
conduct-instance involves its “basic assessment . . . in each case.”365 As
demonstrated above, however, evaluating the military necessity or nonnecessity of a conduct-instance matters only in the notion’s material context
(i.e. strictly as a strategic self-interest)366 and juridical context (i.e. strictly as
an express exceptional clause),367 not in its normative context. Besides, the
MILITARY OPERATIONS 277, 300 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010) (“In conjunction, the principles of
military necessity and of humanity could be said to reduce the sum total of permissible military action . . . .”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); see also Nils Melzer, The ICRC’s Clarification Process on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE 151, 162
(Christian Tomuschat et al. eds., 2010). Despite these modifications, however, two principal characteristics of
interest to our present discussion remain. First, adding humanity does not per se alter the idea that military
necessity still reduces that sum total, at least as far as Melzer is concerned. Second, adding “could be said”
preserves the argument that military necessity reduces the sum total of lawful military action.
363 MELZER, supra note 3, at 287 (footnotes omitted).
364 See supra Part I.
365 MELZER, supra note 3, at 287.
366 See supra Part I.
367 See supra Part III.
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latter context does not support the idea that lacking in material military
necessity means illegitimate apt for prohibition or restriction under positive
international humanitarian law.368 Thus, the mystery still remains: How, in
Melzer’s view, does the proposition “X-ing is materially unnecessary in view
of its basic military necessity assessment” transform itself into the proposition
“X-ing is unlawful in view of its basic military necessity assessment”?
It appears that Melzer’s arguments are two-fold. First, in his view, validly
posited IHL rules are merely necessity-driven derogations in armed conflict
from their more restrictive peacetime counterparts. Second, Melzer effectively
asserts that certain elements of military necessity survive the process of IHL
norm-creation.
a. Validly Posited IHL Rules as Necessity-Based Derogations from
Peacetime Rules
Melzer mentions the “more restrictive rules applicable in peace time” from
which “this necessity-factor . . . makes . . . conduct lawful despite its
deviation.”369 In essence, Melzer appears to treat every belligerent conductinstance as a deviation from its corresponding conduct-kind in peacetime and
every validly posited IHL rule as a necessity-driven derogation clause from its
“more restrictive” counterpart applicable in peacetime. From these rules, only
those deviant conduct-instances that constitute material military necessities
would, on an individual basis, be eligible for derogation.370 This, it is
submitted here, is a highly idiosyncratic construal of international
humanitarian law. One would rather think that, once an armed conflict exists,
international humanitarian law provides a stand-alone—albeit admittedly
nonexclusive—normative framework by which the compliance or otherwise of
a given belligerent conduct-instance with its own rules can be intelligibly
assessed.
368

See supra Part II.
MELZER, supra note 3, at 287.
370 In this connection, Melzer says something interesting. Id. at 289 (“In the final analysis, as much as the
positive rules of IHL may presume the existence of military necessity, they also presuppose such necessity as
an inherent condition for the lawfulness of military operations. Therefore, where the targeting of an individual
is concerned, the restrictive aspect of military necessity as informed (and not: balanced) by humanitarian
considerations requires that, whenever possible, even combatants be captured rather than killed.” (footnotes
omitted)); id. at 290 (“For the most part, this balance [between the permissive function of military necessity
and other interests such as humanitarian, cultural, religious, political, environmental or economic values] has
already been made, and is expressed in positive rules. As long as the military necessity presumed by those
provisions is not manifestly absent in the concrete circumstances, hostilities can be conducted according to
these rules without carrying out a renewed balance of interests.”).
369
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Even if, arguendo, any conduct-instance lacking in material military
necessity did expose itself to those “more restrictive” peacetime rules and,
even if, arguendo, the latter rules did render such a conduct-instance unlawful,
it is the said peacetime rules, not the absence of material military necessity,
that would render the conduct-instance unlawful. Even according to Melzer’s
own terminology, the loss or absence of the “necessity-factor” is not what
“wrongs” or “vitiates” the conduct-instance’s lawfulness otherwise left intact
by validly posited IHL rules. He argues instead that, with this necessity-factor
now removed, the conduct-instance would be assessed by reference to the
more restrictive peacetime rules, and that these rules would render the conductinstance unlawful.371
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Melzer appears to suggest that international
humanitarian law would still be the body of law by reference to which the
militarily unnecessary conduct-instance is to be regarded as unlawful. In
Melzer’s own words: “[A] direct attack against an otherwise legitimate
military target constitutes a violation of IHL if that attack is not required for
the submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life and
physical resources.”372 The position implied here is therefore not that of
another, epistemologically distinct body of law functioning as lex specialis
relative to international humanitarian law on a given conduct-instance. It is
rather that a conduct-instance otherwise lawful according to positive
international humanitarian law nevertheless becomes unlawful according to
the same body of law, all things considered, if that conduct-instance is lacking
in material military necessity and thus becomes “deviant from the more
restrictive rules applicable in peace time.”373
Melzer’s position that “materially unnecessary” means “unlawful” under
IHL does not appear to match the reason he gives for his position—i.e., that
IHL’s rules are necessity-based derogations from the more restrictive
peacetime rules.
b. Purported Survival of Elements of Military Necessity Through the
Process of IHL Norm-Creation
Melzer also observes:

371
372
373

Id. at 287.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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[C]ontrary to what powerful States and many authors appear to believe, the fact that IHL does not prohibit direct attacks against combatants does not give rise to a legal entitlement to kill combatants at
any time and any place so long as they are not hors de combat within
the meaning of Article 41(2) AP I [Additional Protocol I of 1977].
Strictly speaking, although the absence of such a prohibition is undisputedly intentional, it constitutes no more than a strong presumption that, in a situation of armed conflict, it will generally be militarily necessary to kill, injure, or capture combatants of the opposing
armed forces in order to bring about the submission of the adversary
with a minimum expenditure of time, life and physical resources. It
does not permit the senseless slaughter of combatants where there
manifestly is no military necessity to do so, for example where a
group of defenseless soldiers has not had the occasion to surrender,
but could clearly be captured without additional risk to the operating
374
forces.

Note Melzer’s reference to “no more than a strong assumption that . . . it
will generally be militarily necessary” to kill, injure, or capture eligible enemy
combatants with a maximum resource efficiency.375 On this assumption, the
mere fact that the law takes military necessity into consideration does not leave
the belligerent at liberty to do that which is in fact militarily unnecessary.
Where rules are formulated without an express military necessity exception, it
merely means that whatever these rules authorize is considered generally
militarily necessary. Where there is a collision between a conduct-instance
constituting a material military non-necessity and a conduct-instance being
lawful according to validly posited IHL rules, the former prevails over the
latter—effectively by “wronging” or “vitiating” it.376 Where material military
necessity does not exist or ceases to exist with respect to a particular conductinstance, the law, all things considered, does not authorize it.377 In other words,
the idea that a given conduct-instance’s lack of material military necessity
should be a reason for its restriction or prohibition has survived the process of
IHL norm-creation (the framers of IHL rules themselves having declined to act
on such an idea). It may be recalled here that this line of reasoning is identical
in structure if not in direction to that used in Kriegsräson.378 If one were to
reject Kriegsräson because it impermissibly involves the purported survival of

374
375
376
377
378

Id. at 288 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 289–90.
Id. at 297.
See infra Part IV.A.
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military necessity considerations through the process of IHL norm-creation,
one should reject counter-Kriegsräson precisely for the same reason.
One might take Melzer as arguing more specifically that belligerents are
bound by a standing duty—this being a duty of international humanitarian
law—to reduce the amount of evil being inflicted even on eligible enemy
combatants. Thus, whenever a choice is possible between incapacitating them
via two alternative means, one involving less evil than the other, the belligerent
is duty-bound to choose the less evil alternative. There are two difficulties with
this argument. First, arguably, this line of reasoning is no longer based on
military necessity per se; it would rather derive itself from humanity.379
Second, what is being advocated here is essentially the application of the
“double effect” rule to all aspects of military operations, including active
hostilities between opposing combatants who have not been placed hors de
combat. Problematically, double effect as articulated by Henry Sidgwick,380 or
revised as double intention by Walzer,381 operates only in respect of
minimizing collateral damage.382 Nowhere does Sidgwick suggest that double
effect entails a duty to capture rather than kill when the former is possible;
rather, his subsequent discussions focus on non-combatants and combatants
placed hors de combat.383 Similarly, Walzer’s concern is not with the amount
of evil inflicted on enemy combatants. He is exclusively concerned, at least as
far as the text shows, with the need to spare civilians.384 Indeed, in the words
of Françoise J. Hampson: “The question of ‘double effect’ is addressed in the
case of attacks against military objectives where there is a risk of considerable
379 See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 360, at 82 (“In sum, while operating forces can hardly be
required to take additional risks for themselves or the civilian population in order to capture an armed
adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or
her an opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.” (emphasis
added)); Melzer, The ICRC’s Clarification Process on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 362, at 162; see also Hayashi, supra note 145, at 766–78, for the
tentative possibility that humanitarian exhortations and demands may arguably survive the process of IHL
norm-creation and render contrary conduct-instances unlawful, all things considered, notwithstanding the
latter’s lawfulness otherwise left intact by those validly posited IHL rules applicable to them.
380 See, e.g., SIDGWICK, supra note 170, at 254 (“It is clear that the aim of a moral combatant must be to
disable his opponent, and force him to submission, but not to do him (1) any mischief which does not tend
materially to this end, nor (2) any mischief of which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison with
the amount of the mischief.”); Neuman, supra note 170, at 104–05.
381 WALZER, supra note 134, at 155–56.
382 The doctrine’s narrow focus has also attracted criticisms. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anscombe, War and
Murder, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 285, 294–96 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979); van
Baarda, supra note 157, at 32–35.
383 See SIDGWICK, supra note 170, at 254–57.
384 See WALZER, supra note 134, at 155–56.
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civilian casualties, by means of the principle of proportionality. The principle
does not appear to be applicable, at least in the current state of the law, to
military operations in an exclusively military environment.”385
On February 27, 1991, toward the conclusion of hostilities in the Gulf War,
a large number of retreating Iraqi forces along Highway 8 came under attack
by the Coalition forces.386 According to one account:
The run down the highway showed more clearly than any other episode the weaknesses of Iraqi field forces and the onesidedness of the
conflict. Through the afternoon and night of 27 February the tankers,
Bradley gunners, and helicopter crews and artillerymen of the 1st and
4th Battalions, 64th Armor, fired at hundreds of vehicles trying to redeploy to meet the new American attack from the west, or simply to
escape north across the Euphrates River valley and west on Highway
8. With no intelligence capability left to judge the size or location of
the oncoming American armored wedges and attack helicopter
swarms, as well as insufficient communications to coordinate a new
defense, Iraqi units stumbled into disaster. Unsuspecting drivers of
every type of vehicle, from tanks to artillery prime movers and even
commandeered civilian autos, raced randomly across the desert or
west on Highway 8 only to run into General McCaffrey’s firestorm.
Some drivers, seeing vehicles explode and burn, veered off the road
in vain attempt to escape. Others stopped, dismounted, and walked
toward the Americans with raised hands. When the division staff detected elements of the Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard
moving across the 24th’s front, McCaffrey concentrated the fire of
nine artillery battalions and an Apache battalion on the once elite enemy force. At dawn the next day, the twenty-eighth, hundreds of vehicles lay crumpled and smoking on Highway 8 and at scattered
387
points across the desert.

Let us say that McCaffrey’s conduct-instance was “applying overwhelming
military force by the Coalition” and his purpose-instance “disabling ablebodied, non-surrendering Iraqi combatants.” It would appear that the former
was lawful in view of the latter.388 Even if, arguendo, the deaths and injuries
385 See Françoise J. Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE GULF
WAR 1990–91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 89, 106 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993).
386 This incident is not to be confused with a similar incident involving a much larger number of Iraqis
which took place on February 26, 1991 on Highway 80 (also known as the “Highway of Death”).
387 THE WHIRLWIND WAR 194–95 (Frank N. Schubert & Theresa L. Kraus eds., 1995).
388 Note here that they were simply retreating, not offering to surrender. See, e.g., CRIMES OF WAR 2.0:
WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 165 (Roy Gutman et al. eds., rev. ed. 2007); ROGERS, supra note 3, at 31
(“There can be no question that the column was a legitimate target. It comprised enemy soldiers who had not
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suffered by the retreating Iraqi combatants rendered the conduct-instance a
material military non-necessity—say, by dint of its material excessiveness visà-vis the purpose-instance—would it follow that it was therefore unlawful
despite the standing attack liability to which combatants are exposed unless
placed hors de combat?389 Hampson, although apparently commenting on a
subsequent, more controversial “turkey shoot” incident in March 1991,
observed:
The military forces and equipment of the adversary are a legitimate target of attack until they surrender. There may have been a
misunderstanding if the [retreating] Iraqis thought they would not be
attacked, provided they did not attack the coalition forces, whereas
what was required was the abandonment of all their equipment. Allowing the coalition forces the benefit of the doubt on that score, it
would appear that the Iraqi forces could be attacked. The question
then becomes whether they were subjected to “unnecessary suffering
or superfluous injury.”
. . . If the devastation was wrought by general purpose bombs
or the strafing of the columns of vehicles and forces, this would appear to be lawful unless it represented “unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.”
The killings might seem both unnecessary and superfluous, but
the prohibition concerns suffering or injury, rather than unnecessary
or superfluous actions . . . .
This may suggest, particularly if military forces were unwilling
to carry on attacking an unresisting adversary, the need for a new
principle. It would be an extension of the existing rule. It would require that an attack should not proceed, even against a legitimate target and by means of a lawful weapon, where it is unnecessary or superfluous to the attainment of the war aim. The principal difficulty
with such a rule would be in distinguishing between an unresisting
enemy and one in tactical retreat. So long as the Iraqi government
surrendered. They represented a military threat to coalition operations . . . . As for the question of bad faith,
this is not established by examination of the facts. On 22 February 1991, President Bush presented Saddam
Houssein with an ultimatum, which expired the following day. It required the Iraqis to commence their
withdrawal from Kuwait before expiry of the ultimatum and complete it within one week. In return, the allied
undertook not to attack withdrawing troops so long as the withdrawal continued according to the ultimatum.
Iraq did not accept these terms, so the conditions of the ultimatum lapsed and the ground attack started on 24
February. Even after that the allies announced that the retreating Iraqis would be safe so long as they
abandoned their weapons and vehicles. Needless to say, those on the Basra road did not do so.”); see also
DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 102–03.
389 See Nobuo Hayashi, Continuous Attack Liability Without Right or Fact of Direct Participation in
Hostilities—The ICRC Interpretive Guidance and Perils of a Pseudo-Status, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ANTECEDENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT TIME 58–59 (Joanna NowakowskaMałusecka ed., 2010).
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took no steps to obtain a cease-fire, its fighting forces were a legitimate target, even if they no longer offered an immediate threat to the
390
coalition forces.

Besides, as noted earlier, the prohibition of superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering refers to evil.391 Even a similar principle—i.e., that “the
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited”392—does not change the situation. It does not because the basis for
the limitation in question need not be the lack of military necessity on the part
of the means or method of warfare concerned. Rather, it could be based on
humanity, chivalry, fairness, and/or justice,393 as well as a host of other
considerations.394 There is no reason for which the military non-necessity of a
given means and method of warfare should per se furnish a basis for the
limitedness of the belligerent’s right to choose it. Proponents of military
necessity as an additional layer of restriction have yet to (1) demonstrate that
the “meta”-rule of the kind in question does actually exist de lege lata or (2)
advocate the valid establishment of such a rule de lege ferenda.395
One has yet to see a cogent basis for the view that military necessity is
inadmissible de novo vis-à-vis validly posited IHL rules as a justification or
excuse yet it is admissible de novo vis-à-vis such rules as an additional layer of
restraint. The difficulties arise from the fact that this view relies erroneously on
the purported existence of a notion that lacking military necessity means
unlawful and the purported survival of military necessity considerations
through the process of IHL norm-creation. As it stands, counter-Kriegsräson
remains unconvincing.396
390 Hampson, supra note 385, at 107 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 195, at 5-3 (military necessity does not prohibit the “application of overwhelming
force against enemy combatants, units and material consistent with the principles of distinction and
proportionality”).
391 In other words, injury that is superfluous and suffering that is unnecessary.
392 Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 35(1); see also 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 196, art.
22; Gehring, supra note 296, at 57–58.
393 See, e.g., Oxford Manual, supra note 1, at 37–38.
394 See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 3, at 281 (listing interests that are “cultural, religious, political,
environmental, or economic” in character).
395 See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 385, at 107.
396 See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct
Participation in Hostilities, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 180, 192 (2010) (“Therefore, no further and more specific
restraints exist with regard to who is subject to lethal force.”); Schmitt, supra note 2, at 835 (“[M]ilitary
necessity infuses IHL; it is not a prohibition which applies over and above the extant rules.”); Schmitt, supra
note 63, at 41 (“No state practice exists to support the assertion that the principle of military necessity applies
as a separate restriction that constitutes an additional hurdle over which an attacker must pass before mounting
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2. Possibilities of a Validly Posited “Capture Rather Than Kill” Rule?
It would of course be a different matter altogether if the question were how
military necessity should be understood strictly as a means of interpreting
validly posited IHL rules. Melzer asserts that “within the parameters set by the
more specific provisions of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities,
considerations of military necessity and humanity should serve as guiding
principles in determining the kind and degree of force which is permissible
against legitimate military targets.”397 Nor should the foregoing discussion be
taken to preclude all logical or future possibilities whereby “capture rather than
kill” may come to be seen as an operative restraint on combat behavior.
Indeed, there are at least four distinct possibilities. One concerns what
Melzer calls “the more restrictive rules applicable in peace time.”398 If it were
agreed that these rules do validly impose such a restraint whatever validly
posited IHL rules say about the conduct in question,399 then “capture rather
than kill” might indeed come to bind belligerents. The interplay between
international humanitarian law and international human rights law in times of
armed conflict, a debate with a long history which has become lively again
these days,400 may be relevant in this regard. Similarly, some general principles
of public international law may impose restrictions on belligerent conduct
independently of international humanitarian law.401 One problem remains: It
does not follow from this possibility that the duty in question would be a duty
of international humanitarian law.

an attack.”); id. at 42 (“The crucial issue is not whether the individual in question can feasibly be captured but
instead whether he or she has clearly expressed his or her intention to surrender. The claim that an individual
who has not surrendered must, when feasible, be captured (or at least not attacked) is purely an invention of
the [ICRC’s] Interpretive Guidance [on direct participation in hostilities].”).
397 Melzer, supra note 357, at 904 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id. at 907–08 (“It appears
justified . . . to regard considerations of military necessity and of humanity, which are generally recognized as
underlying and informing the entire normative framework of IHL, as guiding principles for the interpretation
of the rights and duties of belligerents within the parameters set by the more specific provisions of IHL
governing the conduct of hostilities.” (emphasis added)).
398 MELZER, supra note 3, at 287.
399 Whether it is or should be so agreed is an entirely different question.
400 See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International
Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 881 (2006); Doswald-Beck & Vité,
supra note 272; Françoise Hampson, Human Rights Law and International Law: Two Coins or Two Sides of
the Same Coin?, in 91 BULL. HUM. RTS. 46 (1992); Melzer, Targeted Killings in Operational Law Perspective,
supra note 362, at 298–99.
401 See, e.g., Melzer, Targeted Killings in Operational Law Perspective, supra note 362, at 299.
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A second possibility is where it is shown that the peacetime restraint enters
the corpus juris of positive international humanitarian law through connecting
clauses such as the Martens Clause.402 A third possibility exists if or when the
process of IHL norm-creation—whether the process is customary or
conventional—validly posits a new IHL rule imposing a “capture rather than
kill” duty on belligerents. Fourth, it may be asked whether some elements of
humanitarian considerations survive the process of IHL norm-creation and
operate as additional, free-floating determinants of a given conduct-instance’s
lawfulness over and above validly posited IHL rules.403
V. VARIABILITY OF MILITARY NECESSITY
Material military necessity is a relational, situation-dependent, and
evaluative idea. It describes the process through which one assesses whether a
particular course of action was, or would be, necessary or unnecessary vis-àvis a given military purpose under the prevailing circumstances.404 It is
therefore arguable that the idea of material military necessity does not vary as
such. What can, and does, vary, however, is the specific conclusion one may
reach on the material military necessity or non-necessity of a given conductinstance and the reasons he or she may give therefor.
As noted above, even among those assessors of comparable competence
and experience observing the same event more or less simultaneously, opinions
varied as to whether destroying the Monte Cassino abbey constituted a material
military necessity.405 Hindsight is also an element in the variability of specific
material military necessity assessments. The evolution of military doctrine in
response to actual battlefield experiences, such as that concerning barrage
discussed earlier,406 is a typical example. Similarly, as Agincourt indicates,407
military history can bring new insights to the perceived appositeness of those
strategies and tactics employed in the past, which may otherwise come across
as materially impertinent.
402 See, e.g., YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
657–60, 666 (2009).
403 See Hayashi, supra note 145, at 766–78 (providing a tentative suggestion that such a possibility might
indeed exist).
404 See Hayashi, supra note 6, at 41–42.
405 See supra Part III.A.1.
406 See supra Part III.A.3.b. As the technique becomes more refined, the particular manner in which
artillery fire was concentrated during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle would come to be seen as excessive.
407 See supra Part III.A.3.c.
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It may be said that normative military necessity’s reason-giving function
itself remains unvaried. Nevertheless, the very stipulation that a particular
conduct-kind is deemed constitutive of or lacking in material military necessity
is variable.408 So is, by extension, the specific reason-giving weight given to
this or that conduct-kind’s permissibility once its material military necessity
has been stipulated.409
To begin with, the legitimate purpose-kinds vis-à-vis which conduct-kinds
are to be deemed militarily necessary or unnecessary have themselves proved
variable. The contentious debate as to whether launching an attack (i.e.
conduct-kind) should be limited to destroying, capturing, or neutralizing a
military objective (i.e. purpose-kind) as defined in Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I, or as defined inter alia by its effective contribution to the
adversary’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability, is a case in point.410 As
for conduct-kinds, technological advances and tactical evolutions have
rendered using numerous types of weapons of diminishing effectiveness and
utility.411 The kinds of circumstances in which the material military necessity
or non-necessity of a conduct-kind is to be stipulated have also varied. Thus,
for a long time, military operations were limited to land and sea. The
emergence of the airspace as an increasingly important arena in the earlytwentieth century412 was only matched by the rise of the outer space in the
post-World War II era413 and cyberspace in the twenty-first century.414
408

In other words, a given conduct-kind X-ing considered to constitute a material military necessity at a
given moment Tn may no longer be so considered at a subsequent moment Tn+1. Thus, von Clausewitz
observed: “If, then civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is
because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more effective ways of
using force than the crude expression of instinct.” VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 38, at 76.
409 This also implies variability in the stipulation of evil and non-evil conduct-kinds as well as the weight
of their prohibitive reason-giving value. For example, recruiting children and using them in combat has
arguably come to be seen as a conduct-kind that is distinctively evil, i.e., as opposed to the evil deemed to be
entailed by recruiting persons and using them in combat generally. Similarly, destroying cultural property may
entail evil that is distinct from that present in destroying objects.
410 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 145, at 95–96; ROGERS, supra note 3, at 80–
81; Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131, 148–49 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007).
411 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 331, at 43 (siege weapons, since siege had become less frequent); id.at 35
(anti-armor weapons, since knightly heavy metal armor had gone out of fashion); id.at 38 (the “dum-dum”
bullet, though its ban was resisted for a while by some states insisting on its lawful use against “savages”);
id.at 64 (certain incendiary weapons, since they had become less relevant in mechanized warfare).
412 See, e.g., Richard Overy, Air Warfare, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF MODERN WAR 262, 262–63
(Charles Townshend ed., 2005).
413 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack: The Normative Software, 4 Y.B. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. 53, 59 (2001).
414 See, e.g., id.
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Juridical military necessity varies, albeit not so much in its essence as in its
specific manifestations and requirements. It does so not only in the existence or
otherwise of exceptional military necessity clauses and/or their scope. It also
varies in the manner in which the specific requirements are understood and
interpreted where exceptional military necessity clauses are indeed available.
Thus, in the nineteenth century, it was, according to the Lieber Code,
exceptionally permitted to deny quarter in unusual conditions of combat on
account of military necessity.415 Be that as it may, today’s international
humanitarian law clearly contains no such exception vis-à-vis the prohibition
against denying quarter.416 The same may be said mutatis mutandis of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Article 53 of Geneva
Convention IV prohibits the belligerent from destroying real or personal
property in the territory it occupies “except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations.”417 The types of military
operations envisaged in this exceptional clause are commonly understood to
include the so-called “scorched earth” policy by an occupying force in
retreat.418 By virtue of Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I, however, such a
force is no longer eligible for this exception in respect to objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population.419 Conversely, in 1949, Article 49 of
Geneva Convention IV420 arguably added a military necessity clause excepting
temporary evacuation of residents from occupied territories to the hitherto
unqualified prohibition against their deportation upheld in von Manstein.421
Variability also permeates the types of indicators considered satisfactory for
certain of the requirements of juridical military necessity. As regards the
requisite knowledge, for example, improvements in the quantity and quality of
intelligence gathered and analyzed may well heighten the standard of
contemporaneous and bona fide knowledge expected of the person invoking
military necessity pleas. Lastly, states bound by Article 6 of Hague Cultural
Property Protocol II422 effectively undertake to re-interpret and arguably

415 See Lieber Code, supra note 296, art. 60, at 11 (“[A] commander is permitted to direct his troops to
give no quarter, in great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with
prisoners.”); see also 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 235, at 169–70.
416 See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 40; Additional Protocol II, supra note 176, art. 4(1).
417 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 176, art. 53.
418 See IV COMMENTARY, supra note 267, at 302.
419 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 72, art. 54(2).
420 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 176, art. 49.
421 See von Manstein, supra note 3, at 523; see also Hayashi, supra note 6, at 92–93.
422 See Hague Cultural Property Protocol II, supra note 318, art. 6.
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tighten the scope of the military necessity exception available under Article
4(2) of the Hague Cultural Property Convention.423
CONCLUSION
The foregoing demonstrates the multifaceted character of military necessity
as a notion used in international humanitarian law. Despite its deceptively
simple and straightforward appearance—after all, how difficult can it be for
one to tell when something is militarily necessary or unnecessary?—the
concept requires a careful, contextualized discussion.
Materially, military necessity merely separates vocational competence from
vocational incompetence. Material military necessity indicates that it is in
one’s strategic self-interest to perform military necessities and forbear military
non-necessities. In IHL norm-creation, the stipulated material military
necessity of a given conduct-kind does not conclusively establish its
legitimacy; nor does its stipulated lack of material military necessity alone
connote its illegitimacy. Normative military necessity does matter, albeit not
conclusively, for the legitimacy or otherwise of evil conduct-kinds.
Nevertheless, normative military necessity does not turn the material military
non-necessity of an evil conduct-kind into the basis for its illegitimacy. Rather,
it would simply show that unnecessary evil is unmitigated evil. Nor does
normative military necessity modify the legitimacy of conduct-kinds that are
not evil in the first place. In the strictly juridical context of validly posited IHL
rules, military necessity operates exclusively as an exception from their
qualified principal prescriptions. Juridical military non-necessity reverts
conduct-instances to being regulated by the principal rule. Because it is strictly
an exception, military necessity does not justify or excuse deviant conduct
from the unqualified prescriptions of validly posited IHL rules.
Kriegsräson has been correctly rejected. The stipulated material military
necessity of a conduct-kind may be a weighty reason for the framers of IHL
rules to consider authorizing it. If a validly posited IHL rule unqualifiedly
prohibits the conduct-kind, however, this means that the rule’s framers have
accounted for the said reason and set it aside. In other words, this particular
reason-giving element of military necessity has not survived the process of

423

57.

See Hague Cultural Property Convention, supra note 275, art. 4(2); O’KEEFE, supra note 299, at 252–
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IHL norm-creation and is therefore inadmissible de novo vis-à-vis unqualified
IHL rules.
Counter-Kriegsräson should be rejected because there is no indication that
militarily unnecessary simpliciter means illegitimate per se. Furthermore, as far
as unqualified IHL rules are concerned, the fact that they have been validly
posited implies that their framers have already reflected upon normative
considerations of military necessity and declined to let them survive. It follows
that military necessity does not operate as an additional layer of restraint over
and above unqualified rules of positive international humanitarian law.

